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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the topic of open market share repurchases in Europe over 
the period 1997 to 2006. This thesis strives to document and clarify the managerial 
motives as well as the market perception and respective reaction to open market share 
repurchases, in a cross country framework. Therefore this thesis delves into the 
hypotheses that have been developed in the literature for interpreting these issues. The 
theories and hypotheses investigated in this thesis are mainly the information 
asymmetry and signalling for undervaluation, the tax hypothesis, the dividend 
substitution, the capital structure adjustment, and agency costs hypotheses under 
varying regulatory and institutional frameworks. 
Consistent with the U.S. evidence, share repurchases are popular in the U.K., 
but I find that the market does not have the same level of reaction as in the U.S. For 
Germany and France, share repurchase activity has been a more recent phenomenon, 
but not common. Nevertheless due to recent regulatory changes, this trend seems to be 
changing in favour of share repurchases.  
The empirical evidence in this thesis shows that market reaction to the 
announcement of intention to repurchase shares in the open market varies 
significantly among countries, and that the market becomes more accustomed to 
subsequent announcements made by the same firms. Furthermore, I find that 
ownership concentration, firm size, leverage, and in some cases past share price 
performance, have a significant impact on the market reaction, as well as on the 
managerial motives for announcing an open market share repurchase programme. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that not all the managerial motives and drivers of the 
market reaction have a uniform impact throughout the varying markets. Rather, it is 
only a number of firm characteristics that consistently influence the likelihood of an 
open market share repurchase in all three countries. Furthermore, I find that firms on 
average repurchase approximately three quarters of the shares targeted at the time of 
the announcement, suggesting that on average, firms repurchase a substantial portion 
but not the intended amount. In addition, I find that managers repurchase shares in 
order to provide price support. Finally, this thesis provides evidence that it is the 
actual trades and their respective reporting, and not the repurchase announcement 
itself that convey risk related information to the market. Therefore, the reporting of 
the actual repurchase trades sends positive signals to the market, which are reflected 
on the reduction of firms’ systematic risk.  
xvi 
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Chapter 1.  
1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the open market share repurchases as a payout method, 
which has gained an increasing popularity over the recent years. In addition, I 
discuss the theoretical framework and the respective controversies that provide the 
motivation for this thesis. Finally, the main empirical findings that are derived from 
this thesis and its contribution to the body of the existing literature are discussed. 
  
2 
1.1. Introductory Notes 
In recent years, share repurchases have been gaining an increasing popularity as 
a payout method for many corporations. For instance, Dittmar (2008) reports that the 
use of share repurchases as a payout method in the U.S., shows a fluctuating, but 
nevertheless, upward trend, with a significant surge starting from 2004. Moreover, the 
author reports that the annual aggregate volume of share repurchases surpassed the 
respective volume of dividends on 2005, and that the margin of share repurchases 
over cash dividends has widened significantly in 2006. This surge in share repurchase 
activity is supported by DeAngelo et al. (2008), where they show that both gross and 
net share repurchases surpassed the level of cash dividends after the turn of the 
millennium. Furthermore, Skinner (2008) shows that net repurchases in the U.S. have 
exceeded the dividends paid in 1999, 2000, 2004, and 2005. In addition, he reports 
that the level of aggregate repurchases has grown twice as much in 2004 compared to 
1998 to $233bn, which was significantly larger compared to the growth of dividends. 
Furthermore, Grullon and Michaely (2004) report in the U.S. that corporations 
spent approximately 23% of their total annual earnings on share repurchases during 
1984 to 2000. Moreover, in 1999 and 2000 they report that the amount spent on share 
repurchases, for the first time in history, exceeded the amount that corporations spent 
on dividends. Additionally, Jagannathan et al. (2000), report that the number of 
repurchase announcements for the period 1985 to 1996 made by U.S. firms has 
increased by 650%, from 115 to 755, while the respective value of the announcements 
increased by 750% from $15.4mn to $113bn. While over the same period, cash 
dividends, although larger than repurchases, have only doubled from $67.6bn to 
$141.7bn.  
On the other hand, in Continental Europe, share repurchases have not been as 
common as in the U.S., mainly due to institutional and cultural differences. For 
instance in France, it was not until recently that the legal system was reformed, thus 
allowing corporations to repurchase their own shares. Under the July 2nd 1998 law, the 
open market share repurchases can be authorized by a firm’s shareholders for up to 
the limit of 10% of the firm’s capital and can extend for a maximum period of 18 
months. For each 24-month period, shares representing 10% of a firm’s capital can be 
cancelled or be kept as Treasury stock, which is subject to shareholder authorisation. 
In the U.K., even though share repurchases were legal since 1981, they started to 
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become popular in recent years, due to the ambiguity of the tax treatment, and to the 
negative potential signalling of a shortage of profitable investments. 
An increasing number of corporations in Europe have recently announced their 
intention to repurchase their shares. For instance, Lasfer (2005) reports that the 
repurchase announcements made by European corporations in 1997 amounted to 
$47.2bn as opposed to $14.2bn in 1996. It should be noted that the majority of the 
share repurchase announcements were made by British corporations, where they 
amounted to approximately 80% of the total repurchases (Lasfer, 2005). In addition, 
Oswald and Young (2004) report 268 open market share repurchase announcements 
from January 1995 to December 2000. This is also supported by Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002), where they report that from January 1980 to June 1998, only 489 share 
repurchase announcements were made by European companies and 60% of these 
announcements were made by companies listed in the United Kingdom. This is 
mainly due to regulatory restrictions, which made share repurchases a forbidding 
payout mechanism for many Continental Europe countries. For instance, in Germany, 
prior to the legislation passed on May 1st 1998, share repurchases were treated as 
illegal, since they were perceived to be a prohibited repayment of capital. But this 
new legislation, which is based on the European Second Law Directive, opened the 
way for companies in Germany to repurchase their stock. In France, companies were 
allowed in 1998 to repurchase their stock and cancel them or keep them as Treasury 
stock. This trend favouring share repurchases increases with the new legislations 
coming into effect.  
After the amendment of regulations that were already in place, corporations 
operating in countries such as France and the United Kingdom were able to engage in 
practices, such as repurchasing their own shares. Keswani et al. (2007), report a 
dramatic rise in the open market share repurchase activity in the U.K. (196 firms 
announced their intention to repurchase their shares), for the period April 1999 to 
December 2002, due to the abolition of advance corporation tax on April 5th, 1999. 
This is because the abolishment of ACT lifted the tax burden on both dividends and 
share repurchases, which made these two forms of payout attractive. This is also 
supported by Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), where they report for a three year period 
(January 2000 to December 2002), 371 repurchasing firms in France, relative to the 
51 repurchase announcements made in the period 1985 to 1998 (Lasfer, 2005), which 
is before the change in legislation took place. In addition, Ginglinger and Hamon 
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(2007) report that approximately 40% of French firms repurchased their shares during 
the sample period, which highlights the significance of the effect that different 
regulatory frameworks can have on share repurchases. 
The purpose of this thesis is to shed ample light on the relatively unexplored 
area of open market share repurchases. For achieving this goal, I identify a diversified 
sample of firm announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market 
that took place in the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The data are hand-
collected, for the period 1997 to 2006. Hence, this heterogeneous, from an 
institutional, cultural and regulatory point of view, sample of open market share 
repurchases, allows me to analyse the existing theories related to share repurchases 
and identify what are the managerial motives for announcing an open market share 
repurchase programme; what is the market reaction to such announcements; what are 
the determinants of the markets’ reaction to open market share repurchase 
announcements; if firms truly repurchase the amount of shares targeted at the time of 
the announcement; and finally, if there are any risk changes throughout the entire 
process of open market share repurchases, i.e. from the time prior to the 
announcement, to the actual implementation, completion, and the period after the end 
of the repurchase programme.  
1.2. Theoretical Framework and Motivation 
Share repurchases can take place in the following four forms: (1) the open 
market, where shares are repurchased through a broker at the current market price and 
usually in a long time horizon, (2) fixed-price tender offer, where a firm offers its 
shareholders to buy back a specific number of shares at a given price before a given 
expiration date, (3) Dutch auction, where a price is not specified in advance, rather the 
firm sets a range of prices within which it is willing to repurchase its shares, or (4) 
Privately negotiated repurchases which is done via direct negotiation with a major 
shareholder.  
From the corporation’s perspective, the benefit of a fixed-price tender offer and 
a Dutch auction is that the firm can retire a large block of shares in a relatively short 
period (usually a month), which can also be an efficient acquisition defence 
mechanism. Moreover, firms that undertake fixed-price and Dutch auction share 
repurchases, offer a large “premium” to the tendering shareholders, compared to the 
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firm’s share price prior to the share repurchase. For instance, Masulis (1980) and 
Comment and Jarrell (1991), report an excess return of 16% for fixed-price tender 
offers, whereas for Dutch auctions Louis and White (2007) and Grullon and Michaely 
report an excess return of 12.5%. Furthermore, privately negotiated transactions can 
take place at a premium, at the market price or at a discount (Grullon and Ikenberry, 
2000). These repurchases are taking place mainly to provide liquidity to investors that 
want to exit rapidly or when a firm wants to repurchase shares from a potential hostile 
bidder. Nevertheless, the open market share repurchases are by far the most popular 
method of repurchasing shares due to their flexibility in both the price to be paid and 
the timing of acquiring the targeted shares (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Grullon and 
Ikenberry, 2000). Even though open market share repurchases are the most 
economical way of repurchasing stock, quite often they are subject to volume and 
price restrictions.  
When companies announce their intention to repurchase their shares, stock 
prices tend to increase. A number of studies, the majority of which is investigating the 
U.S. market, have tried to provide an explanation for this phenomenon and document 
the reasons and motives for undertaking a share repurchase. The most widely accepted 
explanations are the benefits from improved capital structure, signalling of 
undervaluation and/or improvement of future cash flows, the reduction of agency 
costs, the capital gains tax benefits, and flexibility that share repurchases can offer 
(Ikenberry et al., 1995; Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000; Jensen, 1986; Barclay and Smith, 1988; Grullon and Michaely, 2002).  
According to the signalling hypothesis, a good firm can separate itself from a 
bad firm by giving a costly signal to the capital markets, since the bad firm will not be 
able to mimic this signal because it would be costly. Specifically, the signalling of 
undervaluation hypothesis suggests that since managers are better informed, and have 
a better understanding of the firm, they can identify if the current share price reflects 
the true value of their firm. Therefore, in order to signal the mispricing of their firm, 
managers announce a share repurchase programme in order to alert the market that 
their firm is trading at a low price. 
Vermaelen (1981) argues that tender offers are costly signals, due to the 
premium that a corporation pays to its shareholders for their tendered shares. The 
author reports an average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of approximately 16% 
on the day of the announcement for the case of tender offers, which reaches 17% for 
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the days following the announcement. In addition, Louis and White (2006) report an 
average abnormal return for fixed-price tender offers of 16.6% over the event window 
[-3, +3] of the announcement and 10.9% for Dutch auctions but not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, Masulis (1980) investigates the impact of fixed price tender 
offers in the U.S. and finds that the market reaction for the announcement window [0, 
+1] is approximately 16%.  
The motive for signalling is particularly important in the case of fixed price 
tender offers, where management offers shareholders a tendering price at 
approximately 16% above the current share price for their shares (Comment and Jarell 
1991). These results are also aligned with Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) who report a 
statistically significant abnormal return for the two days surrounding the 
announcement date [-1, +1], of 7.68% for the case of tender offers and 7.60% for the 
case of Dutch auctions. 
According to Louis and White (2006), fixed-price tender offers are more likely 
to be used as a signal of positive information than Dutch auctions. By contrast, in 
Dutch auctions where management is basically retrieving information from the 
market, thus revealing less information about their own views, the premium paid is 
approximately 12.5%.This leads to the conclusion that the signalling through Dutch 
auctions is weaker. Nevertheless, Dutch auctions seem to be preferred by companies 
who want to repurchase large portions of their stock, in a short period of time and pay 
a smaller premium. Hence, these empirical studies reinforce the argument that tender 
offer and Dutch auction repurchases are considered by the market to be more credible 
signals, due to the incurred cost that accompanies them. In this case, the incurred cost 
is the premium that the firm pays to its shareholders in order to motivate them to 
tender their shares in such a relatively short period of time.  
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) report that the market reaction to the 
announcements of open market repurchases is approximately 3.5%, whereas the 
reaction to fixed-price tender offer repurchase announcements is about 15%. This 
substantial difference on the positive reaction towards the fixed-price repurchase 
reflects the degree of credibility as a signal, since fixed-price repurchases are 
commitments for a corporation and are costly to undertake. Nevertheless, this 
credibility does not come cheap for the corporation, since it has to pay a premium to 
its shareholders in order to make them tender the targeted amount of stocks. Therefore 
the market translates such an announcement as a signal of the management’s belief 
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that the firm’s stock is undervalued. Moreover, if the open market repurchases were 
indeed costly for a corporation to announce them, then it would be a more convincing 
sign, thus enabling the market to have an even more positive reaction to such an 
announcement. Furthermore, concerning the market’s underreaction to an open 
market repurchase announcement, it can be argued that the market is sceptical about 
the management’s claims and underlying signals (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
In an early research study, Stewart (1976) examines the stock market 
performance between repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms, and finds evidence 
that repurchasing firms outperform non-repurchasing firms but only after several 
years following the repurchases. It should be noted though, that there is a number of 
drawbacks in Stewart (1976). Firstly, the author does not differentiate between the 
types of share repurchasing. Secondly, the research paper focuses only on the 
performance following the actual repurchases and not the announcement. And finally 
the author does not adjust the realised returns for risk. 
In a more recent research study Ikenberry et al. (1995) investigate a large sample 
of open market share repurchases in the U.S. and report that repurchasing firms show 
positive and significant compounded excess returns of approximately 12% in the four 
year period following the announcement. Hence, suggesting that the market fails to 
grasp and utilise the information in stock prices promptly. Moreover, the reported 
findings suggest that the undervaluation theory is more applicable to value-stocks 
(securities that have high book-to-market ratios) where the cumulative abnormal 
returns for value stocks over the four year period amount to approximately 45%, 
whereas for growth stocks, they amount to approximately -4%. 
These results are in line with McNally and Smith (2007) who investigate the 
effects of the open market share repurchases in Canada and report a median abnormal 
return of 3.31%. Nevertheless, Ikenberry et al. (2000), investigate the effect of open 
market repurchases in Canada and report a modest average abnormal return of only 
0.93% for the days surrounding the announcement, during the month the repurchase 
programme was announced. These results are fairly lower compared to those reported 
in the U.S. studies of approximately 3.5%. Moreover, in Ikenberry et al. (2000), the 
abnormal performance of repurchasing firms in Canada, is approximately 9% per year 
for value stocks, while for growth stocks it is roughly half of this amount, for a three 
year holding period. This difference between value and growth stocks appears to 
follow the same pattern as the one reported in Ikenberry et al. (1995), where they 
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investigate the open market repurchasing effects in the U.S. market. A potential 
explanation for this moderate reaction around the repurchase announcement on the 
Canadian market is that the market seems to underestimate the information contained 
in share repurchase announcements (Ikenberry et al., 2000).  
So far, the average announcement price effect of an open market share 
repurchase is approximately 3.5%, as reported in a number of U.S. studies. But this 
does not seem to be the case for open market share repurchases in the European 
markets. In the trifling literature investigating share repurchases in Europe, Lasfer 
(2005) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) report an excess return during the three day 
window [-1, +1] surrounding the open market share repurchase announcement, of 
approximately 1.64% and 1.08% in the U.K respectively, and both for the time period 
1985 to 1998. Similarly, Oswald and Young (2004) report a market reaction on the 
announcement of an open market share repurchase in the U.K. of 1.24% during 1995 
to 2005. Furthermore, Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) report an average excess return of 
0.57% over the time window [0, +1] in France. 
Previous studies also document a positive relationship between the amount of 
shares targeted at the time of the open market share repurchase announcement, and 
the market reaction at the time of the announcement (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002). In addition, Ikenberry et al. (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1991) 
and Vermaelen (1981) report a similar in magnitude negative abnormal return of 
approximately 3%, during the month prior to the announcement of intention to 
repurchase. This suggests, that signalling of undervaluation can be a strong motive for 
announcing a share repurchase. Therefore, this finding, in combination with the fact 
that the larger the proportion of shares to be repurchased, the larger the market 
reaction, suggests that managers use share repurchases in order to signal to the market 
their belief that their firm’s current share price is undervalued, and therefore a 
bargain.  
Nevertheless, there is a drawback with this argument. The announcement of an 
open market share repurchase does not constitute a costly signal, since the 
repurchased shares are bought at the current market price and not at a premium. 
Moreover, the announcement of a share repurchase programme is not a commitment 
to the firm. Thus, when companies announce a repurchase programme they do not 
always undertake them or complete them in full. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find 
that firms announcing an open market share repurchase in the U.S., repurchase either 
9 
a substantial fraction of the announced shares or almost none at all. In addition, they 
find that approximately 74% to 82% of the targeted shares are repurchased on a later 
time after the announcement, and that it takes approximately three years for almost 
half of the firms of their sample (57% of the sample) to repurchase the targeted 
number of shares.  
This illustrates the flexibility that open market share repurchases offer to 
management, but also the market’s uncertainty whether this programme will be 
undertaken and in which time horizon. Therefore, this can lead to the argument that 
even a bad firm can mimic a good firm by announcing a repurchase programme 
without intending to undertake such a programme, since there is no commitment for 
the firm to do so. Consequently, it can be argued that signalling of undervaluation to 
the market via an open market share repurchase announcement cannot be a credible 
signal. On the other hand though, buying back overvalued shares is costly, because 
the price is likely to drop at some point. In addition, a good firm can separate itself 
from a bad firm by sending a costless signal to the market, thus attracting the market’s 
scrutiny. In contrast, a bad firm will not mimic this action since it will not want to be 
discovered by the market (Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 2003).  
According to the traditional finance theory, because debt payments are excluded 
from income and subsequently from the taxes paid by the firm, then the value of the 
firm should increase with the substitution of debt for equity. Nevertheless, when debt 
increases, then the risk of the firm also increases (due to the increased probability of 
incurring direct and/or indirect bankruptcy costs), which increases the costs associated 
with debt. Therefore, there is a trade off between the tax benefits of debt and the costs 
and risks associated with higher debt (Ross, 1977). Moreover, Ross (1977) argues that 
because higher debt is associated with higher risk, then it should be perceived by the 
market as credible signal of a more productive firm. In addition to this argument, as 
share repurchases absorb equity and therefore increase the firm’s leverage ratio, the 
firm may use a share repurchase to achieve its target debt ratio (Bagwell and Shoven, 
1988; Hovakimian et al., 2001). Consequently, when a firm finances a share 
repurchase programme by raising debt, then share repurchases can be considered as 
being more credible signals.  
However, when a firm repurchases its shares it has the option to keep the 
repurchased shares as Treasury stock. This gives management the ability of better 
managing the balance between debt and equity, providing more flexibility in fund 
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raising by reissuing stocks when necessary, better managing employee stock options 
(share schemes), disposing the shares when necessary, permitting the investment in a 
company’s own shares, as well as being used as a hostile takeover deterrent. But 
keeping Treasury stock can be a cause of concern for the market, due to the possible 
market interference by the firm who repurchases and resells its own stock, and the 
potential danger for share price manipulation1. Therefore, when share repurchases are 
used for increasing the firms’ Treasury stock, they may not be a strong signal to the 
market. 
In sum, firms that wish to signal their undervaluation are more likely to 
undertake a fixed-price share repurchase, since it is a commitment to the firm and it is 
associated with a premium cost that needs to be payable to the existing shareholders, 
thus making them more credible signals to the market. Nevertheless, fixed price 
repurchases are not considered to be a common practice. The most preferred method 
for repurchasing stock is the open market share repurchase. This is mainly due to the 
flexibility in the time frame that firms are required to undertake such a programme, 
the price they need to pay, and the lack of commitment for completing or even 
initiating the announced share repurchase programme (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
As discussed earlier, managers can have superior information about their firm 
and its true value. On the other hand though, professional and institutional investors 
can also have as much or even superior information than managers. Moreover, it is 
not clear if managers have the ability to identify and exploit opportunities of 
executing the actual share repurchases in a timely manner.  
Previous studies could not investigate managers’ timing ability on executing the 
actual repurchase trades due to difficulties in measuring the amount of the actually 
repurchased shares, as U.S. corporations are only required to disclose the number of 
their shares outstanding at the end of each quarter. In an attempt to overcome this 
obstacle, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) use the quarterly changes of a firm’s 
common shares outstanding as an approximation for measuring the actually 
repurchased shares. Cook et al. (2004) use voluntarily disclosed data and find that 
firms repurchase their shares following drops in the share price. Ikenberry et al. 
(2000) investigate the actually repurchased shares in Canada, where firms are required 
to disclose the number of the actually repurchased shares on a monthly basis. The 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that share repurchases do not dilute the per share value of the firm (Fenn and 
Liang, 2001; Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007). 
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authors find evidence that the changes in price have a significant impact on the firms’ 
repurchase activity. This suggests that managers have timing ability and trade 
strategically. In contrast, Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) find no evidence of firms’ 
timing ability of buying their shares when they are undervalued since they find no 
evidence of undervaluation, captured by the market-to-book ratio and share price 
performance, as having an impact on actual share repurchases. Rather, they find that 
share repurchases are responses to cyclical business waves and excess cash holdings. 
However, the aforementioned studies use quarterly data (Stephens and 
Weisbach, 1998) or monthly data (Ikenberry et al., 2000; Dittmar and Dittmar, 2008) 
or employ voluntarily disclosed data (Cook et al., 2004). Furthermore, Oswald and 
Young (2004) investigate the U.K. market, and find that when share prices fall, 
managers tend to repurchase more shares. However, they investigate the impact that 
the undervaluation hypothesis has on the actual share repurchase trades, and not on 
the timing of execution of the share repurchase trades. Hence, it cannot be clear 
whether managers repurchase shares due to market timing or price support. 
Consequently, from the aforementioned studies, it is difficult to acquire a precise 
understanding of the number of shares actually repurchased and the timing of 
execution of the actual repurchase trades.  
In order to overcome this limitation, Zhang (2005) and Ginglinger and Hamon 
(2006) investigate the share price performance during the actual share repurchases in 
Hong Kong and France respectively. Zhang (2005) finds evidence that managers are 
repurchasing shares after the share price declines. In addition, the author finds that the 
share price shows a positive and significant performance for the twenty days 
following the actual share repurchase trades, suggesting that managers time the 
market and trade opportunistically. In contrast, Ginglinger and Hamon (2006) find 
that managers repurchase shares during periods subsequent to falling prices, but find 
no evidence of the share price improving afterwards. This suggests that managers 
repurchase shares in order to provide price support. These findings lead to the 
formulation of the market timing and price support hypotheses. According to the 
market timing hypothesis a firm’s share price should be lower on repurchase days 
compared to subsequent non-repurchase days, whereas the price support hypothesis 
predicts that a firm’s share price should be lower on repurchase days than on prior 
non-repurchase days. 
12 
The agency costs hypothesis, which is one of the prominent explanations why 
firms are making a payout to shareholders, entails that it can be used as a self-
discipline mechanism imposed on managers. In a qualitative study, Easterbrook 
(1984) paved the way for the agency costs of free-cash-flows hypothesis, by arguing 
that dividends play a significant role in controlling equity agency problems. This 
could be achieved by facilitating primary capital market monitoring and imposing 
controls on a firm’s activities and overall performance. Furthermore, the author 
argued that by making higher payouts to shareholders, the likelihood to sell common 
stock in primary capital markets will increase. Thus, the management’s power will be 
reduced, by decreasing its resources under control and will make it more likely to be 
better monitored by the capital markets. However, Easterbrook (1984), in his theory 
does not take share repurchases into consideration as a payout method. This is due to 
the fact that share repurchases were not popular in the early 1980s. In line with 
Easterbrook’s (1984) theory, Jensen (1986) argues that payouts can be used as a 
mechanism of self-imposed discipline on managers. He suggests that equity holders 
can minimise the cash that management controls, thus reducing the opportunity for 
managers to undertake uncontrolled large spendings and/or invest in negative NPV 
projects that could hurt the existing shareholders. One way to prevent management to 
engage into such actions is to increase the payout to shareholders, thus reducing any 
excess cash. 
Contradicting this theory though, Brav et al. (2005) surveyed 384 financial 
executives, in order to determine the factors that drive dividends and share 
repurchases. They find that not a single manager agreed with the assertion that firms 
pay dividends so that they can attract a particular investor clientele that may monitor 
them. In the interview findings, most executives do not view payout policy as a means 
of self-imposing discipline. Furthermore, almost 87% of executives surveyed do not 
think that the discipline imposed by dividends is an important factor affecting 
dividend policy. Likewise, approximately 80% of executives believe that discipline 
imposed by share repurchases is not important. One drawback that might arise in Brav 
et al. (2005), also noted by the authors, is that managers might not admit even to 
themselves, that at times they may need someone to monitor, or impose discipline on 
their actions. Further, it is possible that managers respond to market pressures in order 
to distribute dividends. These market pressures reflect investors’ demands that the 
firm makes a payout in order to restrict free-cash-flow problems. Nevertheless their 
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results are consistent with the empirical results by Grinstein and Michaely (2005), 
who find that institutional investors prefer dividend paying firms than the non-
dividend-paying firms, but also find that institutions show no preference for 
corporations that pay a high level of dividends. Moreover, they find that institutions 
show a preference for firms that repurchase their shares. However, they find that firms 
that have a high level of repurchasing activity have a higher level of institutional 
investors. 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find evidence, which is consistent with Jensen’s 
(1986) free cash flow hypothesis. They find that repurchasing firms demonstrate a 
decrease in their current level of capital expenditures, as well as their research and 
development (R&D) expenses. Additionally, they report a decline of the firm’s cash 
reserves and more importantly, a stronger market reaction to the announcement of 
intention for share repurchases, for firms that are more likely to over-invest. In 
extension to that argument and aligned with the agency cost hypothesis, Fenn and 
Liang (2001) find that management stock options, and a more volatile operating 
income have a positive relationship with share repurchases, suggesting that share 
repurchases are employed in order to reduce potential agency costs. 
Furthermore, Grullon and Michaely (2004) suggest that repurchases may be 
linked with firms that pass from a high growth level to a lower growth level. Since 
firms have fewer opportunities to grow, their assets have an increasing role on 
determining the value of the firm, thus decreasing their systematic risk. As a 
consequence, the firm’s cost of capital declines. Thus, they argue that since the levels 
of reinvestment decline, there is an increase in free-cash-flows which increases the 
probability of over-investment by management, which in turn increases the likelihood 
of a payout to shareholders. Oswald and Young (2008) perform an empirical study in 
the U.K. and find that non-repurchasing firms that have similar characteristics to 
repurchasing firms are consistently overinvesting. Therefore, since a firm that does 
not repurchase its shares is more likely to overinvest, and because the market is 
already aware of that, it has a positive reaction towards share repurchases. This is also 
reflected on the repurchasing firms’ reduction of systematic risk. Consequently, share 
repurchases may be linked to a reduction in systematic risk and capital expenditures.  
Grullon and Michaely (2004) test the validity of the free-cash-flow hypothesis, 
along these dimensions, for a six year period around the repurchase announcement. 
They find that repurchasing firms experience a significant decline in systematic risk 
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and cost of capital, relative to their non-repurchasing peers2. Additionally, they find 
that firms which experience a larger decline in capital expenditures and R&D 
expenses are the ones who experience a larger decline in systematic risk.  
Berk et al., 1999 argue that the value of firms that are more likely to experience 
lower growth opportunities, is more likely to be determined by their current assets in 
place. This consequently leads to a reduction of systematic risk. In addition, the 
authors argue that good news is associated with a decline in systematic risk and bad 
news with an increase in systematic risk. What is more, Grullon et al. (2002) argue 
that the market is already aware about a firm’s decline in future growth and 
profitability. Therefore, the announcement of a share repurchase can attract more 
scrutiny on the decline of future growth and systematic risk. This argument is in line 
with the findings of Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2005), according to which 
managers are willing to increase payouts when they believe that their firm’s future 
cash flows and profitability are less risky.  
Further, Dann et al. (1991) and Hertzel and Jain (1991)  study the potential of 
firm risk changes, surrounding tender offer share repurchase announcements in the 
U.S. market and find evidence that firm risk is declining from the year before the 
announcement and keeps declining even after the announcement. Therefore, 
suggesting that tender-offer share repurchase announcements convey information to 
the market, that is related to the firms’ risk status. In contrast, Dennis and Kadlec 
(1994) who initially find that the estimated systematic risk of a firm announcing a 
tender offer changes after the announcement, still argue that any changes in risk are 
due to estimation biases. Hence the changes in systematic risk reflect mostly the 
changes in capital structure and the post offer trading activity rather than the actual 
systematic risk change due to the tender offer. 
Studying the relationship between firm risk and open market share repurchases 
in the U.S., Bartov (1991) finds that firms who announce their intention to repurchase 
their shares in the open market, have a significantly higher risk compared to their 
peers and experience a significant decline during and after the year of the 
announcement. Contrary to the argument of the risk change hypothesis, Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2008) argue, that because they still find evidence of abnormal returns 
with Ibbotson’s RATS methodology, which performs monthly adjustments for risk 
                                                 
2
 The changes in systematic risk translate to an economically significant decline in risk premium of 
15% per year. 
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changes after the repurchase announcement, the long-term returns of repurchasing 
firms cannot be explained as the market’s underreaction to changes in risk. Hence, the 
authors argue that the announcement of a share repurchase does not imply that a firm 
may be undervalued due to a potential performance improvement in the future, but 
due to the market’s mistaken belief that the firm’s future performance will decline. 
An additional and much discussed hypothesis concerning share repurchases, is 
the capital structure hypothesis. When corporations use their excess capital in order to 
repurchase their shares, they reduce their equity capital and consequently increase 
their leverage ratio. Hence a share repurchase can reflect the managers’ preference to 
use debt instead of equity financing, in order to move closer to their target (optimal) 
leverage ratio (Bagwell and Shoven, 1988; Hovakimian et. al., 2001). Therefore, firms 
can adjust their equity-capital ratios in a relatively short period of time. But this is 
most clear in the case of tender offers where corporations usually retire large blocks 
of their stock, thus increasing their leverage. In the case of open market share 
repurchases, which is the most common method for repurchasing shares, the capital 
adjustment does not appear to be the primary motive (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). 
Rather, the authors argue that open market repurchases can be used by corporations in 
order to make smaller capital adjustments in a short period of time, hence being able 
to “fine-tune” their leverage ratios.  
In contrast, Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) and Dittmar (2000) find evidence 
that companies are more likely to repurchase their shares when their leverage ratios 
are below their respective target leverage ratios. Furthermore, Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) find that more profitable firms that have lower leverage ratios are more likely 
to repurchase their shares than retire debt. Moreover, Jagannathan and Stephens 
(2003) report evidence suggesting that firms, who have lower debt ratios, repurchase 
their shares more frequently. Hence, suggesting that firms repurchase their shares 
when their leverage ratios are lower than their optimal levels. 
Apart from the theories previously discussed, the existing financial theory 
suggests that tax provisions can play an important role on determining corporations’ 
cash distribution to its shareholders. Assuming that managers make decisions and act 
to their shareholders’ best interest, and taking into account that share repurchases have 
the advantage of allowing investors to be taxed at capital gains rather than income tax, 
which is usually higher, one can see the magnitude of the effect that tax can have on 
payout policies. In addition, when the rate of capital gains tax is lower than the rate of 
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personal income tax, then share repurchases are more beneficial and a more efficient 
payout method. 
Barclay and Smith (1988) argue that from the two most commonly used forms 
of cash distribution to shareholders, namely, cash dividends and open market share 
repurchases, the later should be more “popular” compared to dividends, due to the tax 
advantage. This tax advantage is based on the notion that share repurchases are 
usually taxed as capital gains rather than personal income tax. Since the rate of capital 
gains tax is lower compared to the respective rate of personal income tax, therefore, 
share repurchases can be more beneficial to shareholders compared to cash dividends. 
Nevertheless, up to the time when the research of Barclay and Smith (1988) took 
place, dividends were overwhelmingly used compared to any other form of cash 
distribution. Furthermore, Dittmar (2000) argues that if tax is the driver of firms’ 
decision to repurchase, then the volume of repurchased shares should be inversely 
related to the relative capital gains tax. However, the author finds that the changes in 
tax laws cannot provide a sufficient explanation for the changes in the repurchasing 
trends.  
In contrast, Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that the differential tax advantage 
does have a significant effect and it is positively related to the market reaction 
surrounding open market share repurchase announcements. Consistent with these 
findings, Lie and Lie (1999) report evidence that managers are more likely to 
repurchase shares, either by a tender offer or in the open market, than distribute 
dividends when their shareholders’ income tax rate is higher than the capital gains tax. 
Furthermore, the authors find that managers are more sensitive to their respective 
shareholders’ tax status when there is a large fraction of institutional investors. 
Moreover, Masulis (1980) reports evidence derived from the U.S. market, suggesting 
that the tax effect on fixed price tender offers is persistent as well as the fact that the 
corporate tax benefit of financing a stock repurchase with debt has a significant 
impact on the market reaction.  
Aligned with Lie and Lie (1999) and Grullon and Michaely (2002), are the 
findings of Rau and Vermaelen (2002), where they argue that tax changes do have a 
significant effect on the importance and method of share repurchase in the U.K. The 
authors find that a firm’s payout policy is indeed sensitive to tax changes and, as in 
Lie and Lie (1999), that the tax treatment of the majority of a firm’s investors, such as 
institutional investors, determines the payout policy. They report that for every time 
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period where repurchases looked more attractive than dividends from a tax 
perspective, the number of announcements increased substantially compared to the 
number of announcements when dividends looked more appealing, again from a tax 
perspective. In addition, Kooli and L’Her (2010) report evidence from Canada that the 
tax advantage of capital gains tax relative to income tax has a significant impact on a 
firm’s decision to repurchase its shares. 
Furthermore, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) address the issue of taxation on 
corporate payout policies in the U.S., and especially on the choice between cash 
dividends and share repurchases. In order to do so, they investigate the impact of the 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, which resulted in a reduction 
of the income tax rate to 15%, thus becoming equal to the respective capital gains tax 
rate, and consequently reducing the tax advantage of share repurchases. However, 
they argue that even with the income tax and capital gains tax rates being level, the 
capital gains for non-selling shareholders are deferred, and hence it is not imposed 
periodically. Moreover, the 15% capital gains tax is imposed not on the full 
repurchase proceeds received by a firm’s shareholders, (as it is the case with cash 
dividends where tax is applied on the full dividend proceeds they receive), but only on 
the portion of the repurchase proceeds that exceeds each shareholders’ historical cost 
basis on the shares sold (DeAngelo et al., 2008). Therefore, share repurchases still had 
a tax advantage over cash dividends. Nevertheless, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) find 
that after the income tax cuts, there was a considerable increase on the rate of 
dividends paid by comparatively low-dividend paying firms. Furthermore, they find a 
sharp increase on the number of firms initiating dividends. Nevertheless, the authors 
argue that the tax issue is only one of a number of factors that influence corporate 
payout policies. 
According to the existing literature, one view is that given the flexibility and tax 
advantage that share repurchases can offer, they can substitute cash dividends as a 
payout to shareholders. However, firms which already pay regular cash dividends 
have the necessary resources to implement an open market share repurchase. Hence, 
share repurchases can be viewed as complements rather than substitutes to dividends 
(Jagannathan et al., 2000). DeAngelo et al. (2000) examine the relation of the 
disappearance of special dividends with the surge of share repurchases and find no 
evidence of dividend substitution. Similarly, Dittmar (2000) and Fama and French 
(2001) find no evidence of the open market share repurchases as being substitutes to 
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cash dividends. Skinner (2008) argues that dividend paying firms, and firms that pay 
dividends but also repurchase their shares, have a long dividend paying history. 
Furthermore, the author finds evidence that the number of years that firms have been 
paying dividends has a significant impact on the overall payout mix, which supports 
the importance of dividend history. In addition, he finds that younger firms that have 
not paid dividends are more prone to share repurchases, which, now that these firms 
are becoming mature, are still more likely to use share repurchases as their dominant 
payout method. Furthermore, he finds that the importance of dividend payers 
decreases over time suggesting that share repurchases have become a dominant form 
of payout.  
This supports the life-cycle theory of payout policy according to which firms are 
dealing with a trade off between the factors that encourage retention and flotation 
costs, the agency costs that arise from the free cash flows and other factors that may 
discourage it (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2008). However, this trade off evolves 
throughout the life cycle of a firm since its ability to raise capital for investing in new 
opportunities, as well as the scale of available investment opportunities, also change 
through time. This means that younger and high growth firms have more available 
choices for profitable investments and smaller ability to generate cash internally, and 
therefore are less likely to make payouts to their shareholders. This is contrary to 
larger and more mature firms that have fewer investment opportunities and have 
larger amounts of cash, which they will be more prone to distribute back to their 
shareholders via dividends or share repurchases (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2008). 
Furthermore, Jagannathan et al. (2000) re-examine Lintner’s (1956) argument, 
according to which, managers prefer to increase dividends regularly, and avoid 
decreasing them if possible. Therefore, dividend increases will be related to 
permanent but not necessarily to temporary cash flows and that dividend cuts will be 
less frequent than increases, and they should be accompanied by poor performance. 
The authors find that dividends appear to be paid by permanent earnings and they find 
little evidence of subsequent earnings improvements following dividend increases. 
Additionally, they find that firms who pay dividends have more stable earnings 
compared to firms who repurchase their shares. Even though their findings do not 
provide strong support on the dividend substitution hypothesis, their results suggest 
that repurchases overlap dividends to some extent. Furthermore, Dittmar (2008) finds 
that both share repurchases and cash dividends are employed in order to pay out more 
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permanent earnings. Therefore, the author argues that share repurchases can be 
viewed as being both substitutes and complements to dividends by paying out both 
permanent and unexpected earnings respectively. 
In contrast, Grullon and Michaely (2002) argue that if one looks at the sources 
and the uses of funds’ identity, then cash dividends and share repurchases should be 
viewed as substitutes, if all else is constant. Even though the authors admit that firms 
can always adjust their sources of funds, thus making it possible that shares and 
dividends are determined independently, still they find strong evidence in support of 
the dividend substitution hypothesis. Additionally, they do not find any evidence that 
dividend-paying firms who repurchase shares have, on average, more volatile 
earnings than firms who solely pay dividends. Furthermore, Skinner (2008) finds a 
strong link between earnings and firm payouts, and especially a significant and 
positive relationship between profitability and the choice to repurchase. He shows that 
changes in earnings help explain changes in the choice of payout policy, and that 
share repurchases increasingly substitute the payment of cash dividends.  
Another issue that the existing literature has addressed concerning the effects of 
share repurchases, is the effect it has on the liquidity of the firm. Intuitively, when 
corporations decide to repurchase and cancel their shares and especially in the case of 
cancelling large blocks of shares, the respective liquidity should decline. This is due 
to the reduction on the number of shares available for trading and the number of 
investors capable of trading. Thus, it is argued that if liquidity declines, then the 
firm’s share price should also decline.  
However, this is not always the case, because liquidity could be affected 
positively by the firm’s trades throughout the repurchase process. According to a 
number of finance theorists, the presence of the firm, which is considered to have no 
informational gap, should increase the percentage of better informed traders, thus 
providing an informational edge over other investors. Barclay and Smith (1988) argue 
that if there is no gap of information between management and market participants, 
then the increased market activity from repurchase programmes should not have any 
adverse effects on the firm’s liquidity. Moreover, share repurchases could provide 
more competition for the firm’s market-maker. By placing limit orders on the price 
firms are willing to pay for their own shares, a limit price could be established on the 
bid side to the possible extent where the bid-ask spread is reduced, thus increasing the 
firms’ liquidity and increasing their value. This theory is labelled by Barclay and 
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Smith (1988) as the competing-market-maker hypothesis, and they find that share 
repurchases can have a positive effect on a firm’s liquidity 
Nevertheless, there is a drawback with these findings since the authors use 
annual bid-ask spreads to document changes in liquidity, thus it is not possible to 
examine when exactly this change takes place relative to the announcement of a share 
repurchase, which could have distorted the conclusions on the actual announcement 
effect. In order to overcome this obstacle, Singh et al. (1994) analyse the daily bid-ask 
spreads around the announcement of an open market share repurchase. The authors 
find no evidence of change on the bid-ask spread on the post announcement period 
thus arguing that repurchase announcements do not cause an increase in spreads. 
Consistent with these findings, Franz et al. (1995) find a net decline in bid-ask spread 
percentage, when controlling for inventory-holding and order-processing costs. The 
authors attribute the spread percentage decrease to the reduction of the informed 
trading costs related to the repurchase announcement. Moreover, Miller and 
McConnell (1995) and Kim (2005) find no evidence of share repurchases having a 
significant impact on a firm’s liquidity. On the other hand, Ginglinger and Hamon 
(2006) employ daily data, and find evidence that share repurchases in France have a 
negative effect on a firm’s liquidity. 
Apart from the different effects, interpretations and dynamics that share 
repurchases have, still, they are subject to varying legislation and regulatory 
frameworks from country to country. Especially in Continental Europe countries, 
where share repurchases are subject to several legal restrictions, such as the volume 
and the time frame in which it can take place, the effects of share repurchases could 
vary significantly across countries. This is contrary to the U.S., where there is no 
limitation concerning the volume and the time limit for carrying out a share 
repurchase programme. 
So far, the overwhelming majority of the literature has studied the effect of share 
repurchases and their underlying reasons and motives in the U.S. market, without 
taking into account the effects that the regulatory frameworks can have on the 
repurchase mechanism. For instance, it was not until recently that share repurchases 
were made legal in Germany and France. When the regulations changed, corporations 
started to have a more favourable view on the open market share repurchases. 
It can be clear that regulatory restrictions can have a significant effect to some of 
the main characteristics of share repurchases, such as the flexibility on the time period 
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to undertake the programme and the volume of shares intended to be reacquired by a 
firm. Therefore, it is not possible to draw inferences from the U.S. empirical results 
and apply them to countries such as Continental Europe, where stringent regulations 
are imposed on share repurchases. This argument is also supported by Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002), Lasfer (2005), Oswald and Young (2004) and Keswani et al. 
(2007) where they investigate share repurchases in the United Kingdom and their 
results are lower than the average results reported in the U.S. empirical studies. 
Additionally, the results reported by Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) appear to be 
different and lower than the ones reported in the U.S., Canadian, and U.K. studies, 
suggesting that the markets react differently across countries 
Concerning the regulatory differences among countries, La Porta et al. (1996) 
have shown that legislation among countries differs significantly in areas such as 
shareholder protection and law enforcement. From that perspective, they have shown 
that Continental Europe countries can be distinguished into three categories. Common 
law countries such as the U.K. where the level of shareholders’ protection is the 
highest among Europe, German Civil law and Scandinavian Civil law where the level 
of protection is moderate, and finally French Civil law where the respective level is 
the lowest. Moreover, shares typically give rights to their owners, such as the right to 
vote for companies’ directors (La Porta et al., 1998). These rights give shareholders 
the ability and the power to apply pressure on managers in order to receive the returns 
on their investment. Nevertheless, these rights depend on the legal framework in 
which securities are issued. Therefore, the quality of the legal framework and law 
enforcement can be of important significance for what specific rights and protection 
shareholders actually have (La Porta et al., 1998). Thus, these regulatory differences 
among countries can have a significant effect on how corporations choose to make a 
payout to their shareholders, and more specifically on the choice for undertaking a 
share repurchase.  
La Porta et al. (1997) identify the United Kingdom as a market-oriented country 
whereas the rest of Continental Europe countries as bank-based. The difference 
between the two types is that in the U.K. there is a Common law framework in place, 
which offers more adequate protection to the minority shareholders but still is a fertile 
ground for high information asymmetries between managers and the market. 
Therefore, since higher information asymmetries exist, a much stronger signalling 
effect compared to the remaining Continental Europe countries should also exist. This 
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is also due to the high liquidity that characterizes the U.K. market as well as the low 
levels of ownership concentration of a corporation, which can result to higher market 
reactions to repurchase announcements.  
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that in common law countries that 
have a higher level of investor protection such as the U.K., since shareholders feel 
protected they would accept lower payouts and higher reinvestment rates for high 
growth firms. The opposite should apply for low growth firms, where shareholders 
would demand a higher payout. Thus, in countries with strong investor protection, 
high growth companies should have significantly lower payouts than low growth 
companies (La Porta et al., 2000). In contrast, in countries with low investor 
protection, it is not expected for such a relationship to hold, since investors might try 
to acquire a higher payout and as quickly as possible.  
On the other hand, the converse should apply in the remaining Continental 
Europe countries such as France and Germany, which are bank-based markets and 
therefore have lower information asymmetries. This is due to the civil law framework 
that is in place, the relatively smaller degree of liquidity and the higher level of 
ownership concentration, which result to less pressure from minority shareholders to 
the corporation for making a payout. Additionally, as reported by La Porta et al. 
(1999), civil law countries are characterised by high ownership concentration. 
Moreover, La Porta et al. (2000) argue that the high ownership concentration accounts 
as complementary to low investor protection. Since civil law countries have high 
ownership concentration, meaning there is a lower level of minority shareholders, this 
leads to less pressure on managers, from the agency costs aspect, and to a lower 
degree of information asymmetries between management and the market.  
It should be noted though, that La Porta et al. (2000) investigate the effect that 
legal protection has on corporations’ payouts in the form of dividends solely. In line 
with La Porta et al. (2000) are the findings of Bartram et al. (2009) where the authors 
report that shareholder protection differs significantly between countries. In addition, 
the authors find that even within a country, the agency costs across firms vary 
significantly as well. They report that in countries with poor shareholder protection, 
agency costs and potential growth opportunities have a lesser impact on determining 
corporate payout policies. Thus, it is clear from these arguments, that the various 
regulatory frameworks and different levels of ownership concentration can have a 
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direct and significant effect to corporations’ payouts and more specifically to open 
market share repurchases.  
In sum, there is a number of theories that investigate and try to interpret and 
explain the motives of undertaking a share repurchase programme as well as the 
market’s reaction to share repurchases announcements. This thesis undertakes the task 
to address these theories and hypotheses, and tests each theory in varying markets that 
operate under different regulatory, tax and cultural frameworks. 
1.3. Main Findings and Contribution 
The existing literature provides mixed evidence on the impact and extent of each 
of the prominent hypotheses on the decision to announce an open market share 
repurchase, the respective market reaction on such announcements, and the actual 
implementation of the announced share repurchase programme. The overwhelming 
majority of the literature focuses on the U.S. market (see Allen and Michaely, 2003 
for a review). Hence, one of the motivations for this thesis is the scarcity of studies in 
markets other than the U.S., especially in Europe. Moreover, the existing research 
studies provide a single-country analysis, where share repurchases receive the same 
treatment. Hence, it is difficult to distinguish and extract the contending hypotheses 
that underlie share repurchases, under varying regulatory frameworks and 
institutional, as well as cultural settings. 
This thesis aims to overcome these obstacles by analysing and evaluating the 
payout mechanism of open market share repurchases and the market reaction to such 
announcements, using a comprehensive sample of firms across a number of European 
countries that are characterised with a wide heterogeneity in terms of their regulatory 
and institutional settings. Additionally, this cross country analysis, where firms have 
different levels of ownership concentration and with different types of majority 
shareholders (i.e. managers, family owners and institutional investors), allows me to 
thoroughly investigate the influence that the overall ownership concentration can have 
on open market share repurchases and the respective market reaction.    
The sample includes three main European countries: United Kingdom, France 
and Germany. These countries are the three largest economies in Europe and have 
significantly different characteristics of tax, regulatory and institutional frameworks. I 
hand collect the data from news announcements made by firms that are primarily 
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listed in one of the three markets under investigation. The data is in text format as 
reported in Factiva  and Perfect Analysis databases, which contain all the publicly 
available news reports. In addition, I require the sample of firms to have their 
accounting data and historical share prices listed in Worldscope. I identify 970 
announcements of intention to initiate an open market share repurchase programme 
during the ten year period 1997 to 2006, of which 513 took place in the United 
Kingdom, 263 in France and 194 in Germany. Primarily, the sample shows that the 
majority of the share repurchase announcements took place in the United Kingdom 
which is in line with the existing literature (Lasfer, 2005; Rau and Vermaelen, 2002). 
Rau and Vermaelen, 2002 argue that the reason for this is that open market share 
repurchases were illegal until recently in many European countries such as France and 
Germany. Furthermore, the authors argue that due to the fact that share repurchases do 
not fit the corporate culture in Europe, it is only recently that the respective European 
markets are starting to use share repurchases as a payout mechanism ever more often. 
The issues that are investigated in this thesis are as follows.  
Initially, I analyse the extent of the impact that each of the prominent hypotheses 
concerning share repurchases have on a firm’s decision to publicly announce its 
intention to repurchase its shares in the open market. For achieving this, I employ the 
initial sample of 970 repurchase announcements that took place in the three European 
countries under investigation (United Kingdom, France and Germany) during 1997 to 
2006. Following Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) I employ a standard logit modelling 
methodology in order to evaluate and identify the motives that drive managers to 
announce their intention to undertake an open market share repurchase programme. 
Moreover, I construct a likelihood model that identifies with a high degree of success 
the proportion of firms that have actually made a share repurchase announcement and 
those that have not. For a thorough robustness check, four different matching methods 
for the construction of the control samples and a boot-strap methodology are applied. 
Furthermore, I perform an empirical investigation of the market reaction on the 
announcement of intention to repurchase shares in the open market. In order to do so, 
a standard event methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) is applied. 
Hence, I am able to estimate and analyse the excess and cumulative excess returns at 
the time before, during and after the announcement of the open market share 
repurchase. In addition, unlike previous studies, I examine if there is a significantly 
different market reaction towards the initial and the subsequent share repurchase 
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announcements. This enables me to analyse if the information conveyed to the market 
has the same impact on the initial as on the subsequent announcements, or if the 
market becomes accustomed to subsequent announcements, hence having a smaller 
reaction. I then perform an in-depth cross-sectional analysis in each of the three 
markets individually, in order to identify which are the firm specific characteristics 
that have a significant impact on the market reaction to open market share repurchase 
announcements. In addition, this allows me to analyse if the firm specific 
characteristics have a uniform effect on the market reaction throughout the different 
countries, or if their impact varies in each market under consideration. I also analyse 
the impact that changes in taxation and regulations can have on the respective market 
reaction to open market share repurchase announcements. 
Lastly, I investigate the actual share repurchase trades that took place in the 
open market and the completion rates of the announced share repurchase programmes. 
For achieving this, I focus only on the U.K. market. The reason for this is twofold. 
First, is the lack of data availability for collecting and identifying the actual share 
repurchase trades in France and Germany, that would allow me to perform a cross-
country analysis. Second, the overwhelming majority of the open market share 
repurchases that took place in France and Germany targeted the maximum proportion 
of the common shares outstanding that were allowed to do so by the existing 
regulations. Nevertheless, I identify 196 announcements of intention to repurchase 
shares that took place in the United Kingdom during the ten year period 1997 to 2006. 
I require all the firms in this sample to have stated in their announcement either the 
proportion of the common shares outstanding that they were willing to repurchase, or 
the total cash value that they were willing to utilise for the repurchase programme. 
Furthermore, I analyse if managers trade strategically and display market timing 
abilities or they repurchase for providing price support. In addition I perform a 
rigorous examination on the impact that the announcement, as well as each and every 
stage throughout the implementation of the open market share repurchases, can have 
on firm risk. Furthermore, I perform a thorough firm risk analysis, by breaking down 
a firm’s total risk, to its two main components of systematic and idiosyncratic risk. I 
perform this risk decomposition analysis for robustness check, so that I can assess the 
impact that share repurchases have on both components of a firm’s risk, and hence 
understanding whether it is only the systematic risk that changes, or the firm total risk 
as well. 
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The main empirical findings of this thesis are the following. First, I find that not 
all the factors and firm specific characteristics have a significant impact consistently 
throughout the varying markets on the managerial incentive to announce an open 
market share repurchase programme. I find that in all three countries, firms that are 
large, have low leverage, and are widely held, are more likely to announce their 
intention to repurchase their shares in the open market. Further, I find only in the U.K. 
that a firms’ low growth with high excess cash levels, can have a significant impact 
on the likelihood of announcing an open market share repurchase programme. In 
addition, I find some evidence in France and Germany, that a firm’s potential 
undervaluation has a significant impact on the decision to announce a share 
repurchase. Finally, I find for all three countries that the dividend pay out has a 
positive relationship with the propensity to announce a share repurchase, hence 
supporting the hypothesis that share repurchases are viewed by managers as 
complements rather than substitutes to dividends. 
Second, I find that the market displays a significant reaction to the 
announcement of intention to repurchase shares in the open market, which varies 
significantly among countries. Nevertheless, the abnormal market reaction is 
significantly lower than the average abnormal market reaction reported in U.S. 
studies. Moreover, I do not find strong evidence of the undervaluation hypothesis as 
having the ability to explain the markets’ excess reaction to share repurchase 
announcements. Further, I find a significantly higher market reaction to the initial 
announcement compared to the subsequent announcements, suggesting that the first 
announcement sends a stronger signal to the market that the firm’s stock price is 
undervalued, whereas the subsequent announcements convey less information. The 
empirical results from the cross-sectional analysis show firm size and past share price 
performance have a significant and inverse effect on the market reaction. Moreover, I 
find evidence that it is only in the United Kingdom that regulatory and tax changes 
have a significant impact on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
Third, I find that firms repurchase on average 74% of the shares targeted at the 
time of the announcement. In addition, the evidence shows that managers are willing 
to pay a higher price for repurchasing shares compared to prior non-repurchasing 
days, hence suggesting that managers repurchase shares in order to provide price 
support. Moreover, I do not find evidence that firm risk changes after the 
announcement of a share repurchase. Nevertheless, I find that firm risk is significantly 
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reduced during the period when the actual repurchase trades are taking place, and that 
repurchasing firms have significantly higher risk compared to their industry peers of 
similar size or similar valuation proxied by their market-to-book ratio. Finally, the 
results from the risk decomposition confirm the findings on risk change during the 
actual repurchase trades.  
In summary, the contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is ample. 
This thesis explores the gaps in the main contending hypotheses that underlie the open 
market share repurchases. It reflects the level of homogeneity across the European 
countries under investigation and shows that changes in taxation and regulations can 
have a significant impact on open market share repurchases. Furthermore, this thesis 
provides a thorough examination of the signalling of undervaluation hypothesis, and 
reveals the institutional and firm specific characteristics that impact the market 
reaction to share repurchase announcements.  
Furthermore, a significant contribution of this thesis is the identification of the 
determinants that drive managers to publicly announce their intention to undertake an 
open market share repurchase programme. Additionally, it establishes that in different 
countries, the managerial motives differ significantly and have a varying impact on 
the decision to announce a share repurchase programme. What is more, it provides a 
number of models that have the ability to predict with a fairly high degree of certainty 
and robustness, the likelihood for a firm to announce its intention to repurchase its 
shares in the open market.  
This thesis, in addition, provides an insightful investigation inside the “black 
box” of the completion rates of the announced open market share repurchase 
programmes and their respective actual repurchase trades. What is more, it analyses 
and answers the question if managers repurchase strategically and time the repurchase 
trades or if they repurchase in order to provide price support to the firm’s share price. 
Further, this thesis contributes to the trifling literature on share repurchases and risk3, 
by providing a broad and clear picture of the behaviour and interaction of firm risk in 
respect to all stages of open market share repurchases, from the time period prior to 
the announcement, to their initiation, implementation, and to the short term period 
                                                 
3
 To the best of my knowledge, only Dann et al. (1991), Hertzel and Jain (1991) and Dennis and Kadlec 
(1994) study the impact of the announcement of fixed price tender offer share repurchases on firm risk. 
Whereas it is only Bartov (1991) and Grullon and Michaely (2004) that study the impact of the 
announcement of open market share repurchases on firm risk. It is also notable, that all four of these 
research studies focus on the U.S. market. 
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after its completion. Hence, it establishes if there is any risk related information that is 
conveyed to the market through open market share repurchases. 
Moreover, this thesis examines and incorporates the substitutability of dividends 
and the interaction and effect that regular dividends have on share repurchases in 
general, from both the shareholders’ and managerial point of view. Finally, this thesis 
contributes to the literature by providing fresh evidence from the European markets, 
which can also be comparable to previous U.S. and international evidence. Hence, this 
thesis sheds more light on the relatively unexplored area of open market share 
repurchases and establishes, with the comparability of its findings to the U.S. results, 
if the emerging patterns on security returns are not the result of data mining, as argued 
by Fama and French (1998).  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 analyses and 
identifies the determinants and managerial incentives for announcing an open market 
share repurchase programme. Chapter 3 investigates the market reaction to the 
announcement of open market share repurchases.  Chapter 4 examines the completion 
rates of the announced open market share repurchase programmes and the respective 
actual repurchase trades. In addition, it evaluates the relationship and interaction 
between firm risk and all the stages of open market share repurchases, from the time 
before the announcement, to its implementation, and the period after its completion. 
The summary and conclusions of this thesis are discussed in Chapter 5, along with the 
limitations this thesis, and ideas for potential future research.  
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Chapter 2.  
2. The Determinants of Share Repurchases in Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I employ a logit model methodology in order to identify the 
determinants of a firm’s decision to announce a share repurchase. In the models, I 
incorporate firm specific financial characteristics and measures of share price 
performance. Hence, I am able to estimate the probability of open market share 
repurchase announcements across Europe. The robustness of the proposed models is 
investigated across different dimensions of sample construction methods and with a 
boot-strap technique. I find that leverage, size, and ownership concentration, have a 
significant impact on the announcement of share repurchases in all three countries 
under study. Finally, I construct a number of models with strong predicting ability of 
a firm’s likelihood to announce a share repurchase. 
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2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I perform a cross country analysis in order to identify the 
determinants for announcing open market share repurchase programmes in the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France. Previous studies have focused predominantly on the 
analysis and interpretation of the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
Some of the most prevailing theories relate the market reaction on share repurchase 
announcements to the undervaluation/under-reaction hypotheses. Others focus on the 
impact of excess cash flow and agency costs, capital restructuring, size and growth of 
the firm, differential tax advantage and dividend substitution, ownership concentration 
and management compensation incentive hypotheses4. However, the vast majority of 
these studies are U.S.-based and do not provide a comparative analysis across 
countries with different institutional settings. Finally, they are not focusing on 
identifying the managerial incentives for announcing a share repurchase programme. 
The purpose of this chapter is to overcome this limitation by assessing what are 
the management’s incentives for announcing an open market share repurchase, by 
employing a sample of firms across European countries with wide heterogeneity in 
terms of their institutional settings. This research is also motivated by the dearth of 
studies in these markets. Thus I choose United Kingdom, France and Germany where 
I identify 970 share repurchase announcements that took place over the period 1997-
2006. An additional reason for selecting these three countries is the fact that we have 
limited knowledge on which factors have a significant impact on announcing an open 
market share repurchase in Europe. Furthermore, these countries have significant 
differences between them in tax, regulatory and institutional frameworks. 
In a recent study, Jain et al. (2009) investigate the market reaction to a firm’s 
choice to make a payout to its shareholders, either through dividends or share 
repurchases in the U.S. They report an average market reaction for dividend 
initiations of 1.62% and for share repurchases of 1.25% respectively. The difference 
with their research study is that Jain et al. (2009) investigate the payout decision, and 
more specifically between the choice to initiate a dividend payment and the choice to 
initiate a share repurchase for the first time after a firm has performed an initial public 
offering in the U.S. stock market. Therefore, the authors inevitably investigate only 
                                                 
4
 For a review, see Vermaelen 2005, Ikenberry at al, 1995; Dittmar, 2000; Jagannathan and Stephens, 
2003; Brav et al. 2005; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; and Ikenberry et al., 2000 in Canada. 
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those firms that are going from a transitional stage of high growth to a lower growth, 
since they will already have the ability to cover all of the investment opportunities and 
still have excess cash that they are willing to payout to their shareholders. An 
additional drawback of this study is that share repurchases are considered to be perfect 
substitutes to dividends since the choices are either to pay dividends or to repurchase 
shares, whereas in this study I investigate the likelihood to announce a share 
repurchase or to not make such an announcement at all. In addition, since in a number 
of European countries share repurchases were considered to be illegal practices until 
recently, with the change in regulations even more mature firms that already were 
paying dividends had now an alternative payout method in their arsenal.  
Furthermore, it has been documented in the current literature that only with the 
announcement of intention to repurchase shares in the open market there is a 
significant and positive market reaction of approximately 3.5% in the U.S. (Ikenberry 
et al. 1995), however the market reaction to such announcements is significantly 
lower in Europe. For instance, a market reaction of 1.5% and 0.5% is reported in the 
U.K. (Lasfer, 2005) and in France (Ginglinger and L’Her, 2006) respectively. It is 
notable though, that this positive market reaction occurs just on the announcement 
itself suggesting that the market considers this type of announcement to be good 
news. The paradox with the positive market reaction is that an open market share 
repurchase announcement is not a commitment to the firm and consequently lacking 
credibility, since even a bad firm could mimic this announcement. Subsequently, there 
should not be a positive market reaction. However, Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) 
argue that such an announcement attracts scrutiny and therefore a bad firm would not 
mimic such an announcement because it would want to avoid the market’s scrutiny. 
Therefore, there should be other reasons that lead to a positive market reaction to open 
market share repurchase announcements. Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter 
is to identify what are the principal reasons and their incentives that lead management 
to make such an announcement and not the propensity to actually repurchase shares, 
which falls out of the scope of this chapter and is investigated in chapter 4. 
There is only a limited number of research studies that explore the managerial 
incentives for announcing an open market share repurchase, which take place in the 
Australian market (Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007) and the U.S. market (Barth and 
Kasznik, 1999; and Guay and Harford, 2000). Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) find 
that the main motives for management announcing a share repurchase are 
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undervaluation, as captured by the negative share price performance prior to the 
repurchase announcement, lower ownership concentration, and the excess debt 
capacity. Additionally, they find some evidence of the free cash flow as having a 
positive and significant impact on management’s decision to announce a share 
repurchase. Barth and Kasznik (1999) find that intangible assets and idle cash have a 
positive relationship, whereas information asymmetry has a negative relationship with 
the propensity to announce a share repurchase. Guay and Harford (2000) find that the 
announcement market reaction to dividend increases is higher compared to 
repurchases as well as the fact that cash flow shocks preceding dividend increases are 
significantly more permanent than cash flow shocks preceding share repurchases.  
However, Barth and Kasznik (1999) focus mostly on the relationship between 
the likelihood to announce an open market share repurchase programme in the U.S. 
and firms’ intangible assets, without accounting for other firm specific characteristics 
which could influence the decision to announce an open market share repurchase 
programme. Moreover, Guay and Harford (2000) focus on the permanence of cash 
flows with respect to the choice of announcing dividend increases and announcing a 
share repurchase. Therefore, the authors view share repurchases as substitutes to 
dividends. In addition, the authors consider only dividend increases without taking 
into account the interaction and effect that the choice to repurchase can have on 
dividend initiations as well as dividend decreases and omissions.  
However, there are some fundamental differences between the existing research 
studies and this chapter. First it would be difficult to draw from the Australian 
evidence the same inferences concerning the management’s incentives for a share 
repurchase for other markets. This is due to the existence of crucial differences 
concerning the repurchase mechanism from the announcement to the actual 
implementation of the repurchase programme. In detail, share repurchases in Australia 
must be formally announced, firms must implicitly state the number of shares 
intended to be bought back, the announced repurchase programme must commence 
within two months, and the programme must be completed within six months5 after 
the announcement. 
Moreover, the findings reported in the existing literature are derived from a 
single country analysis. Therefore, when studying the European markets which have a 
                                                 
5
 From September 1999 and onwards it was possible for firms to conduct a share repurchase 
programme for a longer or unlimited duration if noted. 
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wide heterogeneity in regulatory and institutional frameworks, I argue that there can 
be significant differences on the managerial incentives for announcing a share 
repurchase programme. For instance in France, companies have high levels of 
ownership concentration (La Porta et al., 1999) and for a number of firms a 
considerable level of ownership belongs to either wealthy families or even to the state 
(Morck et al., 2005). Further, the majority of the U.K. firms are widely held 
companies whereas France and Germany have a more concentrated ownership 
structure, of which France has a higher level of ownership concentration compared to 
Germany (La Porta et al., 1999). In addition, in Germany, banks can have 
considerable voting power over a wide range of firms, since shareholders routinely 
sign over their voting rights to banks that manage their stock accounts (Morck et al., 
2005).  
Hence, different levels of shareholder protection and especially ownership 
concentration, will lead to different managerial attitudes towards shareholder value 
maximisation, and consequently, to different attitudes on firms’ cash utilisation and 
the choice of firm payout decisions. For instance, in France, where firms tend to be 
family owned, and in Germany, where firms have higher levels of ownership 
concentration compared to the U.K., share repurchases would most likely be treated 
unreceptively. Moreover, in a qualitative study, Brounen et al. (2004) find that firms 
in the U.K. consider shareholder wealth maximisation as one of their most prominent 
priorities, as opposed to France and Germany where firms tend to put less weight 
towards realising that goal. What is more, they find that managers in France and 
Germany consider shareholder wealth maximisation as being less important than 
optimising firm leverage. In addition, they find that U.K. firms are more shareholder 
oriented as opposed to French and German firms, where shareholders are less 
important. Consequently, different managerial attitudes and different levels of 
ownership concentration are likely to have varying impacts on management’s decision 
to announce a share repurchase.  
Therefore, by performing a cross country analysis where firms have different 
levels of ownership concentration and with different types of majority shareholders 
(i.e. managers, family owners and institutional investors) more light can be shed on 
the influence that the overall ownership concentration can have on management’s 
incentives to announce a share repurchase programme. 
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In order to identify the extent to which each of the prominent hypotheses will 
affect a firm’s decision to announce a share repurchase, I follow Mitchell and 
Dharmawan (2007), and apply a standard logit model methodology. I evaluate in a 
univariate and multivariate dimension, the significance and influence of the 
undervaluation, excess cash, leverage, agency costs, tax savings incentive and 
ownership concentration, by using the appropriate proxy variables as suggested by the 
existing literature.  
This enables me to analyse and identify what are the managerial incentives in 
each country of this study, that have a significant impact on the decision to announce 
an open market share repurchase programme. In order to achieve this, this chapter 
covers 970 an open market share repurchase announcements (test-sample) that took 
place in three European countries (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). Then, 
I match the test-sample with firms that have not announced an open market share 
repurchase during the entire ten year period under investigation, by employing a 
number of matching methods. Further, based on the logit models, I construct a 
successful likelihood model that predicts the probability of announcing a share 
repurchase programme. In addition, I check the robustness of the results by employing 
different sample matching methods and a boot-strap simulation technique. Finally, I 
evaluate the proportion of firms that are classified by the employed model in the boot-
strap simulation, as repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms (in- and out-of-
sample).  
I find that for all three countries, some factors have a consistently significant 
impact on the announcement of share repurchases. Additionally, I find that size 
(proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets) and the payment of cash dividends 
(proxied by the ratios dividend yield, and cash dividend over net income) have a 
positive and significant impact, and that the ownership concentration (proxied by the 
percentage of closely held shares to common shares outstanding) has a negative and 
significant impact on the decision to announce an open market share repurchase. 
Furthermore, the fact that dividend paying firms are more likely to announce a share 
repurchase programme, supports the hypothesis that repurchases are complements to 
dividends rather than substitutes. These findings suggest that in all three countries 
firms that are large, are widely held, and pay higher cash dividends, are more likely to 
announce their intention to repurchase their shares in the open market. 
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Furthermore, I find that some of the factors that could have a significant impact 
on the decision to repurchase are not significant in all three countries. For instance, it 
is only in the UK that the proxy variable DFCF , which is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one for firms with low growth (lower than the median) and high excess 
cash flows (higher than the median), is positively related to the likelihood of 
announcing a share repurchase. In addition, I find weak evidence that a firm’s 
undervaluation can have a significant impact on the likelihood of announcing a share 
repurchase announcement only in France and Germany. Hence, the results suggest 
that apart from size, the payment of cash dividends, and ownership concentration, the 
remaining factors do not consistently have a significant impact on management’s 
decision to announce a share repurchase in countries with varying institutional and 
regulatory settings.  
Moreover, I do not find any evidence that the tax advantage of share repurchases 
over cash dividends, as measured by the dummy variable DTAX (which takes the 
value one when share repurchases are more beneficial from a tax perspective 
compared to cash dividends, and zero otherwise) has a significant impact on the 
decision to announce an open market share repurchase. Finally, I construct a number 
of logit models which have a strong predicting ability, especially for the case of the 
U.K. and France. 
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the 
current literature and sets the hypotheses that are to be tested. Section 2.3 presents the 
data and provides an overview of the descriptive statistics as well as the methodology 
applied in this research. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical results. The conclusions 
are in Section 2.5.  
2.2.  Literature Review & Hypotheses Setting 
In this section I discuss the potential motives for a share repurchase that have 
been developed in the existing literature. Furthermore, I develop and set my 
hypotheses for each of the contending theories that are tested, in order to identify 
which are the managerial incentives for announcing a share repurchase. Finally, I 
discuss the proxy variables that I employ in the study in order to test the hypotheses.  
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2.2.1. Excess Cash 
It has been widely discussed in the literature that when a company’s existing 
capital exceeds its potential investment opportunities, the firm can either retain the 
excess cash or distribute it back to its shareholders in order to reduce the potential 
arising agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; and Jensen, 1986).  
Two of the most prominent forms of cash distribution to the existing 
shareholders, are the open market share repurchases and the payment of cash 
dividends. One of the main advantages for a firm to distribute its excess cash through 
a share repurchase is that share repurchase announcements pose no commitment to the 
firm and there is no expectation that this cash distribution will reoccur in the future, 
whereas dividend announcements are a commitment to the firm and the market 
penalises firms that reduce or omit their dividend payment (see Grullon, Michaely, 
and Swaminathan, 2002; Amihud and Li, 2006; and Allen and Michaely, 2002). Thus 
share repurchasing can be a more flexible method for a firm’s cash distribution to its 
shareholders. 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) report that the reduction in free-cash-flows (as 
well as the reduction in systematic risk) is the source of the positive market reaction to 
share repurchase announcements. Guay and Harford (2000) find that in the U.S. 
market, share repurchases are related to less permanent cash flow shocks, whereas 
more permanent changes in cash flow are related to dividend increases. Furthermore, 
Dittmar (2000) and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) report evidence that firms are 
more likely to repurchase their stock when they have high cash flows and low 
investment opportunities. Although, these two research studies focus on the likelihood 
of actual repurchases and not on the announcement, they indicate that excess cash 
flow can be a potential explanation of a firm’s likelihood to announce a share 
repurchase.  
Hence, I expect free cash flow, which is captured by the firm’s excess cash and 
low growth opportunities, to increase the propensity to repurchase shares. As a proxy 
for capturing the excess cash, following Dittmar (2000) I employ the ratio of net 
operating income before taxes and depreciation to total assets (CF) at the year-end 
prior to the repurchase announcement. Additionally, in order to capture a firm’s lack 
of future growth opportunities, in the spirit of Myers (1977) and Mitchell and 
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Dharmawan (2007), I use the market-to-book ratio (MKBK), which is defined as the 
book value relative to the market value of equity.  
As an alternative measurement of a firm’s free cash flow that will also capture a 
firm’s future growth opportunities, following Opler and Titman (1993) I construct a 
dummy variable (DFCF) that takes the value of one for firms that have 
simultaneously low Tobin’s q (lower than the median q of a firm’s respective industry 
for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher than the median cash flow of the 
respective industry for each year) and the value of zero otherwise. 
Furthermore, as argued in the literature (e.g. Opler and Titman, 1993; Mitchell 
and Dharmawan, 2007) in order to have a direct measure of free cash flow I combine 
the cash flow (CF) proxy variable with the ratio proxy variable MKBK, into one 
interaction variable (FCF). As argued in Bagwell and Shoven (1988), Nohel and 
Tarhan (1998) and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007), the interaction variable is a more 
appropriate measure for capturing a firm’s level of free cash flow for each firm. 
Therefore, I replicate the logit models with the interaction variable FCF  instead of 
CF , and I find no significant change in the results. 
2.2.2. Excess Debt Capacity 
When a firm distributes its excess capital to its shareholders trough a share 
repurchase then it reduces its equity capital. This in turn increases its leverage ratio. 
Therefore, a share repurchase reflects the management’s preference to use debt 
instead of equity in order to move closer to an optimal leverage ratio (Bagwell and 
Shoven, 1988; and Hovakimian et. al., 2001). Previous studies report evidence that 
companies are more likely to repurchase stock if their respective leverage ratios are 
below their targets (Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007; and Dittmar, 2000). In addition, 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) report that more profitable firms have on average lower 
leverage ratios and are more likely to repurchase stock instead of retiring debt. 
Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) further report, that firms which repurchase their 
own shares most frequently, appear to have the lowest debt ratios. These findings 
support the notion that firms are more likely to repurchase stock when they have 
excess debt capacity, consequently being motivated to move towards their target 
leverage ratio.  
Therefore, I expect to find that the decision to announce a share repurchase will 
be motivated by the firm’s current leverage ratio and that the respective leverage 
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ratios should be lower for the firms that announce a share repurchase compared to 
firms that do not make such an announcement. Thus I expect to find a negative 
relationship between a firm’s leverage and its likelihood to announce a share 
repurchase. Following Dittmar (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) I use as a 
proxy for a firm’s leverage ratio its total debt divided by its total assets (LVG).  
2.2.3. Agency Costs 
As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), agency costs are incurred between the 
controlling and the minority shareholders. The higher the ownership concentration, 
the less it is possible for minority shareholders to influence the firm’s decision 
making. Therefore, controlling shareholders can wreak substantial costs to other 
shareholders by redistributing the firm’s wealth. Consequently, the lower the 
ownership concentration the more it is possible for the minority shareholders to 
influence a firm’s decision making on the excess cash utilization.  
On the other hand, Stulz (1988) argues that fixed price share repurchases can be 
used in order to consolidate voting power in the hands of management. Nevertheless, 
this can be beneficial to shareholders since they could force bidders to pay a higher 
premium for tendering their shares. In addition, Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) argue 
that when the management owns a large proportion of the company’s shares, then in 
the case of a share repurchase they will be paying essentially with their own money. 
Therefore, in the case of privately negotiated share repurchases there must be other 
motives than the reduction of potential agency costs that can have a significant impact 
on the decision to repurchase.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if the costs are lower than the benefits 
from reducing the respective agency costs, then it could be for the management’s 
benefit to repurchase shares in the market and reduce ownership dispersion. 
Companies with low ownership concentration can have potentially high agency costs 
and therefore have more incentives to undergo a share repurchase programme, since a 
share repurchase can be a self imposed control mechanism to management. Further, 
shareholders can achieve protection from management’s self interest behaviour either 
through the firm’s reflected price in the equity market or through the level of 
management’s compensation. Thus, managers should be motivated to minimize the 
respective agency costs (Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007). Furthermore, Mitchell and 
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Dharmawan (2007) find that the managerial incentive for a share repurchase in 
Australia is inversely related to a firm’s level of ownership concentration.  
In addition, Fenn and Liang (2001) find a positive relationship between 
management stock options and share repurchases, suggesting that share repurchases 
are used for reducing potential agency costs. But this is contradictory to Jagannathan 
and Stephens (2003) who report that firms that repurchase most frequently have the 
lowest level of managerial ownership, which supports Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
who argue that the lower the ownership concentration level, the less it is possible for 
shareholders to influence managers on undertaking a share repurchase. Moreover, 
Bartram et al. (2009) find in the U.S. market that the lower the ownership 
concentration, the higher the payouts (both dividend increases and share repurchases) 
that firms make. Consequently, different levels of protection and ownership 
concentration can lead to differences in information asymmetry and the market’s 
perception which are reflected on the timely update of stock prices, with new firm 
specific information, such as share purchase announcements.  
It should be noted though, that there is a difference between managerial (insider) 
ownership and block holder (outsider) ownership, since these two groups might have 
conflicting interests. Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) find evidence that firms that 
have high levels of institutional ownership and low levels of managerial ownership 
are the ones which tend to repurchase more frequently, suggesting that infrequent 
repurchasers are more likely to have higher levels of information asymmetry6. In 
addition, De Cesari et al. (2009) find that a firm’s tendency to time the share 
repurchases is positively related to institutional ownership for firms where the level of 
institutional ownership is low, whereas it is negatively related to institutional 
ownership for firms where the existing level of institutional ownership is high. 
Moreover, the authors find that insider ownership is inversely related to a firm’s 
tendency to time share repurchases.  
Nevertheless, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) and De Cesari et al. (2009) are 
studying the frequency and the timing of actual repurchases respectively, not the 
announcement of intention, and they are only distinguishing between managerial and 
institutional shareholders, without taking into account other outsider block holders 
                                                 
6
 However, Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) suggest that the interpretation of this finding should be 
done with caution since both the institutional ownership and repurchase frequency increase over their 
sample period. 
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that could be influential on the decision to announce a share repurchase programme. 
Furthermore, Oswald and Young (2008) investigate the impact that insider ownership 
and external shareholder monitoring have on the distribution of excess cash in the 
U.K. They report evidence suggesting that firms which have scarce investment 
opportunities and the risk of overinvesting is high, both the level of insider ownership 
and external monitoring have an incrementally significant positive relationship with 
share repurchases. In addition, the authors conclude that a better insider incentive 
alignment with shareholders’ incentives is an important factor on initiating payouts 
such as share repurchases. However, Oswald and Young (2008) investigate the impact 
that agency costs have on actual share repurchases and not on the announcement of 
intention to repurchase shares, which this chapter investigates. 
Moreover, Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) report that widely held firms experience 
a more favourable market reaction on the announcement of a share repurchase 
compared to family controlled firms, as well as the fact that the identity of a firm’s 
shareholders affects the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. They 
find that since a share repurchase programme may enhance shareholder concentration 
and because the market takes into account any negative or positive effects of possible 
increase in ownership concentration, thus family controlled firms react more 
negatively.  
Nonetheless, these findings are derived from a single-country analysis which is 
taking place in the French market, where companies have high levels of ownership 
concentration (La Porta et al., 1999), and for a number of firms a considerable level of 
ownership belongs to either wealthy families or even to the state (Morck et al., 2005). 
The majority of the U.K. firms are widely held companies whereas France and 
Germany have a more concentrated ownership structure, of which France has a higher 
level of ownership concentration than Germany (La Porta et al., 1999). This is also 
supported by Faccio and Lang (2002), who report that there are significant differences 
in the ownership patterns between the UK and Germany and France. They report that 
widely held firms comprise 63.8% of the UK firms. In contrast, they report that 
France and Germany are among the countries with lowest proportions of widely held 
firms (14% and 10.37% respectively).  Moreover, they find that firms in France and 
Germany are mostly family owned companies (approximately 65% in each country), 
whereas in the U.K., family controlled firms comprise only approximately 24% of the 
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firms. Finally, Faccio and Lang (2002), find that large firms are less likely to be 
family owned.  
In addition, banks in Germany can have a considerable voting power over a 
wide range of firms, since shareholders routinely sign over their voting rights to banks 
that manage their stock accounts (Morck et al., 2005). Therefore, I argue that under 
different institutional settings, the influence that ownership concentration can have on 
the incentive to announce a share repurchase can vary significantly. 
I expect to find that repurchasing firms with lower levels of ownership 
concentration and therefore are more likely to experience potential agency costs, 
should be more prone to utilise share repurchases as a payout method in order to 
reduce the arising agency conflicts. As discriminatory variable with the potential of 
influencing the likelihood of an open market share repurchase announcement, I follow 
Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) and Bartram et al. (2009), and use the percentage of 
closely held shares7 divided by the number of total common shares outstanding (OWN 
CON). However, this proxy has its limitations. First this proxy excludes the options 
due in sixty days, shares in form of convertibles and shares held in fiduciary capacity 
or by insurance companies, which could dilute the findings on ownership 
concentration. Second, this proxy does not distinguish between the types of the 
majority shareholders (i.e. insiders and outsiders) of the firm. Nevertheless, I argue 
that the percentage of closely held shares relative to the common shares outstanding 
can still be a good indication for the impact that the concentration of firm ownership 
can have on payout decisions such as share repurchases. I expect to find a negative 
coefficient suggesting that the lower overall level of ownership concentration, the 
higher will be the probability for the announcement of a share repurchase, in order to 
reduce the potential agency costs. 
                                                 
7The variable Closely Held Shares is taken from Worldscope database, and represents the following: 
Shares held by insiders; Shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families; Shares held in 
trust; Shares of the company held by any other corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity 
by banks or other financial institutions); Shares held by pension/benefit plans; Shares held by 
individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares. It excludes: Shares under option 
exercisable within sixty days; Shares held in a fiduciary capacity; Shares held by insurance companies; 
Preferred stock or debentures that are convertible into common shares.  
42 
2.2.4. Firm Size 
According to Vermaelen (1981) small firms are more likely to have higher 
information asymmetries, since they have less coverage by analysts and the media. 
Therefore, small firms are more likely to be misvalued which in turn increases the 
likelihood to repurchase their shares. Further, Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) find 
that smaller companies (in the Australian market) and especially those that announce 
a large fraction (6% or greater) of the outstanding shares to be repurchased, have a 
high signalling impact due to information asymmetry.  
Further, a number of research studies in the U.S. market (Dittmar, 2000; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002; Ikenberry et al., 1995) report that large firms are more likely to 
undertake a share repurchase, as well as the fact that size is positively related to the 
volume of share repurchases. This suggests that large firms are also trying to take 
advantage of possible undervaluation. Thus, firm size can be a significant firm 
characteristic which can influence the propensity of a share repurchase announcement.  
I expect to find that larger and more mature companies, which are more likely to 
have less available investment opportunities for future growth, should have a higher 
propensity to distribute the excess cash back to the shareholders via a share 
repurchase programme, in order to reduce any potential agency costs. Following 
Dittmar (2000), Grullon and Michaely (2002), and Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), 
I proxy for size (SIZE) with the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets at the year 
end prior to the share repurchase announcement. In addition, following Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002), I replicate the models by using as a size proxy the natural 
logarithm of the total value of a firm’s market capitalization at the year-end prior to 
the share repurchase announcement and find no significant change on the results. 
2.2.5. Personal taxation and dividend substitution 
An additional factor with the ability to influence the decision to repurchase, is 
the tax differential between capital gains and personal income tax. Typically, share 
repurchases are taxed as capital gains. Consequently, when capital gains are taxed 
lower than personal income, share repurchases can be more beneficial to investors. 
According to the personal tax savings hypothesis, share repurchases can be more tax 
efficient and can be more valuable (from a tax perspective) for shareholders than a 
dividend payout (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
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Nevertheless, the findings reported in the existing literature on the impact of tax 
on share repurchases are mixed. For example, Bagwell and Shoven (1989) and 
Dittmar (2000), find no evidence that the tax regulations can have a significant effect 
on payout policies. In contrast, a number of research studies (e.g. Masulis, 1980; 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Lie and Lie, 1999; Rau and Vermaelen, 2002; and 
Lasfer, 2005) report evidence that taxation is an important driver on firms’ payout 
decision making and when more favourable measures are taken towards share 
repurchases, then share repurchase announcements and share repurchasing activity, as 
well as the market reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase, increase. 
When a firm announces its intention to repurchase its shares, the firm experiences a 
positive announcement return. McNally (1999), agues that the announcement returns 
reflect the increase of the firm’s after-tax value, which is associated with the implied 
change in distribution policy, and the higher the investors’ average tax rate, the 
greater is the increase in the after-tax value. 
Moreover, Kooli and L’Her (2010) report evidence from Canada that tax has a 
significant impact on a firm’s decision to actually repurchase its shares. Moreover, the 
authors report that after the change in regulations where the rate of capital gains tax 
became lower than the top marginal rate on dividends tax, the dollar amount 
distributed by share repurchases relative to dividends increased from 55.02% to 
74.29%. Hence, it reflects the effect that the capital gains tax differential relative to 
income tax can have on the decision to repurchase. 
Given the flexibility and tax advantage of open market share repurchases, they 
can be viewed as substitutes to cash dividends. Another view though, is that firms that 
pay cash dividends already have the necessary resources in order to implement an 
open market share repurchase. Therefore, based on the flexibility of open market 
share repurchases compared to cash dividends, these two payout mechanisms can be 
viewed as complements rather than substitutes (Jagannathan et al., 2000).  
Concerning the substitution hypothesis, the overwhelming majority of the 
evidence is derived from the U.S. market. DeAngelo et al. (2000) examine the 
relationship between special dividends and share repurchases, and they find no 
evidence in support of the substitution hypothesis. Moreover, Jagannathan et al. 
(2000) find that firms use permanent earnings for the cash dividend pay out, whereas 
share repurchases are funded from unexpected earnings. This is also supported by 
Dittmar (2000) where the author reports evidence that firms repurchase shares when 
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they have excess cash and finds no evidence that repurchases act as substitutes to cash 
dividends. Finally, Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) in the Australian market, report 
that dividends do not influence a firm’s decision to repurchase. In contrast, Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) report evidence for the U.S. market that share repurchases are 
perceived by the market to be substitutes to cash dividends.  
Given the conflicting evidence on the dividend substitution hypothesis and the 
limited research on markets other than the U.S., I hypothesise that the managerial 
incentive for announcing a share repurchase will be related to the firm’s payment of 
dividends. Hence, for testing if the tax flexibility and benefit of share repurchases has 
a significant impact on the decision to repurchase, I follow McNally (1999) and I 
proxy for the average tax rate with the dividend yield ratio (DIV_Y). According to the 
personal tax savings hypothesis, I expect to find an inverse relationship between the 
dividend yield and the decision to repurchase. In order to test if share repurchases are 
viewed as substitutes or complements, following Dittmar (2000) and Jagannathan and 
Stephens (2003), I use DIV/NI, which is the ratio of regular cash dividends divided by 
the firm’s net income as reported in the year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. If share repurchases are used as substitutes then I expect to find a 
negative relationship between the incentive to repurchase and the dividend cash 
payout (DIV/NI), whereas if they are viewed as complements then I expect to find a 
positive relationship. Therefore, I employ both proxy variables, because the first can 
be used for capturing the tax effect, whereas the latter is a direct proxy of a firm’s 
cash payout, and therefore a more direct measure for the dividend substitution 
hypothesis. 
Additionally, in order to capture the effect that a favourable tax differential of 
capital gains might have on a firm’s decision to announce a share repurchase 
programme, I employ a favourable capital gains differential tax dummy variable 
(DTAX). (DTAX) takes the value of one for every event (both test- and control-firms) 
that takes place during the time periods where for each of the three countries capital 
gains were taxed lower than the personal income tax, and zero otherwise. I expect to 
find a positive relationship between the capital gains differential tax dummy and the 
decision to announce a share repurchase. 
For the U.K., I identify two periods. First, the period prior to April 1st 1998, 
where the abolishment of the Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) became effective. 
Prior to the abolishment of ACT an imputation system of taxation was in effect in the 
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U.K., according to which open market share repurchases were cash distributions for 
tax advantage purposes, hence creating an ACT charge. Furthermore, in the case 
where there was no surplus ACT capacity against which the tax liability of share 
repurchases could be offset share, then open market share repurchases would generate 
an additional tax liability for shareholders. For instance, prior July 2nd, 1997, tax-
exempt shareholders such as pension funds were able to claim back the tax credit on 
dividends, hence making an 80 pence net dividend worth out of 100 pence. However, 
the tax credit on share repurchases was not refundable. Therefore, prior to the 
abolishment of ACT share repurchases were not considered to be an attractive method 
of payout. Moreover, Rau and Vermaelen (2002), argue that while ACT was effective, 
investors belonging to high tax brackets would prefer open market share repurchases 
than cash dividends, whereas investors belonging to low tax bracket would prefer cash 
dividends over share repurchases. With the abolishment of ACT the tax disadvantage 
of share repurchases was removed hence, increasing firms’ attractiveness to open 
market share repurchases. Second, the period following February 1st 2005 where a 
payment made by a company on the purchase of its own shares would be subject to 
income tax, rather than capital gains tax which were taxed at a lower level than the 
respective level of income tax. Consequently, the tax benefit of share repurchases for 
the shareholders would be diminished. Thus, for the time period between April 1st, 
1998 and January 31st, 2005 the dummy variable (DTAX) is assigned the value of one, 
and zero otherwise.  
In France, before January 1st, 2005 short-term capital gains (gains on sales of 
securities held for less than two years) were taxed as regular income tax whereas 
long-term capital gains were taxed at a 19% rate. After January 1st 2005 and until 
December 31st 2005 long-term capital gains were taxed at a lower rate of 15%. For the 
period between January 1st 2006 and December 31st 2006 long-term capital gains were 
taxed even lower at 8%. Therefore, the dummy (DTAX) for France takes the value of 
one for the period after January 1st 2005 and zero otherwise. In Germany, after 
January 1st 2001, where the Tax Reform 2000 became effective, only 50% for both 
dividends and capital gains received by individual shareholders would be taxable. 
Since the marginal personal tax rate was effectively reduced to 48.5% any tax 
advantage of share repurchasing would be diminished. Hence, the dummy (DTAX) for 
Germany, takes the value of one prior to the period after January 1st 2001 and zero 
otherwise. 
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Further, Lie and Lie (1999) find evidence that shareholder tax implications 
affect how firms distribute cash to their shareholders. In addition they report that 
managers are more sensitive to the tax threshold of the shareholders if a large fraction 
of the shares is owned by institutional investors because they can be more capable and 
willing to inform managers about the tax implications of different cash disbursements.  
2.2.6. Information Asymmetry and Undervaluation 
Information asymmetry, leads to one of the main motives for a share repurchase 
that has been largely discussed in the literature which is the undervaluation 
hypothesis. The undervaluation hypothesis is based on the notion that information 
asymmetry between the management and the shareholders can lead to a firm’s 
misvaluation. In that case, if managers believe that the current equity price in the 
market is not reflecting the true price of the firm, then the firm can repurchase its own 
stock since it believes it is a good opportunity to invest in its own stock due to the 
current misprice or signal to the market that the firm is undervalued. Therefore, by 
making such an announcement (assuming that the markets respond efficiently) prices 
should then adjust instantly to the new price levels that reflect the true value of the 
firm. 
A number of research studies (e.g. Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; Louis and 
White, 2007; Vermaelen, 1981; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005) report evidence 
suggesting that the market has a much higher positive reaction on the announcement 
of fixed-price tender offer share repurchases compared to that of an open market share 
repurchase announcement. Because the firm pays a premium in order to repurchase 
the tendered shares, it can be translated as a costly signal to the market, thus bearing 
more credibility, contrary to an open market repurchase announcement, which poses 
no commitment to the firm, therefore being a less credible signal to the market.  
Therefore, firms that wish to signal their undervaluation would be more likely to 
proceed to a fixed-price tender offer since they are considered to be costly signals, 
thus making them more credible. But that is not always the case, since the majority of 
firms that undertake a share repurchase and wish to signal their undervaluation, 
repurchase their shares in the open market, which poses no commitment to the firm 
(Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; Allen and Michaely, 2003). Since open market share 
repurchases are costless signals, there is a drawback concerning the signalling 
hypothesis. Because the announcement of an open market share repurchase is a 
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“costless” signal for a company, meaning that it could be imitated even by a bad firm 
as there is no commitment to undertake the announced share repurchase programme, 
therefore share repurchases could not be considered as a credible signal. 
On the other hand though, Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) argue that an open 
market repurchase announcement still can be a credible positive signal, because by 
making such an announcement, the company will attract scrutiny. Consequently, the 
bad firm cannot mimic the good firm because it would want to avoid any possible 
scrutiny by the market. 
Previous studies show that share prices increase significantly on the 
announcement of intention to buy back stocks. On average, the announcement price 
effect of an open market share repurchase is approximately 3%, as reported in a 
number of U.S. studies, whereas this does not seem to be the case for European 
markets, for instance Lasfer (2005) reports an excess return of approximately 1.6% in 
the U.K. and Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) an excess return of 0.57% in France. In 
addition, the market reaction is positively related to the targeted proportion of shares 
outstanding to be repurchased (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
This implies that the larger the proportion of shares sought, the stronger the signal of 
undervaluation, signifying that the management believes that the current share price is 
a better investing opportunity for the firm. Moreover, Ikenberry et al. (1995), 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Vermaelen (1981) report a similar in magnitude 
decrease in the share price, during the month prior to the announcement of intention to 
repurchase, signifying that signalling for undervaluation can be a strong motive for 
announcing a share repurchase. 
Further, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report evidence derived from the U.S. 
market that firms repurchase either a substantial fraction of the announced shares or 
almost none at all. Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) argue that firms make the 
announcement but not repurchase because the signal has already worked (meaning 
that the firm has already attracted the wanted scrutiny from the market). Moreover, 
the authors argue that the more a firm is undervalued, or ignored by the market, the 
greater the scrutiny will be, and therefore the greater the trading profits will accrue by 
discovering this information about the firm. 
In the predominantly U.S. literature (e.g. Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; 
Ikenberry et al., 1995; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Dittmar, 2000; and Mitchell 
and Dharmawan, 2007 in Australia) negative abnormal returns are reported during the 
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period preceding the announcement of a share repurchase programme, indicating that 
firms announce their intention to repurchase in order to signal to the market that their 
current stock price is undervalued. It is notable though, that this might not be the case 
for the European markets. Lasfer (2005) reports that in the U.K. for the period of -151 
to -3 days prior to the announcement of a share repurchase, firms show a slightly 
negative performance, although not statistically significant, whereas for Continental 
Europe the respective abnormal performance for the same time window appears to be 
highly negative (-4.56%) and statistically significant. This signifies that the weight of 
undervaluation as being a motive for announcing a share repurchase programme, can 
vary among different markets. This is reinforced by the notion that U.S. firms are 
more widely held compared to the U.K. firms, and even more so compared to 
Germany and France as discussed earlier, implying that there should be lower levels 
of information asymmetries in Europe, which is translated to the fact that there should 
be a lower impact of undervaluation in this study.  
Moreover, Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) argue that even if the initial purpose a 
share repurchase announcement is not to indicate a firm’s undervaluation, the 
managers’ timing for the announcement of a share repurchase programme should be 
triggered by negative abnormal returns during the period preceding the 
announcement. In addition, the authors report that the average daily abnormal return, 
during the six months prior to the announcement, is inversely related to the market 
reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase programme.  
Therefore, I expect to find that the greater the undervaluation of a firm, the 
greater will be the propensity to announce a share repurchase programme. As reported 
in the literature (e.g. Ikenberry et al., 1995; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Dittmar, 
2000; Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007) a reduction in stock price performance is 
almost entirely concentrated in the year prior to the share repurchase announcement 
suggesting undervaluation. In order to capture any potential undervaluation I use as a 
proxy (RET_1yr), which is the cumulative daily market-adjusted stock returns for the 
entire year prior to the announcement of a share repurchase (-261 to -2 days).  
In addition, I replicate the logit models by estimating the market adjusted returns 
in a smaller time horizon. I do this in order to identify if it is a longer or a shorter term 
undervaluation that can have a significant impact on the decision to announce a share 
repurchase, as well as if managers have a timing ability on announcing a share 
repurchase. The smaller time periods employed are -151 to -2 days (RET_6m),  -40 to 
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-2 days (RET_2m) and -20 to -2 days (RET_20d) prior to the announcement of 
intention to repurchase. In any case the results remain unaltered. 
Apart from the stock returns prior to a share repurchase announcement, an 
additional indication of a firm being undervalued is the market-to-book ratio. 
Ikenberry et al., (1995) and Ikenberry et al., (2000) show that firms with high book-
to-market ratios earn significant abnormal returns in the subsequent periods, thus 
suggesting that these firms were potentially undervalued. Further, Dittmar (2000) 
reports that firms which repurchase stock show an inverse relationship between the 
dollar amount of repurchased shares and the respective market-to-book ratio 
suggesting that firms repurchase their stock in order to take advantage of their 
undervaluation. In addition, Barth and Kasznik (1999), test if undervaluation has a 
significant impact on the decision to announce an open market share repurchase in the 
U.S., and employ as a proxy the ratio of market-to-book value of equity. 
Thus, I include as a proxy for potential undervaluation the market-to-book ratio 
(MKBK) which is the company’s market value compared to its book value of equity at 
the year end prior to share repurchase announcement. A negative coefficient should 
suggest that the lower the market-to-book ratio the higher the propensity will be to 
announce a share repurchase programme in order to exploit a potential 
undervaluation.  
2.2.7. Alternative Motives 
An additional reason why firms repurchase their shares is to offset the costs 
involved of issuing stock options to their employees as compensation. Due to the fact 
that the issuance of stock options and their respective exercise has a dilutive effect on 
a firm’s earning per share, firms repurchase their shares for countering the options’ 
dilutive effect and keep the number of shares outstanding at the desirable level. 
Furthermore, Dittmar (2008) argues that when the share options compensation 
programmes involve executives, as this is often the case, managers have an additional 
incentive for repurchasing instead of paying dividends which have a tax disadvantage 
over repurchases and because share options are typically not entitled to dividends.  
A number of studies in the literature find evidence that firms that use stock 
options show a higher propensity to repurchase their shares than pay dividends. 
Bartov et al. (1998), Jolls (1998), and Weisbenner (1998) employ a discrete-choice 
methodology for analysing the impact of employee or management stock option on 
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firms’ payout choice between dividends and share repurchases. All three studies 
report evidence suggesting that stock options have a positive relationship with the 
probability to repurchase shares. Furthermore, Fenn and Liang (2001) investigate the 
impact of stock options on a firms’ choice to repurchase or pay dividends but also on 
its total payout policy as a whole. The authors report evidence of a negative 
relationship between stock options and the payment of dividends, whereas share 
repurchases have a positive relationship with stock options suggesting that stock 
options and their increasing use as a compensation policy could be one of the reasons 
of explaining the increasing trend of share repurchases at the expense of dividends. 
Furthermore, Dittmar (2000) finds evidence of stock options having a significant 
impact on firms repurchasing their shares. Contrary to these findings, Brav et al. 
(2005) find no evidence on their qualitative study (only 10.6% of the interviewed 
managers agreed) that firms repurchase their shares instead of paying dividends 
because employee stock options are dividend-protected.  
The aforementioned studies focus on the impact of stock options on the actual 
share repurchases and not on firms’ announcement of their intention to repurchase 
shares. Babenko (2009) investigates the impact of stock options on the announcement 
of share repurchases against a dividend increase. The author finds that the payout 
method chosen by a firm is indeed affected by the firms’ compensation structure and 
that share repurchases are more likely to be announced when employees hold more 
unvested stock and even more so when these firms have a higher need for human 
capital. However, due to the difficulty of finding accurate data on stock options and 
more specifically for the two stock option categories of those held by employees and 
those held by executives which consequently reflects different interests and incentives 
alignment between these two groups and due to the fact that the impact of stock 
options should be reflected more on the actual share repurchase trades rather than the 
announcement itself which is not a commitment to firms, the investigation of stock 
options falls out of the scope of this research. 
An additional motive for share repurchases is the takeover deterrent hypothesis, 
according to which in the presence of an upward-sloping supply curve for shares, a 
potential target firm can increase the bid price and consequently the cost of the 
acquisition by repurchasing its shares. Share repurchases increase a firm’s share price 
in this case because they provide the demand for the firm’s shares which increase the 
lowest price for which the stock is available (Bagwell, 1992; Dittmar, 2000). 
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Furthermore, Dittmar (2000) finds evidence that a potential takeover has a positive 
and significant effect on firms actually repurchasing their shares during time periods 
of takeover waves. However, if a firm wishes to prevent a hostile takeover it would 
prefer to undertake a fixed price tender offer or a Dutch auction repurchase share 
repurchase, which gives it the ability to retire a large number of shares in a short 
period of time and in a pre-specified price range, thus making it a more efficient 
takeover deterrent mechanism (Bagwell, 1991; 1992). Therefore, the examination of 
the takeover deterrent hypothesis influencing the managerial incentives for 
announcing an open market share repurchase falls out of the scope of this research. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the motives for announcing an open market share 
repurchase programme investigated in this research represent only a number of 
potential factors that lead firms to make such an announcement, a caveat which one 
should bear in mind when interpreting the results regarding the managerial incentives 
for announcement the intention to repurchase shares in the open market reported in 
this research.  
2.3.  Data and Methodology 
2.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample of repurchasing firms is constructed by identifying all the 
announcements of intention to repurchase ordinary shares in the open market. The 
data is collected by using news articles posted in Perfect Analysis and Factiva  
databases from 1st of January 1997 through 31st of December 2006. The reason for 
selecting this time period is because it was not until 1998 that share repurchasing was 
allowed to take place more freely in both Germany and France, thus allowing me to 
do the cross country analysis between the three different markets.  
These databases report any news announcements that were available in the press 
made by U.K. and European corporations on share repurchases. The sample is refined 
so as to involve solely firms that announce their intention to repurchase ordinary 
shares in the open market, thus excluding announcements concerning the repurchase 
of B-shares or preference shares. Additionally I control my sample for American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and cross-country listings. Moreover, financial firms, 
property companies and investment trusts are excluded from the sample. Such 
exclusion is common practice in the literature (e.g, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Fama 
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and French, 1992). This is due to the fact that financial firms exhibit different capital 
structures compared to non-financial firms and, especially, they have increased levels 
of leverage (Saunders and Cornett, 2008). Finally, corporations included in the sample 
are required to have their share prices listed on DataStream and their accounting data 
on Worldscope. The sample contains 970 announcements of intention to repurchase 
from corporations primarily listed in the United Kingdom (513 announcements), 
France (263 announcements) and Germany (194 announcements). 
After collecting the sample of firms that have announced an open market share 
repurchase (test-sample), I proceed to the construction of the control firms sample. In 
order to construct the control sample of non-repurchasing firms, I collect data on all 
domestic companies that were trading in the respective main markets of each of the 
three countries under study, that have not announced a share repurchase 
announcement during the ten year period 1997 to 2006.  
The approach I use for matching the repurchasing firms with the non-
repurchasing firms is standard in the literature. For every year in the study I randomly 
generate a sample of firms from the population of firms that have not announced a 
share repurchase, which I refer to as the “control” group. Each control firm is selected 
randomly following a uniform distribution and only once from the pool of companies 
that have not announced a share repurchase programme for the ten year period under 
study8. As argued in Hasbrouck (1985), “the use of a non-industry matched control 
sample will render indistinguishable firm- and industry-specific effects, while the use 
of an industry-matched sample will purge from the analysis any industry-specific 
effects”. Therefore, following Hasbrouck (1985), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003), 
and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) I employ an industry-matching procedure and 
                                                 
8
 The matching method of test and control firms (i.e. repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms 
respectively) is common in the literature (e.g. Hasbrouck, 1984; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; 
Mitchell and Dharmawan, 2007; etc.). The primary reason for following this procedure is that choice 
based sample provides higher information content than a random sample (Cosslett, 1981). Given that 
the number of firms announcing their intention to repurchase their shares in the open market is 
relatively small compared to non-repurchasing firms, random sampling will consequently result in a 
sample comprising of a substantially large sample of non-repurchasing firms and only a few firms that 
made open market share repurchase announcements. Palepu (1986) argues that this would prove to be 
inefficient from an estimation perspective. Therefore, it is important to select the samples in a way that 
will ensure that the test samples represent an adequate proportion of the overall sample which 
incorporates certain distinguishable firm- and/or industry-specific characteristics. Furthermore, Manski 
and Lerman (1977) and Manski and McFadden (1981) point out that such a choice based sample will 
provide more efficient estimates than a random sample of the same size, while Cosslett (1981) 
characterizes such a sample as a close-to-optimal design. Finally, I employ a number of different model 
selection methods, in order to ascertain the robustness of the results irrespective to the sample 
specification. 
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alternatively a market-to-book, a size-matching procedure (which is defined as the 
market capitalisation at the end of the year prior to the share repurchase 
announcement) and a non-matching procedure, for robustness check of the results. 
The industry-, market-to-book-, and size-matching procedures are performed on 
a one-to-one basis, meaning that for every test firm, a unique control firm that 
complies with the requirements of each matching method is selected. For the industry-
matched samples, I select randomly the control firms from the same two-digit 
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code that have not announced a share 
repurchase programme within the whole ten year period of this study and I assign 
them with a company from the test-sample, that has the same two-digit industry code. 
For the market-to-book matching method, I randomly select a control firm that has not 
made a repurchase announcement within the whole ten year period under study, and 
with a market-to-book ratio that falls within a ten percent range above or below the 
respective level of the test firm, during the year of the repurchase announcement. 
Similarly, for the size-matched method, I randomly select a control firm, a firm that 
has not made a repurchase announcement within the entire ten year period under 
study, and with a respective market value that falls within a ten percent range above 
or below the respective level of the test, during the year of the repurchase 
announcement. Finally, for robustness check, I do not match a repurchasing firm with 
a specific non-repurchasing firm. Rather, I include in the model all the firms that are 
trading in each respective stock exchange in each year, for the ten year period under 
study. In this case, all firms that have made a share repurchase announcement appear 
throughout the ten year period as repurchasing (test) firms and the remaining firms 
that have never made a share repurchase announcement throughout the ten year period 
are employed as non-repurchasing (control) firms. 
Table 2.1 reports the number of repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms that 
met the criteria for each of the four matching procedures. It should be noted though 
that apart for the non-matched samples for every repurchasing firm there is an 
equivalent non-repurchasing firm, meaning that half of the total number of firms per 
annum are repurchasing firms and the other half are non-repurchasing firms for each 
matching procedure. It should be noted though, that due to the fact that each test firm 
is matched with a unique control firm which appears only once in the sample of 
control firms and due to the respective criteria restriction imposed on each matching 
method (industry, size and market-to-book) yields smaller test samples, relative to the 
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initial 970 open market share repurchase announcements. This is also the reason why 
the samples from each matching method differ significantly between them. 
Table 2.1 Annual distribution of test and control firms for the four matching 
methods in each country 
This table contains the number of firms on a per year basis, for each matching method. It should be 
noted that the matching for each method apart for the non-matched samples method that has taken 
place is on a one-to-one basis. This means that for every test firm there is a matched control firm that 
has not made an open market share repurchase announcement during the ten-year period under study. 
 
 
Industry-Matched 
 
Size-Matched 
  
United 
Kingdom Germany  France Total 
 
  
United 
Kingdom  Germany France  Total 
1997 20 0 2 22 
 
1997 20 0 0 20 
1998 48 2 30 80 
 
1998 48 2 20 50 
1999 36 16 40 92 
 
1999 38 12 28 50 
2000 34 42 74 150 
 
2000 38 32 62 70 
2001 56 64 26 146 
 
2001 50 56 20 106 
2002 88 50 52 190 
 
2002 80 48 42 128 
2003 82 30 56 168 
 
2003 70 24 48 94 
2004 100 30 48 178 
 
2004 56 20 20 76 
2005 116 48 28 192 
 
2005 68 44 10 112 
2006 108 40 64 212 
 
2006 66 40 44 106 
Test Sample 344 161 210 715 
 
Test Sample 267 139 147 406 
Control 
Sample 344 161 210 715 
 
Control 
Sample 267 139 147 406 
Total 688 322 420 1,430 
 
Total 534 278 294 812 
          MKBK-Matched 
 
Non-Matched 
  
United 
Kingdom Germany  France Total 
 
  
United 
Kingdom  Germany France  Total 
1997 20 0 2 22 
 
1997 1,019 285 245 1,549 
1998 52 2 32 86 
 
1998 1,007 293 263 1,563 
1999 44 12 36 92 
 
1999 1,098 297 251 1,646 
2000 42 32 80 154 
 
2000 1,025 300 243 1,568 
2001 54 48 26 128 
 
2001 1,087 295 205 1,587 
2002 96 48 50 194 
 
2002 1,235 270 203 1,708 
2003 90 28 52 170 
 
2003 1,200 222 183 1,605 
2004 102 26 38 166 
 
2004 1,165 194 164 1,523 
2005 124 52 26 202 
 
2005 1,281 204 142 1,627 
2006 114 54 64 232 
 
2006 1,426 186 160 1,772 
Test Sample 369 151 203 520 
 
Test Sample 417 261 259 937 
Control 
Sample 369 151 203 520 
 
Control 
Sample 11,126 2,285 1,800 15,211 
Total 738 302 406 1,040 
 
Total 11,543 2,546 2,059 16,148 
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2.3.2. Methodology 
In order to estimate what are the managerial incentives for announcing an open 
market share repurchase, a standard binary logit model is employed. Hence, I can 
determine the functional relationship between the firm characteristics and the 
probability of an open market share repurchase announcement taking place in a given 
period: 
 
( , ) ( , )
1
1i t x i t
p
e
     (2.1) 
 
where ( , )i tp  is the probability that the firm i will announce a share repurchase 
programme in period t, x(i,t) is a vector of financial variables with potential 
discriminatory ability, and β is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. 
As previously discussed, the (predominantly U.S.) existing literature has 
developed certain hypotheses that are more likely to explain the motives behind a 
share repurchase and the respective market reaction as well as the ascertaining of 
some key financial variables which are highly characteristic of share repurchasing 
firms. Therefore, these variables are more likely to influence the probability of a firm 
announcing a share repurchase. Further, I discuss a series of logit models that have 
been employed under different matching procedures for the control firms. 
2.3.3. Optimal cut-off probability 
Prediction tests typically involve distinguishing a group of firms into two 
categories. In the case of this research, the group of firms is distinguished from those 
which announce a share repurchase and to those which do not make such an 
announcement, based in the estimated share repurchase probability. But in order to 
classify each firm of a given sample, the estimated share repurchase announcement 
probability is compared to a predefined cut-off probability, and if the estimated 
probability is less than the predefined cut-off probability, then the firm is classified as 
a non-repurchasing firm. 
In the same context, but in the mergers and acquisitions field, Palepu (1986) 
argues that the appropriate cut-off probability that is to be employed in the prediction 
tests is determined by the decision context in which the model’s predictions are to be 
applied. Thus, by applying an arbitrary 0.5 cut-off probability the results of the 
56 
prediction tests from each logit model will not be accurate and subsequently difficult 
to interpret. Therefore, instead of relying on a simple à priori cut-off probability of 
0.5, I follow Palepu (1986) and for each of the applied logit models I calculate the 
optimal cut-off probability.  
The condition that allows to determine the optimal cut-off probability is the 
following:  
1
2
( repurchasing)
1( non repurchasing)
f p i
f p i
    (2.2) 
where  1 .f  is the distribution probability of repurchasing among the group of 
firms that have announced an open market share repurchase and  2 .f  is the 
corresponding distribution for those firms that have not made such an announcement. 
From condition (2.2) in order to determine the optimal cut-off probability, the 
conditional probability density functions of  1 .f  and  2 .f  must be known first. I 
achieve this by plotting the distribution of the estimated probabilities for the 
repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms that is used to estimate the model 
parameters, therefore obtaining empirical approximations for  1 .f  and  2 .f . Thus, 
the optimal cut-off probability is the value where the two plots intersect. An example 
of the probability distributions plot that provides the optimal cut-off point is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. Plot of probability distributions for optimal cut-off point. 
This figure presents the plot of the probability distributions of the repurchasing (test) firms and the non-
repurchasing (control) firms, in order to estimate the optimal cut-off probability point for the market-
to-book matching method in the United Kingdom. It has been estimated it to be 0.68. 
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2.4.  Empirical evidence 
2.4.1. Univariate Analysis 
For both groups, repurchasing and non-repurchasing firms, I collect a list of 
financial variables with potential discriminatory ability, as discussed in the literature 
review section, at the end of the year preceding the year in which the share repurchase 
announcement took place. The firm characteristics for each group of firms (test and 
control firms) and for each country are presented in Table 2.2. Panels A and B present 
the firm characteristics and summary statistics for the industry- and the size-matched 
matched samples whereas Panels C and D present the respective characteristics for the 
market-to-book-matched and the non-matched samples respectively. It should be 
noted that for the market-to-book- and size-matched methods, the differences in 
means (between the sample and control firms) for the respective market-to-book and 
size proxy variables are not reported since I control for these variables. 
What is most apparent from all four matching methods is that, firms in all three 
countries that have announced their intention to repurchase their shares, have a 
significantly lower ownership concentration level. This supports my expectations that 
firms with lower levels of ownership concentration would be more prone to announce 
a share repurchase as a means of a self-imposed discipline mechanism for reducing 
potential agency costs. Moreover, I see that the levels of ownership concentration for 
both the test and control samples vary across the three countries, from which the 
ownership concentration for the U.K. firms is the lowest compared to Germany and 
France. 
Further, in the industry matched samples, I see that for all three countries 
repurchasing firms have significantly higher excess cash and are larger in size, 
compared to non-repurchasing firms, as proxied by cash flow and total assets 
respectively. This suggests that repurchasing firms are larger in size and distribute 
their excess cash flows through a share repurchase. When examining the leverage 
ratios though, I find that it is only in the German market that repurchasing firms have 
significantly lower leverage ratios compared to their respective counterparts. This 
suggests that repurchasing firms in Germany are trying to exploit their excess debt 
capacity. In order to see if firms that announce a share repurchase are trying to signal 
their undervaluation, I find that their market-to-book ratios (which are used as proxies 
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of undervaluation) are not significantly different compared to the control sample for 
all three countries.  
In order to check if repurchasing firms have a lower growth than non-
repurchasing firms, I find that their growth as captured by the Tobin’s q, is only for 
the case of the U.K. that the test firms have a significantly lower q compared to their 
matched counterparts. Nevertheless, I find that it is the combination of having a lower 
growth ratio (Tobin’s q) and higher excess cash compared to the median industry 
ratios respectively. Finally, I find that for France only, the test sample has a 
significantly higher dividend yield ratio, suggesting that repurchasing firms pay out 
more cash dividends and have on average a shareholder clientele with a higher tax 
rate compared to non-repurchasing firms of the same industry. 
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Table 2.2 Univariate analysis between test and control firms. 
This table presents the univariate analysis results, which contains the mean values for each reported variable and their respective t-tests of the difference in 
mean values assuming unequal variances, for the two groups of repurchasing and non repurchasing firms, for the period 1997 to 2006. Panel A presents the 
results of the univariate analysis from the industry matching method. Panel B presents the respective univariate analysis results from the market-to-book 
matching method. Panel C presents the respective univariate analysis results from the size matching method. Panel D presents the respective univariate 
analysis results from the non-matched samples. Financial companies are excluded from the samples. CF is the ratio of net operating income before taxes and 
depreciation to total assets at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. Tobin’s q is the ratio of a firm’s ratio of its market value to the value of its 
gross capital stock adjusted for inflation, at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. DFCF is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for 
firms that have simultaneously low Tobin’s q (lower than the median q of a firm’s respective industry for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher 
than the median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and the value of zero otherwise. LVG is the ratio of total debt divided by its total assets. 
ROA is defined as the ratio of a firm’s net income to its total assets at the year end prior to the share repurchase announcement. SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of a firm’s total assets at the year end prior to the share repurchase announcement. RET 1yr is the cumulative daily market-adjusted stock returns for the 
entire year prior to the announcement of a share repurchase (-261 to -2 days). RET 20 daily market-adjusted stock returns for the period of -20 to -2 days prior 
to the announcement of intention to repurchase. MKBK is a firm’s market value compared to its book value of assets at year end prior to share repurchase 
announcement. OWN CON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the number of total common shares outstanding.  DIV_Y is a firm’s dividend yield 
ratio at the year end prior to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. The p-values for the difference in means are reported in italics below the 
mean values of each variable. The number of observations are reported in brackets. The standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for each variable 
for the test and control samples respectively are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
Panel A. Industry - Matched 
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY FRANCE 
Test Control Test Control Test Control 
REP_DUMMY 1 0 1 0 1 0 
- - - 
[345], 
(0, 1, 1) 
[345],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[161],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[161],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[210],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[210],  
(0, 0, 0) 
CF 0.098 -0.003 0.152 0.071 0.108 0.086 
0.000 0.150 0.130 
[328],  
(0.190, -2.504, 0.529) 
[247],  
(0.377, -2.771, 0.621) 
[159],  
(0.663, -0.664, 8.346) 
[156],  
(0.227, -1.572, 0.927) 
[206], (0.072, -0.123, 
0.371) 
[178],  
(0.185, -1.769, 0.422) 
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Table 2.2 Panel A., Continued. 
 
TOBIN'S Q 1.416 1.756 1.480 1.278 1.450 1.513 
0.144 0.252 0.788 
[336], 
(1.312, 0.062, 7.857) 
[261], 
(3.568, 0, 46.512) 
[161],  
(1.824, 0.265, 17.53) 
[150],  
(1.252, 0.087, 9.445) 
[207],  
(1.992, 0.251, 19.46) 
[171],  
(2.449, 0.030, 22.355) 
DFCF 0.368 0.195 0.335 0.298 0.374 0.148 
0.000 0.474 0.000 
[345],  
(0.483, 0, 1) 
[345],  
(0.397, 0, 1) 
[161],  
(0.474, 0, 1) 
[161],  
(0.459, 0, 1) 
[210],  
(0.485, 0, 1) 
[210],  
(0.356, 0, 1) 
LVG 0.234 0.433 0.137 0.189 0.224 0.210 
0.374 0.005 0.412 
[337],  
(0.184, 0, 0.928) 
[306],  
(3.908, 0, 68.285) 
[161],  
(0.140, 0, 0.545) 
[161],  
(0.188, 0, 0.935) 
[209],  
(0.144, 0, 0.583) 
[189],  
(0.175, 0, 1.119) 
ROA 0.039 -0.678 0.025 -0.040 0.032 0.005 
0.189 0.004 0.031 
[337],  
(0.135, -1.653, 0.323) 
[307],  
(9.545, -1.670, 1.423) 
[160], 
(0.125, -1.050, 0.367) 
[161],  
(0.258, -1.895, 0.538) 
[209],  
(0.086, -0.536, 0.458) 
[190],  
(0.147, -0.824, 0.257) 
 SIZE 10,452.38 369.86 9,111.67 767.46 8,242.40 910.34 
(millions $) 0.000 0.001 0.000 
  
[337],  
(30,582.4,2.623,18,354) 
[292],  
(13,92.9, 0.004, 14,229) 
[151],  
(29,429.15,9.920,18,56
1) 
[155],  
(2,753.4, 1.082, 26565) 
[209],  
(15,330.38,3.988,89,20
7) 
[189],  
(6,339.54,0.857,83,346
) 
RET 1YR % 0.002 0.003 -0.019 -0.012 -0.003 -0.023 
0.868 0.664 0.128 
[345],  
(0.085, -0.459, 0.334) 
[345],  
(0.113, -0.421, 0.649) 
[161],  
(0.111, -0.434, 0.344) 
[161],  
(0.148, -0.844, 0.668) 
[210], (0.128, -0.538, 
0.334) 
[210],  
(0.145, -0.715, 0.465) 
RET 20D % 0.001 0.002 -0.019 -0.008 -0.005 -0.029 
0.877 0.538 0.079 
[345],  
(0.086, -0.468, 0.302) 
[345],  
(0.113, -0.411, 0.660) 
[161],  
(0.112, -0.465, 0.326) 
[161],  
(0.194, -0.999, 1.469) 
[210],  
(0.127, -0.515, 0.333) 
[210],  
(0.153, -0.720, 0.469) 
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Table 2.2 Panel A., Continued. 
 
MKBK 2.715 2.826 3.034 2.776 2.714 2.293 
0.700 0.449 0.071 
[328],  
(3.357, 0.070, 25.801) 
[267],  
(3.566, 0.250, 29.27) 
[155],  
(2.861, 0.410, 21.070) 
[141],  
(2.988, 0.080, 20.846) 
[209],  
(2.398,1.190, 17.590) 
[172],  
(2.125, 1.450, 14.110) 
OWN CON % 20.484 38.094 41.892 59.003 44.888 63.680 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
[332],  
(22.565, 0.001, 91.633) 
[287],  
(23.860, 0.009, 98.169) 
[128],  
(22.988, 0.004, 96.100) 
[90],  
(27.696, 0.018, 99.850) 
[191],  
(24.833, 0.060, 98.900) 
[108],  
(21.769, 6.210, 99.901) 
DIV_Y 2.963 2.061 1.607 1.578 1.860 1.680 
0.000 0.896 0.350 
[339],  
(2.538, 0.000, 26.769) 
[256],  
(2.7913, 0.000, 25.671) 
[158],  
(1.738, 0.000, 7.0744) 
[149],  
(2.131, 0.000, 11.288) 
[205],  
(1.649, 0.000, 11.656) 
[174],  
(2.049, 0.000, 11.750) 
DIV/NI -1.312 0.944 1.018 0.289 2.494 0.108 
0.533 0.077 0.003 
[315], 
(6.309, -4.710, 26.489) 
[345], 
(12.224,-13.631, 
21.896) 
[156],  
(4.894, -1.619, 28.726) 
[161],  
(1.493, -9.300, 8.943) 
[155],  
(9.678,-1.782,70.599) 
[208],  
(0.937, -3.355, 9.846) 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. MKBK – Matched 
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY FRANCE  
Test Control Test Control Test Control 
REP_DUMMY 1 0 1 0 1 0 
- - - 
[330],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[408],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[165],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[136],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[224],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[180],  
(0, 0, 0) 
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Table 2.2 Panel B., Continued. 
 
CF 0.139 0.085 0.127 0.109 0.125 0.106 
0.000 0.280 0.209 
[326],  
(0.130, -1.148, 0.476) 
[197],  
(0.156, -0.695, 0.513) 
[161],  
(0.179, -1.649, 0.445) 
[90],  
(0.083, -0.086, 0.433) 
[216],  
(0.106, -0.515, 0.485) 
[87],  
(0.125, -0.494, 0.635) 
TOBIN'S Q 1.506 1.102 1.430 0.869 1.416 1.334 
0 0.000 0.711 
[326],  
(1.129, 0.246, 7.577) 
[196],  
(1.055, 0.121, 9.343) 
[165],  
(1.779, 0.244, 17.690) 
[91],  
(0.526, 0.096, 3.606) 
[221],  
(1.900, 0.251, 18.760) 
[89],  
(1.708, 0.159, 12.682) 
DFCF 0.376 0.598 0.364 0.537 0.375 0.461 
0.000 0.003 0.082 
[330],  
(0.485, 0, 1) 
[408],  
(0.491, 0, 1) 
[165],  
(0.483, 0, 1) 
[136],  
(0.500, 0, 1) 
[224],  
(0.485, 0, 1) 
[180],  
(0.499, 0, 1) 
LVG 0.212 0.192 0.140 0.195 0.224 0.181 
0.144 0.013 0.012 
[327],  
(0.165, 0.000, 0.835) 
[198],  
(0.150, 0.000, 0.794) 
[165],  
(0.140, 0.000, 0.545) 
[91],  
(0.179, 0.000, 0.682) 
[222],  
(0.142, 0.000, 0.583) 
[89],  
(0.134, 0.000, 0.472) 
ROA 0.051 0.006 0.021 0.012 0.032 -0.134 
0.001 0.605 0.265 
[328],  
(0.150, -1.615, 0.948) 
[199],  
(0.158, -0.876, 0.528) 
[165],  
(0.205, -2.092, 0.371) 
[91],  
(0.066, -0.210, 0.231) 
[222],  
(0.093, -0.612, 0.447) 
[90],  
(1.406, -13.27, 0.239) 
 SIZE 12,385.810 28,690.780 11,768.580 21,573.470 9,167.521 26,513.350 
(millions $) 0.000 0.026 0.000 
[324],  
(32,704.62,5.218,18,354) 
[312],  
(42,063.08,0.168,11,674) 
[163],  
(31,110.05,9.505,19,769) 
[110],  
(37,886, 3.221, 116,747) 
[218],  
(17,938.78,7.428,12,705) 
[109],  
(39,117.2,5.262,11,674) 
RET 1YR % 0.001 0.000 -0.020 0.021 -0.006 -0.001 
0.883 0.002 0.679 
[330],  
(0.108, -0.669, 0.628) 
[408],  
(0.098, -0.412, 0.814) 
[165],  
(0.109, -0.482, 0.344) 
[136],  
(0.113, -0.191, 0.804) 
[224],  
(0.129, -0.538, 0.396) 
[180],  
(0.080, -0.470, 0.328) 
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Table 2.2 Panel B., Continued. 
 
RET 20D % 0.001 0.001 -0.019 0.025 -0.008 -0.002 
0.999 0.001 0.564 
[330],  
(0.109, -0.657, 0.622) 
[408],  
(0.102, -0.387, 0.827) 
[165],  
(0.112, -0.505, 0.326) 
[136],  
(0.116, -0.209, 0.804) 
[224],  
(0.130, -0.515, 0.414) 
[180],  
(0.079, -0.447, 0.232) 
MKBK 5.491 3.080 2.790 3.507 2.657 2.986 
0.369 0.347 0.265 
[330],  
(4.832, 0.286, 29.580) 
[408],  
(6.137, 0.434, 27.220) 
[165],  
(2.955, 0.330, 22.110) 
[136],  
(8.451, 0.030, 29.660) 
[224],  
(2.775, 1.440, 24.860) 
[180],  
(3.064, 0.300, 21.99) 
OWN CON % 0.179 0.324 0.405 0.670 0.443 0.638 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
[319],  
(0.191, 0.000, 0.916) 
[194],  
(0.215, 0.000, 0.964) 
[131],  
(0.238, 0.000, 0.961) 
[73],  
(0.293, 0.067, 0.999) 
[203],  
(0.249, 0.000, 0.989) 
[76],  
(0.239, 0.001, 0.9940) 
DIV_Y 3.407 3.291 1.675 2.389 2.802 2.725 
0.632 0.021 0.792 
[330],  
(2.495, 0.000, 17.550) 
[408],  
(4.000, 0.000, 25.140) 
[165],  
(2.013, 0.000, 13.190) 
[136],  
(3.099, 0.000, 25.740) 
[224],  
(2.558, 0.000, 17.280) 
[180],  
(3.159, 0.000, 28.94) 
DIV/NI 1.018 0.181 0.394 0.168 0.307 -0.091 
0.188 0.076 0.007 
[330],  
(1.141,-1.410, 5.205) 
[408],  
(1.859, -1.715, 18.642) 
[165],  
(1.502, -1.243, 17.786) 
[136],  
(0.575, -2.889, 2.386) 
[224],  
(1.055, -2.098, 13.832) 
[180],  
(1.705, -2.720, 3.708) 
 
Panel C. Size - Matched 
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY FRANCE  
Test Control Test Control Test Control 
REP_DUMMY 1 0 1 0 1 0 
- - - 
[242],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[292],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[159],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[120],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[165],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[129],  
(0, 0, 0) 
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Table 2.2 Panel C., Continued. 
 
CF 0.128 0.115 0.119 0.127 0.122 0.126 
0.285 0.650 0.755 
[241],  
(0.146, -1.148, 0.561) 
[292],  
(0.138, -0.808, 0.388) 
[155],  
(0.184, -1.649, 0.445) 
[119],  
(0.092, -0.150, 0.442) 
[159],  
(0.115, -0.515, 0.485) 
[124],  
(0.098, -0.099, 0.645) 
TOBIN'S Q 1.413 1.461 1.467 1.016 1.402 2.130 
0.712 0.005 0.423 
[241],  
(1.110, 0.159, 7.860) 
[289],  
(1.863, 0.137, 23.682) 
[159],  
(1.790, 0.199, 17.690) 
[120],  
(0.838, 0.000, 6.322) 
[165],  
(1.977, 0.251, 18.760) 
[128],  
(10.117, 0.092, 14.820) 
DFCF 0.388 0.356 0.358 0.367 0.358 0.380 
0.444 0.889 0.696 
[242],  
(0.488, 0, 1) 
[292],  
(0.479, 0, 1) 
[159],  
(0.481, 0, 1) 
[120],  
(0.484, 0, 1) 
[165],  
(0.481, 0, 1) 
[129],  
(0.487, 0, 1) 
LVG 0.200 0.216 0.128 0.165 0.214 0.221 
0.273 0.037 0.715 
[242],  
(0.169, 0.000, 0.835) 
[292],  
(0.169, 0.000, 0.992) 
[159],  
(0.135, 0.000, 0.545) 
[120],  
(0.157, 0.000, 0.552) 
[165],  
(0.145, 0.000, 0.583) 
[129],  
(0.148, 0.000, 0.833) 
ROA 0.041 0.027 0.017 0.034 0.029 0.034 
0.309 0.325 0.593 
[242],  
(0.151, -1.679, 0.341) 
[292],  
(0.160, -1.754, 0.278) 
[159],  
(0.202, -1.956, 0.347) 
[119],  
(0.070, -0.224, 0.288) 
[165],  
(0.109, -0.658, 0.450) 
[128],  
(0.064, -0.237, 0.255) 
 SIZE 1,539.183 1,119.996 3,267.734 2,628.623 3,189.252 5,090.943 
(millions $) 0.127 0.604 0.276 
  
[237],  
(3,694.9, 5.272, 32,685) 
[284],  
(2,235.9, 2.927, 15,032) 
[154],  
(10,371.6,9.920,86,434) 
[115],  
(9,686.3, 3.459, 96,802) 
[165],  
(7,853.8, 3.988, 59,879) 
[121], 
(17,917,6.453,16,919) 
RET 1YR % 0.000 0.009 -0.023 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 
0.372 0.156 0.640 
[242],  
(0.125, -0.669, 0.628) 
[292],  
(0.110, -0.567, 0.608) 
[159],  
(0.119, -0.481, 0.344) 
[120],  
(0.111, -0.279, 0.733) 
[165],  
(0.143, -0.538, 0.396) 
[129],  
(0.117, -0.326, 0.664) 
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Table 2.2 Panel C., Continued. 
 
RET 20D % 0.000 0.009 -0.022 -0.002 -0.012 -0.005 
0.368 0.139 0.633 
[242],  
(0.126, -0.657, 0.621) 
[292],  
(0.113, -0.564, 0.589) 
[159],  
(0.119, -0.505, 0.326) 
[120],  
(0.107, -0.277, 0.687) 
[165],  
(0.142, -0.515, 0.413) 
[129],  
(0.119, -0.347, 0.660) 
MKBK 2.838 1.911 3.071 2.491 2.818 2.673 
0.803 0.063 0.689 
[238],  
(5.581, 0.039, 27.315) 
[282],  
(13.372,0.019, 32.757) 
[154],  
(3.077, 0.526, 21.610) 
[116],  
(2.010, 0.050, 21.320) 
[165],  
(3.244, 0.390, 31.760) 
[117],  
(2.808, 0.010, 27.006) 
OWN CON % 0.205 0.248 0.421 0.723 0.486 0.657 
0.018 0.000 0.000 
[236],  
(0.201, 0.000, 0.875) 
[289],  
(0.222, 0.000, 0.894) 
[128],  
(0.233, 0.000, 0.961) 
[96],  
(0.272, 0.002, 0.990) 
[149],  
(0.233, 0.000, 0.917) 
[106],  
(0.251, 0.001, 0.980) 
DIV_Y 3.152 2.894 1.586 2.389 1.696 1.845 
0.189 0.002 0.526 
[240],  
(2.299, 0.000, 9.833) 
[290],  
(2.194, 0.000, 12.244) 
[157],  
(1.774, 0.000, 7.074) 
[116],  
(2.310, 0.000, 9.091) 
[164],  
(1.738, 0.000, 11.656) 
[122],  
(2.109, 0.000, 14.667) 
DIV/NI 0.169 0.475 0.344 0.814 0.289 0.245 
0.401 0.040 0.776 
[241],  
(1.142, -8.74, 4.896) 
[292],  
(13.032,-18.37, 18.469) 
[155],  
(1.288, -1.365, 14.467) 
[115],  
(2.166, -0.705, 18.210) 
[165],  
(1.088, -2.304, 12.057) 
[127],  
(1.474, -5.731, 14.930) 
 
Non - Matched 
Panel D. UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY FRANCE  
Test Control Test Control Test Control 
REP_DUMMY 1 0 1 0 1 0 
- - - 
[317],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[29,190],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[171],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[9,280],  
(0, 0, 0) 
[220],  
(0, 1, 1) 
[11,053],  
(0, 0, 0) 
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Table 2.2 Panel D., Continued. 
 
CF 0.140 -0.484 1.111 1.536 11.102 12.535 
0.006 0.263 0.866 
[313],  
(0.139, -1.148, 0.561) 
[13,732],  
(26.432,-23.720, 113.9) 
[168],  
(3.827, -4.244, 7.887) 
[5,898],  
(18.158,-29.478, 49.050) 
[211],  
(9.235, -26.490, 12.300) 
[5,821],  
(40.498,-27.265, 24.982) 
TOBIN'S Q 1.651 3.792 1.442 1.479 1.390 1.342 
0.043 0.816 0.716 
[314],  
(1.382, 0.159, 7.859) 
[12,434],  
(11.800, 0.000, 29.750) 
[171],  
(1.771, 0.244, 17.690) 
[5,088],  
(5.931, 0.000, 35.555) 
[216],  
(1.876, 0.251, 18.760) 
[5,138],  
(2.863, 0.000, 24.820) 
DFCF 0.371 0.204 0.357 0.244 0.371 0.224 
0.000 0.003 0.000 
[313],  
(0.484, 0, 1) 
[12,314],  
(0.403, 0, 1) 
[168],  
(0.481, 0, 1) 
[4,991],  
(0.429, 0, 1) 
[210],  
(0.484, 0, 1) 
[4,949],  
(0.417, 0, 1) 
LVG 0.223 0.295 2.892 1.610 47.949 162.944 
0.003 0.203 0.022 
[315],  
(0.176, 0.000, 0.835) 
[13,926],  
(2.638, 0.000, 1.702) 
[169],  
(1.469, 0.000, 1.923) 
[5,908], 
 (5.799, 0.000, 9.943) 
[217],  
(1.446, 0.171, 1.462) 
[6,045],  
(3.446, 0.142, 2.473) 
ROA 0.047 -0.638 2.594 0.618 5.578 1.076 
0.002 0.208 0.419 
[315],  
(0.148, -1.615, 0.334) 
[13,954],  
(26.918, -2.379, 11.390) 
[169],  
(2.0324,-0.571, 26.020) 
[5,929],  
(17.040,-23.970, 22.400) 
[217],  
(5.4931, -6.332, 17.096) 
[6,059],  
(13.221,-13.260, 15.677) 
 SIZE 4,496.710 2,567.126 6,792.704 500.569 25,899.100 3,677.102 
(millions $) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
[315],  
(27,2063, 26.23, 17,169) 
[13,965],  
(11,187, 0.205,22,157) 
[169],  
(16,887.1, 0.080, 10,386) 
[5,929],  
(2,839, 0.010, 89,910) 
[217],  
(62,402, 0.020, 51,991) 
[6,059],  
(22,449, 0.010, 34,934) 
RET 1YR % - - - - - - 
- - - 
- - - - - - 
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Table 2.2 Panel D., Continued. 
 
RET 20D % - - - - - - 
- - - 
- - - - - - 
MKBK 2.138 5197.460 3.267 10.588 3.120 3.693 
0.245 0.002 0.476 
[306],  
(0.237, 0.406, 19.654) 
[18,761],  
(6.125, 0.032, 28.000) 
[162],  
(2.465, 0.591, 35.010) 
[6,108],  
(18.553, 0.275., 29.971) 
[219],  
(1.986, 0.430, 27.934) 
[6,923],  
(5.779, 0.123, 39.00) 
OWN CON % 18.214 35.841 45.603 69.107 48.176 66.696 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
[309],  
(19.280, 0.000, 91.633) 
[12,723],  
(23.413, 0.000, 99.990) 
[78],  
(26.033, 7.435, 99.099) 
[2,930],  
(23.086, 7.66, 99.999) 
[150],  
(24.729, 2.127, 99.008) 
[2,680],  
(20.891, 1.442, 99.998) 
DIV_Y 3.314 2.573 1.350 1.596 2.670 11.173 
0 0.068 0.000 
[317],  
(2.549, 0.000, 19.920) 
[20,133],  
(5.178, 0.000, 23.529) 
[171],  
(1.575, 0.000, 7.730) 
[6,572],  
(4.847, 0.000, 17.867) 
[220],  
(2.394, 0.000, 20.550) 
[7,490],  
(18.311, 0.000, 26.860) 
DIV/NI 1.282 0.343 0.352 0.971 0.331 0.236 
0.164 0.075 0.229 
[312],  
(11.838,-15.410, 20.500) 
[13,756], 
(7.969,-36.200, 33.875) 
[167],  
(1.469, -1.243, 17.786) 
[5,431],  
(24.190,-30.078, 18.780) 
[218], 
(1.059, -1.878, 13.832) 
[5,745],  
(2.420, -78.93, 11.246) 
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When matching the sample firms with the respective control sample by size, I 
find that it is only in Germany and France that repurchasing firms have a tax clientele 
with a lower tax rate as captured by dividend yield and have significantly lower 
leverage ratios. This suggests that firms in these two markets are motivated to 
announce a share repurchase when they have low leverage ratios, which supports the 
excess debt capacity hypothesis as well as having shareholders that fall into lower tax 
brackets, compared to non-repurchasing firms. Finally, I find that in Germany, 
repurchasing firms have a significantly lower growth (captured by Tobin’s q) 
compared to non-repurchasing firms of similar size. 
For the market-to-book matched method, I find that repurchasing firms have 
significantly larger size compared to their matched counterparts, suggesting that it is 
larger firms that announce a share repurchase. Further, I find that in the U.K., 
repurchasing firms have significantly lower profitability compared to their matched 
counterparts. In addition U.K. repurchasing firms have higher growth rates, excess 
cash flows as well as higher leverage ratios compared to non-repurchasing firms of 
similar market-to-book valuation ratios. Hence, repurchasing firms in the U.K. are 
larger but have also higher growth potential, suggesting that they are not mature but 
rather high growth firms that want to signal their undervaluation.  
Similarly, in Germany I find that repurchasing firms have significantly higher 
growth ratios, but contrary to the U.K., repurchasing firms in Germany have 
significantly lower leverage ratios, suggesting that firms are trying to exploit their 
excess debt capacity. This suggests that repurchasing firms in Germany are smaller 
and higher growth firms that are trying to signal their undervaluation. Moreover, I 
find that repurchasing firms pay out fewer dividends compared to non-repurchasing 
firms of similar valuation. Finally, for the market-to-book matching method for 
France, I find that repurchasing firms have significantly lower levels of ownership 
concentration and are larger in size, suggesting that it is larger firms that tend to 
announce a share repurchase programme.  
For the non-matched samples, the findings support in their overwhelming 
majority the results derived from the previous three matching methods and consistent 
with my expectations. For all three countries, I find that repurchasing firms compared 
to the non-repurchasing firms have significantly lower growth and high cash flows (as 
captured by the DFCF dummy), lower ownership concentration and are significantly 
larger in size. Moreover, in the U.K. and France, repurchasing firms have significantly 
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lower leverage. In addition, I find that in Germany, repurchasing firms are 
significantly undervalued compared to the non-repurchasing firms. Finally, it is 
interesting to find that in the U.K., contrary to Germany and France, repurchasing 
firms pay high dividends and cater higher tax shareholder clienteles, as captured by 
the dividend yield ratio.  
To summarise, the most striking finding in the univariate comparison between 
firms that announce a share repurchase and those that do not, is that repurchasing 
firms have significantly lower ownership concentration levels, which is translated to 
the fact that more diversely owned companies repurchase their shares in order to self 
discipline the management and reduce the respective agency costs. In addition, I find 
some evidence for the excess cash flow and excess debt hypotheses as well as the fact 
that size, growth and dividend yield ratios are variables that can have a discriminatory 
ability which can be useful in order to determine the characteristics of firms that 
announce their intention to repurchase their shares. This in turn will help identify the 
managerial incentives for announcing an open market share repurchase and estimating 
the probability of a firm making such an announcement. 
2.4.2. Multivariate analysis 
By estimating a series of logit regressions, I am able to test the significance and 
influence of each of the previously discussed managerial incentives for announcing a 
share repurchase. In the analysis, I apply the same logit model for each country. I 
replicate all the models for the non-matched and the size- and market-to-book-
matched control samples for robustness check. It should be noted though, that for the 
size matched samples I exclude the SIZE proxy, whereas for the market-to-book 
matched samples I exclude the undervaluation proxy MKBK, since I have already 
controlled for these variables in each matching method respectively.  
Table 2.3 reports the results from the logit regressions, derived from each 
country and for all four matching methods. It should be noted that the correlations 
between the variables are lower than 0.5, as reported in the correlation matrix reported 
in Appendix A. However, in cases where independent variables are statistically 
correlated with one another, auxiliary regressions are employed in order to make them 
orthogonal. Furthermore, Table 2.4 reports the marginal effects of each explanatory 
variable on managers’ likelihood to announce an open market share repurchase.  
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What is most apparent is that for all three countries, ownership concentration 
and size have a significant impact on the decision to announce a share repurchase. 
This shows that for the three countries under study there are only two factors that 
consistently influence the decision to announce a share repurchase. I find that for each 
matching method and for all three countries, ownership concentration is inversely 
related with the decision to announce a share repurchase, whereas size has a positive 
and significant impact on the repurchase announcement, which is in line with my 
expectations. For instance, for the industry matching method, the estimates imply that 
a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration reduces the likelihood of 
a firm making an open market share repurchase announcement by approximately  
19% in the U.K., by 19% in Germany and even larger reduction of approximately 
24% in France. This effect of ownership concentration on managers’ incentive to 
announce their intention to repurchase shares in the open market is consistent through 
the market-to-book- and size-matched samples. With the exception of the non-
matched samples where even though it has a negative impact it is of smaller 
magnitude due to the overwhelmingly larger control sample relative to the test 
samples. These findings on ownership concentration are similar to the results reported 
in Oswald and Young (2008) where they report a negative and significant relationship 
of both the insider and external ownership and the likelihood to actually repurchase 
shares.  
Furthermore, for the industry-matched samples a one standard deviation change 
in size increases the likelihood of an open market share repurchase announcement by 
24% in the U.K., and by approximately 15% in Germany and 20% in France. This 
shows that even though size is a significant factor that influences managers’ 
incentives to announce an open market share repurchase, its impact varies 
significantly between countries. The consistent effect of ownership concentration and 
size regardless of the sample matching method, can be translated to the fact that in all 
three countries (i) widely held firms are more likely to announce a share repurchase; 
and (ii) that the larger a firm is, the higher is the probability of announcing an open 
market share repurchase programme. 
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Table 2.3 Multivariate analysis on the managerial determinants of the propensity to announce an open market share repurchase  
This table presents the estimation results for each country, for the industry-, market-to-book-, size-matching and non-matched sample matching methods, for the period 1997 
to 2006. Financial companies are excluded from the samples. CF is the ratio of net operating income before taxes and depreciation to total assets at the year end prior to the 
repurchase announcement. DFCF is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that have simultaneously low Tobin’s q (lower than the median q of a firm’s 
respective industry for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher than the median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and the value of zero otherwise. 
LVG is the ratio of total debt divided by its total assets. OWN CON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the number of total common shares outstanding. SIZE is 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets at the year-end prior to the share repurchase announcement. RET 1yr is the cumulative daily market-adjusted stock returns for the 
entire year prior to the announcement of a share repurchase (-261 to -2 days). MKBK is a firm’s market value compared to its book value of equity, at the year end prior to 
share repurchase announcement. DTAX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every event (both test- and control-firms) that take place during the time periods 
where for each of the three countries capital gains were taxed lower than the personal income tax. DIV_Y is a firm’s dividend yield ratio at the year end prior to the 
announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. DIV/NI is the ratio of a firm’s total cash dividend payout divided by its respective net income reported at the year end 
prior to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. Below the values of the estimated coefficients of each model, the respective p-values of significance are 
reported. ***,**, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. The table reports the goodness-of-fit and robustness for each model as 
measured by the McFadden R-squared, Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) statistics and the respective probability chi square value for the H-L statistics. Finally, the table reports the 
estimated optimal cut-off probability point for each model individually and presents the percentages of correct predictions made by the model for the repurchasing, non-
repurchasing and total sample of firms. 
 
 
 Industry - Matched MKBK - Matched Size – Matched Non-Matched 
 U.K. GE FR U.K. GE FR U.K. GE FR U.K. GE FR 
C 1.291*** 0.855*** 2.364*** 0.714*** -5.235*** 0.825** -0.179 2.702*** 0.588* -5.050*** -2.119*** -1.116*** 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.023) (0.431) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CF 0.413 0.039 4.132** 1.283 1.094 1.707 0.572 -1.171 -0.734 0.104*** -0.035 -0.003 
 
(0.394) (0.823) (0.047) (0.246) (0.430) (0.310) (0.471) (0.393) (0.610) (0.000) (0.856) (0.465) 
DFCF 0.679*** -0.327 0.830** -0.224 -0.407 -0.426 0.101 0.422 0.158 -0.371** -0.107 0.299 
 
(0.006) (0.406) (0.043) (0.331) (0.285) (0.224) (0.602) (0.263) (0.594) (0.011) (0.707) (0.129) 
LVG -0.119 -1.718 0.033 1.173 -3.190*** 3.254*** -0.355 -2.759** -0.175 -1.012** -0.049 0.000 
 
(0.841) (0.116) (0.976) (0.102) (0.006) (0.003) (0.523) (0.021) (0.867) (0.016)  (0.350) (0.669) 
OWN_CON -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.046*** -4.011*** -3.453*** -3.879*** -1.022** -4.404*** -2.999*** -0.010*** -0.030*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.490*** 0.339*** 0.464*** 0.563*** 0.461*** 0.391***    1.004*** 0.656*** 0.425*** 
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(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
RET 1YR -0.762 -0.171 0.630 0.111 -2.612* 0.162 -0.693 -0.972 -0.572    
 
(0.459) (0.903) (0.604) (0.907) (0.074) (0.905) (0.396) (0.557) (0.577)    
MKBK -0.029 -0.013 0.205***    0.001 0.145** 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.329) (0.823) (0.007)    (0.703) (0.046) (0.803) (0.993) (0.977) (0.237) 
DTAX 0.156 0.026 0.149 -0.069 -0.481 -0.487 -0.138 -0.325 -0.079 0.275* 0.386 0.599* 
 
(0.496) (0.954) (0.743) (0.757) (0.279) (0.207) (0.483) (0.504) (0.815) (0.054) (0.165) (0.050) 
DIV_ Y 0.076** -0.013 -0.074 -0.044 -0.320*** -0.004 0.043 -0.158* -0.076 0.126*** -0.149* -0.038 
 (0.027) (0.873) (0.497) (0.270) (0.005) (0.942) (0.320) (0.075) (0.230) (0.000) (0.078) (0.178) 
DIV/NI -0.003 0.068** 0.177*** 0.003 0.197 0.517** 0.008 -0.063 0.063 0.009*** 0.000 0.082 
 
(0.231) (0.040) (0.002) (0.756) (0.549) (0.042) (0.378) (0.518) (0.498) (0.004) (0.937) (0.221) 
 
            
McFadden R2 0.201 0.149 0.306 0.218 0.278 0.213 0.014 0.250 0.089 0.275 0.271 0.199 
Total Observations 482 193 219 510 201 272 511 211 240 10645 1867 1893 
H-L Statistic 12.156 5.800 2.520 18.674 7.601 10.546 3.376 7.053 8.375 15.077 8.127 4.423 
Prob. χ2(8) 0.144 0.670 0.961 0.017 0.473 0.229 0.909 0.531 0.398 0.058 0.421 0.817 
 
            
Optimal Cut-off point 0.590 0.564 0.591 0.680 0.742 0.679 0.467 0.556 0.531 0.110 0.134 0.136 
% Correct Control 73.87 67.53 76.74 55.76 76.92 50.00 55.76 76.92 50.00 0.110 0.134 0.136 
% Correct Test 72.79 67.24 77.44 56.22 75.00 75.00 56.22 75.00 75.00 95.86 95.43 88.78 
% Correct Total 73.24 67.36 77.17 55.97 75.83 65.00 55.97 75.83 65.00 49.16 51.39 55.48 
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Further, I find evidence that in France and Germany, undervaluation as captured by 
the market-to-book ratio, is a significant factor for a share repurchase announcement. 
However, it is only in France that the marginal effect of market-to-book ratio on the 
likelihood of a share repurchase announcement is significant. Moreover, I find only in 
Germany, for the market-to-book matched samples, that past market-adjusted returns 
(which are used as alternative proxies of undervaluation) are inversely related to the 
likelihood of a share repurchase announcement. 
Additionally, I find evidence that in the U.K. and France, the combination of low 
growth and excess cash flow, as captured by the dummy variable DFCF , has a significant 
effect on the management’s decision to announce a share repurchase. In particular, a one 
standard deviation change of the dummy variably DFCF  causes an approximately 7% 
increase in the likelihood to announce an open market share repurchase programme in the 
U.K. and France respectively. When comparing firms of the same industry, a firm is most 
likely to announce a share repurchase when it has low growth and high excess cash flows. 
However, when comparing firms of similar market valuation measured by the market-to-
book ratio and for the non-matched samples (except for the U.K.) firms of low growth 
and excess cash will be less likely to announce a share repurchase.  
Moreover, in the U.K. when matching the repurchasing with the non-repurchasing 
firms that belong to the same industry, as well as for the non-matched samples, I find that 
dividend yield has a positive and significant effect on the decision to announce a share 
repurchase. In particular, a on standard deviation change in dividend yield causes an 
increase of 4% on the likelihood of a share repurchase announcement. This suggests that 
repurchasing firms cater to the demands of a higher tax clientele and are more likely to 
pay out cash dividends. Similarly, I find that in France for the industry-, and market-to-
book-matched samples, and in Germany for the industry-matched samples, the ratio of 
cash dividends to net income (DIV/NI), is positively and significantly related to the 
propensity of announcing a share repurchase. However, it is only in France that a one 
standard deviation change in the DIV/NI variable causes a small but significant increase 
(0.07%) on the likelihood to announce an open market share repurchase programme. This 
can be interpreted as the fact that the more firms are paying as dividends from their 
earnings, the more likely they are to announce a share repurchase. Hence the evidence 
support the hypothesis that share repurchases are complements rather than substitutes of 
dividends, which is consistent with the findings of Dittmar (2000) and Jagannathan and 
Stephens (2003) in the U.S., and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) in Australia.
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Table 2.4 Marginal effects of the managerial determinants on the propensity to announce an open market share repurchase  
This table reports the marginal effects from the logit estimation results for each country, for the industry-, market-to-book-, size-matching and non-matched sample matching 
methods, for the period 1997 to 2006. Financial companies are excluded from the samples. CF is the ratio of net operating income before taxes and depreciation to total assets 
at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. DFCF is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that have simultaneously low Tobin’s q (lower than the 
median q of a firm’s respective industry for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher than the median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and the value 
of zero otherwise. LVG is the ratio of total debt divided by its total assets. OWN CON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the number of total common shares 
outstanding. SIZE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets at the year end prior to the share repurchase announcement. RET 1yr is the cumulative daily market-adjusted 
stock returns for the entire year prior to the announcement of a share repurchase (-261 to -2 days). MKBK is a firm’s market value compared to its book value of equity, at 
the year end prior to share repurchase announcement. DTAX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every event (both test- and control-firms) that take place 
during the time periods where for each of the three countries capital gains were taxed lower than the personal income tax. DIV_Y is a firm’s dividend yield ratio at the year 
end prior to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. DIV/NI is the ratio of a firm’s total cash dividend payout divided by its respective net income reported at 
the year end prior to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. The first entry in the table is the marginal effect on the likelihood to announce an open market 
share repurchase programme. The second entry is the marginal effect multiplied by the standard deviation of the explanatory variable. The third entry (reported in 
parentheses) is the p-value of the marginal effect. 
 
 
 
Industry - Matched MKBK - Matched Size – Matched Non-Matched 
U.K. GE FR U.K. GE FR U.K. GE FR U.K. GE FR 
CF 0.095 0.009 0.848* 0.286 0.229 0.281 0.142 -0.281 -0.174 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
0.025 0.005 0.066 0.039 0.035 0.031 0.020 -0.041 -0.018 0.014 -0.002 -0.048 
(0.442) (0.912) (0.071) (0.142) (0.546) (0.232) (0.412) (0.518) (0.618) (0.003) (0.861) (0.857) 
DFCF 0.152*** -0.077 0.156** -0.050 -0.086 -0.072 0.025 0.100 0.037 -0.003*** -0.001 0.013 
0.068 -0.036 0.069 -0.025 -0.043 -0.036 0.012 0.048 0.018 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 
(0.003) (0.399) (0.032) (0.333) (0.296) (0.248) (0.601) (0.252) (0.602) (0.005) (0.709) (0.140) 
LVG -0.008 -0.401 0.007 0.261* -0.667*** 0.536*** -0.088 -0.663 -0.041 -0.008*** -0.001 0.000 
-0.022 -0.067 0.001 0.042 -0.102 0.076 -0.015 -0.097 -0.006 -0.021 -0.033 -0.024 
(0.953) (0.133) (0.975) (0.085) (0.007) (0.003) (0.522) (0.018) (0.866) (0.008) (0.168) (0.916) 
OWN_CON -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.893*** -0.722*** -0.639*** -0.253** -1.058*** -0.710*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 
-0.194 -0.187 -0.239 -0.186 -0.192 -0.164 -0.053 -0.308 -0.178 -0.002 -0.008 -0.027 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
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SIZE 0.106*** 0.079*** 0.095*** 0.125*** 0.097*** 0.064*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 
0.241 0.151 0.196 0.246 0.223 0.126 0.015 0.015 0.040 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RET 1YR -0.192 -0.040 0.129 0.025 -0.547 0.027 -0.172 -0.234 -0.135 
-0.019 -0.005 0.018 0.003 -0.062 0.003 -0.020 -0.027 -0.018 
(0.459) (0.899) (0.583) (0.895) (0.140) (0.906) (0.385) (0.546) (0.605) 
MKBK -0.007 -0.003 0.042** 0.000 0.035* 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
-0.023 -0.009 0.744 0.008 0.094 0.009 -0.033 0.000 0.003 
(0.382) (0.828) (0.015) (0.728) (0.077) (0.821) (0.995) (0.993) (0.712) 
D TAX 0.033 0.006 0.030 -0.015 -0.106 -0.086 -0.034 -0.079 -0.019 0.002 0.005 0.031 
0.021 0.001 0.007 -0.007 -0.038 -0.036 -0.016 -0.030 -0.007 0.001* 0.002 0.009 
(0.541) (0.956) (0.734) (0.763) (0.325) (0.246) (0.482) (0.476) (0.827) (0.050) (0.194) (0.109) 
DIV_ Y 0.015* -0.003 -0.015 -0.010 -0.067*** -0.001 0.011 -0.038* -0.018 0.001*** -0.002* -0.002 
0.041 -0.006 -0.028 -0.033 -0.171 -0.002 0.024 -0.071 -0.034 0.003 -0.008 -0.279 
(0.080) (0.882) (0.476) (0.230) (0.001) (0.947) (0.309) (0.095) (0.307) (0.000) (0.097) (0.266) 
DIV/NI 0.009 0.016 0.036*** 0.001 0.041 0.085** 0.002 -0.015 0.015 0.000* 0.000 0.003 
0.099 0.057 0.235 0.006 0.049 0.119 0.018 -0.026 0.019 0.001 0.000 0.008 
(0.100) (0.108) (0.007) (0.855) (0.507) (0.049) (0.510) (0.569) (0.535) (0.087) (0.984) (0.418) 
      
Observations 482 193 219 510 201 272 511 211 240 10,645 1,867 1,893 
Log 
Likelihood -259.18 -110.41 -101.89 -264.37 -94.61 -125.36 -347.19 -108.23 -147.21 -987.50 -222.32 -411.76 
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Regarding the impact of the tax advantage on the repurchase announcement, I find 
that it is only in the U.K. for the non-matched sample, that the tax differential (DTAX) 
between capital gains and personal income tax has a positive and significant impact on 
the propensity to announce a share repurchase. This suggests, that only in the U.K. when 
capital gains are taxed on a lower rate compared to personal income tax, firms are more 
likely to announce a share repurchase programme. Furthermore, this finding suggests, 
that in France and Germany, the personal tax incentive hypothesis does not weigh 
significantly on managers’ incentive to announce a share repurchase. Furthermore, the 
findings on ownership concentration and the free cash flow are consistent with the ones 
reported in Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) for the Australian market. However, some of 
the previously discussed results are contrary to the findings derived from the Australian 
market reported in Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007). This highlights the fact that the 
managerial incentives in European countries and in Australia, as well as within Europe, 
vary significantly.  
Nevertheless, some of the managerial incentives are consistent in all three sample 
countries. For verifying the consistent impact of the firm specific characteristics that 
influence the likelihood of managers announcing an open market share repurchase, I 
select the industry-matched samples, which have the highest McFadden R-squared 
values, and allows to control for industry-specific characteristics. Then, I merge the 
samples from each country into one unified sample, and estimate the new model as 
shown in Table 2.5. The respective marginal effects estimations are reported in Table 2.6. 
The results show that the firm specific characteristics that are statistically significant in 
each of the three countries, namely ownership concentration and size, are also significant 
for the entire sample. This supports the previous finding that large and widely held firms 
are, consistently throughout the sample countries, more likely to announce an open 
market share repurchase. Furthermore, the results show that on a one standard deviation 
increase in size significantly increases the likelihood of a repurchase announcement by 
approximately 30%. Similarly, a one standard deviation decrease in ownership 
concentration leads to a significant increase in the likelihood to announce an open market 
share repurchase. 
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Table 2.5. Multivariate analysis on the persistence of the determinants of the propensity 
to announce an open market share repurchase 
This table presents the estimation results for the industry-matched sample for the unified sample of all three countries 
from the industry-matched samples, for the period 1997 to 2006. Financial companies are excluded from the samples. CF 
is the ratio of net operating income before taxes and depreciation to total assets at the year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. DFCF is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that have simultaneously low Tobin’s q 
(lower than the median q of a firm’s respective industry for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher than the 
median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and the value of zero otherwise. LVG is the ratio of total debt 
divided by its total assets. OWN CON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the number of total common shares 
outstanding. SIZE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets at the year end prior to the share repurchase 
announcement. RET 1yr is the cumulative daily market-adjusted stock returns for the entire year prior to the 
announcement of a share repurchase (-261 to -2 days). MKBK is a firm’s market value compared to its book value of 
equity, at the year end prior to share repurchase announcement. DTAX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
for every event (both test- and control-firms) that take place during the time periods where for each of the three countries 
capital gains were taxed lower than the personal income tax. DIV_Y is a firm’s dividend yield ratio at the year end prior 
to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. DIV/NI is the ratio of a firm’s total cash dividend payout 
divided by its respective net income reported at the year end prior to the announcement of the intention to repurchase 
shares. D_UK is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every sample firm (both test- and control-firms) in the 
UK and zero otherwise. D_FR is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every sample firm (both test- and 
control-firms) in France and zero otherwise. Below the values of the estimated coefficients of each model, the respective 
p-values of significance are reported. ***,**, and * indicate the statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level 
respectively. The table reports the goodness-of-fit and robustness for each model as measured by the McFadden R-
squared, Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) statistics and the respective probability chi square value for the H-L statistics. Finally, 
the table reports the estimated optimal cut-off probability point for each model individually and presents the percentages 
of correct predictions made by the model for the repurchasing, non-repurchasing and total sample of firms. 
All Countries Combined (industry-matched) 
(1) (2) (3) 
C -5.129*** 2.104*** -4.158*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CF 0.405 
(0.300) 
DFCF 0.336* 
(0.055) 
LVG -1.246*** -1.276*** -1.317*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
OWN_CON -0.011*** -0.033*** -0.015*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.485*** 0.462*** 0.414*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RET 1YR -0.465 
(0.470) 
MKBK 0.016 
(0.514) 
DUM TAX -0.249* -0.056 0.078 
(0.099) (0.735) (0.659) 
DIV YIELD -0.005 
(0.880) 
DIVNI -0.002 
(0.359) 
DUM_UK -0.358 -0.258 
(0.101) (0.288) 
DUM_FR 0.310 0.248 
(0.149) (0.276) 
McFadden 0.218 0.225 0.181 
Total Obs 1,134 1,134 894 
H-L Statistic 14.489 8.850 4.593 
Prob. Chi-Sq(8) 0.070 0.355 0.800 
Optimal Cut-off point 0.573 0.610 0.648 
% Correct _ Control 75.88 78.97 78.18 
% Correct _ Test 71.03 67.64 62.41 
% Correct _ Total 73.10 72.49 68.79 
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However, contrary to the findings of the analysis in each country individually, it is 
surprising to find that it is also leverage that has a negative and significant impact on the 
decision to announce an open market share repurchase. In particular, a one standard 
deviation decrease in leverage causes a significant 50% increase in the likelihood to 
announce an open market share repurchase programme. This suggests, that firms that 
have low leverage, are more likely to announce a share repurchase. In addition, I find that 
the combination of high excess cash and low growth, captured by the dummy variable 
DFCF , has a significant impact but only on the 10% confidence interval, and that a one 
standard deviation change causes 3.5% increase in the likelihood of a share repurchase 
programme being announced. 
Furthermore, the results show, contrary to my expectations, that when capital gains 
are taxed lower than the personal income tax as captured by the dummy variable DTAX, 
the likelihood of announcing a share repurchase decreases. However, the dummy variable 
DTAX is only marginally statistically significant, and therefore one should be very 
cautious on interpreting the implications of the tax impact on the likelihood to announce 
an open market share repurchase. Regarding the models’ performance on predicting the 
likelihood of a firm announcing an open market share repurchase, I find that the models 
perform successfully, since model 1 (excluding the two country dummies), correctly 
identifies approximately 71% of the test firms, and correctly identifies approximately 
73% of both test and control firms. 
In summary, I find that there are only three factors that consistently have a 
significant impact on the decision to announce a share repurchase (namely size, leverage, 
and ownership concentration), through different markets and institutional settings. This 
suggests, that large, widely held firms that have low leverage, are more likely to 
announce their intention to repurchase their shares in the open market. In addition, I find 
that for each market, there are varying firm specific characteristics that can influence the 
announcement of a share repurchase in each country individually. 
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Table 2.6 Marginal effects of the managerial determinants on the propensity to 
announce an open market share repurchase  
This table reports the marginal effects from the logit estimation results for each country, for the unified 
sample of all three countries from the industry-matched sample for the period 1997 to 2006. Financial 
companies are excluded from the samples. CF is the ratio of net operating income before taxes and 
depreciation to total assets at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. DFCF is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one for firms that have simultaneously low Tobin’s q (lower than the 
median q of a firm’s respective industry for each respective year) and high cash flow (higher than the 
median cash flow of the respective industry for each year) and the value of zero otherwise. LVG is the ratio 
of total debt divided by its total assets. OWN CON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the 
number of total common shares outstanding. SIZE is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets at the 
year end prior to the share repurchase announcement. RET 1yr is the cumulative daily market-adjusted 
stock returns for the entire year prior to the announcement of a share repurchase (-261 to -2 days). MKBK 
is a firm’s market value compared to its book value of equity, at the year end prior to share repurchase 
announcement. DTAX is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for every event (both test- and 
control-firms) that take place during the time periods where for each of the three countries capital gains 
were taxed lower than the personal income tax. DIV_Y is a firm’s dividend yield ratio at the year end prior 
to the announcement of the intention to repurchase shares. DIV/NI is the ratio of a firm’s total cash 
dividend payout divided by its respective net income reported at the year end prior to the announcement of 
the intention to repurchase shares. The first entry in the table is the marginal effect on the likelihood to 
announce an open market share repurchase programme. The second entry is the marginal effect multiplied 
by the standard deviation of the explanatory variable. The third entry (reported in parentheses) is the p-
value of the marginal effect. 
 
All Countries Combined (industry-matched) 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) 
CF 0.095 
0.031 
(0.341) 
DFCF 0.077** 
0.035 
(0.049) 
LVG -0.303*** -0.310*** -0.308*** 
-0.562 -0.576 -0.573 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) 
OWN_CON -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.004*** 
-0.071 -0.221 -0.100 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
SIZE 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.097*** 
0.328 0.278 0.269 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
RET 1YR -0.109 
-0.013 
(0.480) 
MKBK 0.004 
0.011 
(0.543) 
DUM TAX -0.061* -0.014 0.018 
-0.030 -0.007 0.009 
(0.086) (0.727) (0.664) 
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Table 2.6 Continued. 
 
DIV YIELD -0.001 
-0.002 
(0.886) 
DIVNI 0.000 
-0.016 
(0.529) 
DUM_UK -0.087* -0.060 
-0.043 -0.030 
(0.087) (0.271) 
DUM_FR 0.074 0.057 
0.037 0.026 
(0.129) (0.271) 
No. of Observations 1,134 1,134 894 
Log Likelihood -605.55 -600.05 -494.49 
 
2.4.3. Model Selection  
Having reviewed the influence of each explanatory variable on the decision to 
announce a share repurchase, I now focus on the industry-matched models that have the 
highest predicting ability of a firm announcing a share repurchase. Even though the non-
matched samples have higher overall prediction ability compared to the industry-matched 
samples, they perform poorly on correctly predicting the repurchasing firms. As shown in 
Table 2.7, the industry-matched models have the highest McFadden R-squared values, 
which is an indicator of the model’s goodness of fit. In addition, the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
statistics for goodness-of-fit and the respective chi-square statistics are reported, 
suggesting that the models’ estimates fit the data at an acceptable level. Finally, the 
optimal cut-off probability points are reported, and they have been calculated as 
discussed earlier in section 2.3. 
After applying the estimated optimal cut-off point for each of the respective models 
for each country, I find that the models have a strong predicting ability. For the U.K. the 
models correctly predict approximately 73% of the total sample, from which 
approximately 73% of the sample firms that have indeed announced a share repurchase 
are correctly identified by the model as repurchasing firms, whereas the model correctly 
identifies approximately 74% of the control firms as non-repurchasing firms. Similarly, 
for France the models have an overall correct predicting ability of approximately 77% 
overall, of which 77% of the test sample is correctly identified as repurchasing firms and 
approximately 76% of the control firms are correctly identified as non-repurchasing 
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firms. For Germany, the models have a relatively lower predicting ability compared to the 
U.K. and France. Nevertheless, the models in Germany correctly predict approximately 
67% of the total sample, of which 67% of both the test- and control-firms are correctly 
identified. 
In order to test the robustness of the models, I run additional in- and out-of-sample 
tests, using a boot-strap simulation technique. Since the industry matching-method yields 
on average the highest proportions of correct repurchase likelihood predictions, I report 
the results from the boot-strap simulation for the industry-matched samples. The 
approach on the boot-strap technique is the following. From the overall sample of test and 
control firms for each country I randomly select 85% of the firms and I estimate the logit 
models discussed above for each country. This sample of 85% of the total sample of 
firms forms the basis of the simulated in-sample results. The remaining 15% of the 
observations are then used in order to assess how well the model performs on an out-of-
sample basis, as well as for the respective calculation of Type I and Type II errors. This 
simulation is repeated 5,000 times, selecting a different random in-sample of 85% of the 
overall sample of firms each time.  
The average results from the boot-strap technique for each country are reported in 
Table 2.7. Panels A, B, and C, report the estimation outputs for the industry-matched 
samples of the U.K., Germany, and France respectively. Panel D reports the estimation 
outputs for the combined sample of all three countries, excluding the two country 
dummies (model 1). The coefficient estimates from the boot-strap simulation are similar 
to the ones reported in the original logit model, without any significant changes on the 
interpretation of the results. Further, the results for correctly identifying both a 
repurchasing and a non-repurchasing firm overall are similar to the ones reported in the 
original logit model. However, the results from the boot-strap simulation display 
significantly higher results for correctly identifying the repurchasing firms of slightly 
more than 85% in all three countries. The results on the whole, show the robustness of the 
original logit models in predicting the likelihood of a firm announcing a share repurchase 
programme. Furthermore, the results in each of the three countries for the correct 
prediction of the likelihood of a repurchase announcement are higher than the ones 
reported in Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) and Barth and Kasznik (1999), even after 
checking for their robustness with a boot-strap technique. 
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Table 2.7 Boot-strap simulation for the identification of the managerial determinants of the propensity to announce an open market 
share repurchase.  
In-sample logit model with a boot-strap technique (5000 simulations). This table presents the estimates for the in-sample logit model for estimating the impact of selected factors on the decision 
to announce a share repurchase, by employing the industry-matched method. In addition the table presents the percentages (average values) correctly classified in the in- and out-of-sample 
models for each country. The in-sample selection is as follows. For the U.K., I randomly select 428 companies out of a total of 504 (Panel A). For Germany, I randomly select 164 companies 
out of a total of 193 (Panel B). For France, I randomly select 189 companies out of a total of 223 (Panel C). For the unified sample of all three countries, I randomly select 965 companies out of 
a total of 1135 (Panel D). 
 
Panel A.    UNITED KINGDOM      
 C CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE RET 1YR MKBK DTAX DIV_Y DIV/NI 
@0.025 -6.662*** 0.174 0.510** -1.442** -0.008* 0.431*** -1.524 -0.049 -0.008 -0.013 -0.005*** 
@0.5 -5.801*** 0.383 0.678*** -0.947 -0.004* 0.481*** -0.761 -0.026 0.161 0.016 -0.003 
@0.975 -5.133*** 1.698* 0.863*** -0.505 0.001* 0.547*** -0.018 0.000 0.322 0.043 -0.001 
Average -5.828*** 0.491 0.681*** -0.952 -0.004* 0.483*** -0.765 -0.025 0.160 0.016 -0.003 
            
 Repurchasers    Non-Repurchasers     
 
%  
Correct 
Type I error 
%  
%  
Correct 
Type II 
error %  
Total  
Correct % 
In-sample 86.97% 13.03%  74.50% 25.50%  81.83% 
Out-of-Sample 85.89% 14.11%  65.94% 34.06%  77.13% 
 
Panel B.    GERMANY      
 C CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE RET 1YR MKBK DTAX DIV_Y DIV/NI 
@0.025 -6.114*** 2.414*** 0.511* -2.044*** -0.039*** 0.384*** -0.496* 0.094 -0.265 -0.181 0.112 
@0.5 -4.666 4.178 0.839 -1.019*** -0.030*** 0.466*** 0.602 0.165 0.148 -0.075 0.150 
@0.975 -3.460 6.175 1.250 0.033 -0.024** 0.583*** 1.795 0.246 0.585 0.022 0.242 
Average -4.689 4.206 0.848 -1.008*** -0.030*** 0.470*** 0.615 0.166 0.151 -0.076 0.157 
            
 Repurchasers    Non-Repurchasers     
 
%  
Correct 
Type I 
error %  
%  
Correct 
Type II 
error %  
Total  
Correct % 
In-sample 87.71% 12.29%  42.58% 57.42%  69.77% 
Out-of-Sample 82.85% 17.15%  37.54% 62.46%  64.34% 
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Table 2.7 Continued. 
Panel C.    FRANCE      
 C CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE RET 1YR MKBK DTAX DIV_Y DIV/NI 
@0.025 -3.371*** -2.521 -0.694 -4.198* -0.032*** 0.257*** -2.517 -0.065 -0.372 -0.082* -0.023** 
@0.5 -2.142*** 0.048* -0.321* -3.107 -0.025*** 0.342*** -1.145 -0.013* 0.036 -0.004 0.011*** 
@0.975 -0.943** 0.238*** 0.014*** -2.110 -0.019*** 0.446*** 0.047 0.047*** 0.464 0.074 0.049** 
Average -2.145*** -0.226* -0.325* -3.117 -0.025*** 0.345*** -1.170 -0.012* 0.038 -0.004 0.012*** 
            
 Repurchasers    Non-Repurchasers     
 
%  
Correct 
Type I 
error %  
%  
Correct 
Type II 
error %  
Total  
Correct % 
In-sample 87.05% 12.95%  63.09% 36.91%  77.68% 
Out-of-Sample 83.51% 16.49%  58.59% 41.41%  73.45% 
 
 
Panel D. All three countries 
C LVG OWN_CON SIZE DUM TAX 
@0.025 -5.129*** -1.246*** -0.011*** 0.485*** -0.249* 
@0.5 -5.129*** -1.246*** -0.011*** 0.485*** -0.249* 
@0.975 -5.129*** -1.246*** -0.011*** 0.485*** -0.249* 
Average -5.129*** -1.246*** -0.011*** 0.485*** -0.249* 
 Repurchasers Non-Repurchasers 
%  
Correct 
Type I  
error % 
%  
Correct 
Type II  
error % 
Total  
Correct % 
In-sample 85.53% 14.47% 75.70% 24.30% 81.32% 
Out-of-Sample 85.44% 14.56% 62.80% 37.20% 81.31% 
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In summary, the models display a good performance in successfully predicting 
the likelihood of a firm announcing a share repurchase, especially in the U.K. and 
France. Further, I find that in each country not all the firm characteristics have a 
significant impact on the decision to announce an open market share repurchase 
programme. Rather, it is only size, leverage, and ownership concentration that have a 
significant impact on managers’ decision to announce an open market share 
repurchase programme throughout the three sample countries. 
2.5. Summary and Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter is to identify the main factors and financial firm 
characteristics that influence a firm’s decision to announce a share repurchase and to 
construct an accurate model that predicts the probability of a firm making an open 
market share repurchase announcement.  
In order to achieve this goal, I construct an initial (test) sample of 970 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market, from 
corporations primarily listed in the United Kingdom (513 announcements), France 
(263 announcements) and Germany (194 announcements). After collecting the sample 
of firms that have announced a share repurchase (test-sample), I proceed to the 
construction of the control firms sample. I do this by employing an industry-, a 
market-to-book-, a size-matching and a non-matching method which yield a total 
sample (test- and control-firms combined) of 1,430, 1,040, 812, and 16,148 events 
respectively. Then, I construct a number of logit models in order to identify the 
managerial incentives for announcing open market share repurchases in each of the 
three countries under study. 
The results show that for all three countries, some factors have a consistently 
significant impact on the announcement of share repurchases. I find that in all three 
countries, firms that are large, have lower leverage, and have low levels of ownership 
concentration, are more likely to announce their intention to repurchase their shares in 
the open market. Further, I find only in the U.K. that a firms’ low growth with high 
excess cash levels, can have a significant impact on the likelihood of announcing a 
share repurchase. In addition, I find some evidence in France and Germany, that a 
firm’s potential undervaluation has a significant impact on the decision to announce a 
share repurchase. Finally, I find evidence that the dividend pay out has a positive 
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relationship with the propensity to announce a share repurchase, hence supporting the 
hypothesis that share repurchases are viewed by managers as complements rather than 
substitutes to dividends. 
The contribution of this chapter is the identification of the determinants that 
influence the firms’ decision to announce their intention to repurchase their shares in 
the open market in a cross-country dimension, thus accounting for cultural, regulatory 
and institutional differences among the countries under study. Hence, I identify which 
motives have a consistent effect on the announcement of a share repurchase in all 
three of the largest and most important European markets, and to what extent. In 
addition, this study constructs and presents a model with a strong ability of predicting 
the likelihood of a firm making a share repurchase announcement in each of the three 
countries under study.  
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Chapter 3.  
3. The Market Valuation of Share Repurchases in 
Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I investigate the market reaction to the announcement of intention to 
repurchase shares by a sample of U.K., French and German firms over the period 
1997 to 2006. I find that although the practice is highly popular in the three markets, 
the market reaction is mainly positive only in the U.K. and Germany. I also show that 
the positive market reaction is concentrated on the first announcement of intention to 
repurchase and is affected by fundamental factors such as firm size and the ownership 
concentration. Finally, I find that changes in regulations and taxation have a  
significant impact on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements, but 
only in the U.K.  
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3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I perform a cross country analysis on the market reaction to the 
announcement of intention to repurchase ordinary shares in the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany. A number of studies in the existing literature (see Vermaelen, 
1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Brav et al. 2005; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998, for the 
U.S. and Ikenberry et al., 2000 for Canada) have already documented a positive stock 
price reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase programme. Despite the 
growing importance of share repurchases as a payout method by companies across the 
world, the overwhelming majority of the existing research focuses on the U.S. 
market9. Some of the most prevailing theories relate share repurchases to the 
undervaluation, agency theory, capital restructuring, dividend substitution, and 
management compensation incentive hypotheses.  
However, these studies provide mixed evidence on the impact of each of these 
factors. In addition, these studies do not provide a comparative analysis across 
different institutional settings as they are a single-country analysis, where share 
repurchases are treated in the same way, although changes in institutional settings 
may occur through time. In particular, shares bought back are taxed in the same way 
at shareholder level and they are kept as Treasury stocks, not cancelled, at firm level.  
It is, therefore, difficult to separate the contending hypotheses that underlie share 
repurchases.  
The purpose of this chapter is to overcome this limitation by assessing the 
market perception of the decisions to repurchase shares by a sample of firms across 
European countries with wide heterogeneity in terms of their institutional settings. 
This research is also motivated by the dearth of studies in these markets. Thus, I 
choose United Kingdom, France and Germany where I identify 970 share repurchase 
announcements that took place over the period 1997-2006. The selection of these 
three countries is based on the fact that previous studies have not assessed fully the 
weight of each of the existing hypotheses on the market reaction to open market share 
repurchase announcements in Europe. Furthermore, these countries have significant 
differences between them in tax, regulatory and corporate governance frameworks. 
                                                 
9
 See Allen and Michaely (2003) for a review. 
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In order to identify the extent of which, each of the prominent hypotheses will 
affect the market’s reaction towards a firm’s decision to repurchase its shares, I apply 
a standard event methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985). This enables 
me to analyse the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns experienced before, 
around and after the time of the announcement of open market share repurchases. 
Finally I perform a cross-sectional analysis in order to identify the drivers of the 
market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
In the trifling existing literature on share repurchases in Europe, Lasfer (2005) 
and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) report an average market reaction for the U.K. of 
1.64% and 1.08% respectively, over the period 1985 to 1998. In addition, Oswald and 
Young (2004) in the U.K. as well, but for the period 1995 to 2000 report an average 
market reaction to open market share repurchases of 1.24%. Ginglinger and L’Her 
(2006) report an excess market reaction on share repurchasing announcements in 
France of 0.57% for the two year period 1998-1999.  
However, these studies do not all focus on the announcement day abnormal 
returns and the drivers for the market reaction on the repurchasing announcements, 
since they focus on the tax effect (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002; Oswald and Young, 
2004), or the actual trades and the long-term performance (Oswald and Young, 2004), 
or the corporate ownership and management’s stock options (Ginglinger and L’Her, 
2006). Furthermore, various regulatory and tax changes that affect share repurchases 
have occurred since their study period. 
I assess, whether the differences in market reaction across my sample countries, 
can be related to the regulatory and cultural structure of each market. As reported in 
La Porta et al. (1997), the levels of law enforcement, shareholder ownership, and 
shareholder protection vary significantly among countries. In particular, although the 
U.K. is very similar to the U.S. market, culturally and institutionally, there are 
significant differences across Continental Europe countries (La Porta et al., 1999). For 
example, while the U.K. is, as the U.S., a common law country, France and Germany 
are civil law countries. Moreover, the majority of the U.K. firms are widely held 
whereas France and Germany have a more concentrated ownership structure. 
Furthermore, even between France and Germany there is a difference in the 
ownership concentration. While in Germany firms have a lower level of ownership 
concentration, banks can have a considerable voting power over a wide range of 
firms, since shareholders routinely sign over their voting rights to banks that manage 
89 
their stock accounts. In France a large number of firms are owned predominantly by 
either wealthy families or even the state (La Porta et al., 1999; and Morck et al., 
2005). These institutional differences allow me to explore further the well- 
documented but controversial market mispricing hypothesis, suggested by, amongst 
others, Ikenberry et al. (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1991), and Vermaelen (1981).  
As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), agency costs are incurred between the 
controlling and the minority shareholders. Therefore, the controlling shareholders can 
wreak substantial costs to other shareholders by redistributing the firm’s wealth. Thus, 
the higher the ownership concentration, the less it is possible for minority 
shareholders to influence the firm’s decision making. Consequently, when there is a 
higher ownership concentration, there would be a lower level of information 
asymmetry, which would lead to a lower market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements. Moreover, Bartram et al. (2009) find that shareholder protection 
differs significantly between countries, which is in line with the arguments of La 
Porta et al. (2000). The authors also find that within a country the agency costs across 
firms differ as well.  More specifically, they find that agency costs and growth 
opportunities have a smaller weight on determining corporate payout policies in poor 
protection countries, whereas in high shareholder protection countries shareholders 
are more able to pressure firms to make more committed payouts in the form of 
dividends. 
I therefore test the proposition that these different levels of protection and 
ownership concentration will lead to differences in information asymmetry and the 
market’s perception of the announcement of intention to repurchase stocks. In 
particular, I expect a positive market reaction in the U.K., in line with previous U.S. 
findings, but no or negative reaction in France and Germany, if repurchases are driven 
by information asymmetry and agency costs.  
The treatment of share repurchases is also different across my sample countries. 
In Germany and France, firms are allowed to keep the repurchased shares as Treasury 
stock. In contrast, in the U.K., firms were permitted to keep Treasury stock only after 
December 2003. The argument for keeping Treasury stock is that this gives 
management the ability of better managing the balance between debt and equity, 
providing more flexibility in fund raising by reissuing the stocks when necessary, 
better managing of employee share schemes, disposing of the shares when necessary, 
permitting the investment in a company’s own shares, as well as being used as a 
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hostile takeover deterrent. On the other hand, Treasury stocks may be a cause of 
concern for the market due to possible market interference by the firm who 
repurchases and resells its own stock, thus leading to a false market creation and share 
price manipulation. Consequently, Treasury stocks may be a weak signal compared to 
cancelling the repurchased stocks. Hence, these accounting differences will allow me 
to test further whether the market values the costs and benefits of Treasury stocks. 
Finally, I expand on the impact that the tax consideration has on the decision to 
announce a share repurchase. According to the personal tax savings hypothesis, when 
capital gains are taxed lower than the personal income tax, then share repurchases are 
more beneficial for shareholders compared to regular cash dividends from a tax 
perspective. However, the empirical results of the tax impact on share repurchases are 
mixed. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) investigate the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act in the U.S., which increased the capital gains tax rate and spurred a number of 
predictions that it would reduce the practice of share repurchases. However, this tax 
reform only reduced and not eliminated the tax advantage share repurchases relative 
to cash dividends. The authors show that contrary to the predictions, cash dividend 
payments had fallen to 40% of total cash distributions whereas share repurchases have 
increased relative to the previous years, hence suggesting that the tax consideration 
does not have a significant impact on share repurchases.  
In contrast, Lie and Lie (1999) find that the 1986 Tax Reform Act has a negative 
impact on the choice to distribute cash through open market share repurchases. In 
addition, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) investigate a number of tax changes related to 
share repurchases in order to answer the question whether the tax consideration has a 
significant impact on share repurchases in the U.K. The authors report evidence 
suggesting that corporate payout policy is sensitive to tax law changes in the U.K. and 
that managers are more sensitive to the tax status of their shareholders. Therefore, I 
test if any changes in the tax treatment of share repurchases in each of the three 
markets under study will affect the market reaction to such announcements. For this 
purpose, I follow Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and I investigate the market reaction to 
share repurchasing announcements during different time sub-periods before and after 
changes in tax regulations became effective, with a potential impact on share 
repurchases during the ten year period under study. 
I hand collect data from news announcements made by all publicly listed 
companies in the sample countries, thus the data is in text format. I search for any 
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announcement of intention to repurchase shares. 970 open market share repurchase 
announcements during the ten year period 1997 to 2006 are identified. This shows 
that the majority of share repurchase announcements have taken place in the U.K. 
market, which is in line with the existing literature (Lasfer, 2005 and Rau and 
Vermaelen, 2002). This is due to the fact that share repurchases were made legal only 
recently in France and Germany, thus the respective markets are recently catching up 
with the repurchasing trend and due to the fact that share repurchases do not fit the 
European corporate culture (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002). Moreover, I do not find 
evidence of undervaluation since the pre-announcement returns are not statistically 
significant. Further, my results are aligned with the findings reported in Ginglinger 
and L’Her (2006) for France, Rau and Vermaelen (2002), Oswald and Young (2004) 
and Lasfer (2005) in the U.K. I find a significant abnormal market reaction of 1.58% 
in the U.K., and 2.32% in Germany, but not as strong in France (0.66%), on the 
announcement of an open market share repurchase. Nevertheless, the market reaction 
in all three countries is significantly lower than the average 3% abnormal return 
reported in the U.S. (Ikenberry at al., 1995), which is preceded by a poor market 
performance. 
 Unlike previous studies, I also test for differences in the market reaction 
towards initial and subsequent announcements throughout the ten year period under 
study. This enables me to assess if the initial announcement conveys more 
information than the subsequent announcements and/or if the market is more 
accustomed to the subsequent announcements. Further, I find a higher market reaction 
to the initial announcement than to the subsequent announcements. I argue that the 
first announcement sends a clear signal to the market that the firm’s stock price is 
considered to be undervalued, whereas the subsequent announcements contain less 
information. When analysing the market reaction to solely the initial announcements 
of intention to repurchase, I find that the market reaction for the U.K. and Germany 
(2.34% and 3.07% respectively) are similar to the average 3% market reaction 
reported in the U.S., and is significantly higher than the average market reaction 
reported in prior research for the U.K. market. 
Moreover, I find evidence that tax and regulatory changes do have a significant 
effect on the market reaction in the U.K. but not in France and Germany, since the 
average market reaction between a number of varying time sub-periods appears to be 
statistically different. Finally, the results from the cross-sectional analysis show that 
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firm size and past share price performance have a significant impact on the market 
reaction at the time of the repurchase announcement. Further analysis provides some 
evidence suggesting that that high ownership concentration leads to higher 
information asymmetry, which in turn leads to a higher market reaction, but only on 
the announcement date.   
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a 
summary of the literature review, and the respective gaps that are directly linked to 
this research. Section 3.3 presents the data and methodology applied. Section 3.4 
presents the descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 discusses the results. The conclusions 
are in Section 3.6. 
3.2. Literature Review 
Previous studies show that share prices increase significantly on the 
announcement of intention to buy back stocks. On average, the announcement price 
effect of an open market share repurchase is approximately 3%, as reported in a 
number of U.S. studies, whereas this is not the case for European markets. For 
instance Lasfer (2005) and Oswald and Young (2004) report an excess return of 
approximately 1.6% and 1.24% respectively in the U.K. and Ginglinger and L’Her 
(2006) an excess return of 0.57% in France. In addition, the market reaction is 
positively related to the targeted proportion of shares outstanding to be repurchased 
(Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). This implies that the larger the 
proportion, the stronger the signal of undervaluation, signifying that the management 
believes that the current share price is a bargain. Moreover, Ikenberry et al. (1995), 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) and Vermaelen (1981) report a similar in magnitude 
decrease in the share price, during the month prior to the announcement of intention to 
repurchase, suggesting that the signalling of undervaluation is a strong motive for 
announcing a share repurchase. Therefore, these two results suggest that companies 
use the share repurchase mechanism to signal their undervaluation to the market.  
According to the signalling theory, a good firm can separate itself from a bad 
firm by giving a costly signal to the capital markets, since the bad firm will not be 
able to mimic this signal because it would be costlier for the bad firm. Specifically, 
the signalling of undervaluation hypothesis suggests that since managers are better 
informed, they can identify if the current share price reflects the true value of their 
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firm. Therefore, in order to signal the mispricing of their firm, managers announce a 
share repurchase programme in order to alert the market.  
Nevertheless, there is a drawback with this argument. The announcement of an 
open market share repurchase programme is considered to be a costless signal, 
because even a bad firm can mimic a good firm by announcing a repurchase 
programme without intending to undertake such a programme, since there is no 
commitment for the firm to do so. Therefore, it can be argued, that signalling of 
undervaluation to the market via a share repurchase announcement cannot be a 
credible signal. On the other hand, buying back an overvalued share is costly, because 
the price is likely to drop at some point. In addition, a good firm can separate itself 
from a bad firm by sending a costless signal to the market, thus attracting the market’s 
scrutiny, while a bad firm will not mimic this action since it will not want to be 
discovered (Bhattacharya and Dittmar, 2003).  
Previous studies provide evidence that the market reacts more to the 
announcement of fixed price share repurchase programmes compared to those of an 
open market share repurchase announcement (e.g. Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000; Louis 
and White, 2006; Vermaelen, 1981; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005). Because the firm 
pays a premium in order to repurchase the tendered shares, it can be translated as a 
costly signal to the market, thus bearing more credibility, contrary to an open market 
repurchase announcement, which poses no commitment to the firm, therefore being a 
less credible signal to the market.  
Therefore, firms that wish to signal their undervaluation are more likely to 
proceed to a fixed-price tender offer, since they are considered to be costly signals, 
thus making them more credible. However, the majority of firms that undertake a 
share repurchase and wish to signal their undervaluation, repurchase their shares in 
the open market, even though they are perceived to be costless signals, thus making 
them less credible.  
Nevertheless, previous predominantly U.S. studies show that the market reacts 
positively to the announcement of an open market share repurchase (3% on average) 
even though they are costless signals. On the other hand, studies that investigate other 
markets such as Canada (Ikenberry et al., 2000) and Europe (Lasfer, 2005; Ginglinger 
and L’Her, 2006; Oswald and Young, 2004; Rau and Vermaelen, 2002) report a much 
smaller market reaction on open market repurchase announcements of approximately 
1% on the days surrounding the announcement date. Further, Stephens and Weisbach 
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(1998) report evidence derived from the U.S. market, that firms repurchase either a 
substantial fraction of the announced shares or almost none at all. Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar (2003), argue that firms make a repurchase announcement but do not proceed 
with the actual repurchase because the signal has already worked, meaning that the 
firm has already attracted the market’s scrutiny. Finally, McNally (1999) argues that 
firms might not complete their announced repurchase programme because their goal 
of raising their share price has already been achieved. 
It has been widely discussed in the literature that when a firm’s capital exceeds 
its investment opportunities, then it can distribute its excess cash back to its 
shareholders as a self-imposed discipline mechanism on the managers, in order to 
reduce the potential agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; and Jensen, 1986). In line with 
this hypothesis, Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that repurchasing firms experience 
a decrease in their capital expenditures and research and development expenses. In 
addition, Oswald and Young (2008) find that non-repurchasing firms with similar 
characteristics of repurchasing firms are more likely to overinvest. This suggests that 
firms repurchase their shares in order to avoid overinvesting their capital and 
consequently reducing potential agency costs. Furthermore, Dittmar (2000) and 
Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) report evidence that firms are more likely to 
repurchase their stock when they have high cash flows and low investment 
opportunities. 
When a firm chooses to distribute its excess capital as a payout to its 
shareholders through a share repurchase, it reduces its equity capital, which in turn 
increases its leverage ratio. Consequently, Bagwell and Shoven (1988) and 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) argue that a share repurchase programme, displays the 
managers’ preference to employ debt instead of equity, so that they can approach their 
target leverage ratio. Hovakimian et al. (2001) find evidence suggesting that firms 
with low leverage and high profitability are more likely to repurchase their shares than 
retire debt. In line with these findings, are Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007), and 
Dittmar (2000), who find that firms with lower than average leverage ratios are more 
likely to repurchase their shares. However, Grullon and Michaely (2004) argue that 
open market share repurchases are used for making small capital adjustments rather 
than a large capital restructuring. 
In Continental Europe countries, share repurchases are subject to severe legal 
restrictions, such as the volume and the time frame in which they can take place. This 
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is contrary to the U.S., where there is no limitation concerning the volume and the 
time limit for carrying out a share repurchase programme. Therefore the effects of 
share repurchases could vary significantly across countries.  
Moreover, it can be clear that the regulatory restrictions can have a significant 
impact on some of the characteristics of open market share repurchases, such as the 
flexibility on the time period to undertake the programme and the volume of shares 
intended to be reacquired by a firm. For instance in France, it was only until recently 
that the legal system was reformed, thus allowing corporations to repurchase their 
own shares. Under the July 2, 1998 law, the open market share repurchases can be 
authorized by the firm’s shareholders for up to the limit of 10% of a firm’s capital and 
can extend for a maximum period of 18 months. For each 24-month period shares 
representing 10% of a firm’s capital can be cancelled or be kept as Treasury stock, 
which is subject to shareholder authorisation. In the U.K., even though share 
repurchases were legal since 1981, they started to become popular in recent years due 
to the ambiguity of the tax treatment, and the potential signalling of a shortage of 
profitable investments.  
In Germany, prior to the legislation passed on May 1, 1998, share repurchases 
were illegal since they were perceived to be a prohibited repayment of capital and it 
was only for extraordinary and on individual cases that share repurchases were 
permitted. But the amendment of the legislation, which is based on the European 
Second Law Directive, opened the way for companies in Germany to repurchase their 
stock. Likewise, in France, companies were allowed in 1998 to repurchase their stock 
and cancel them or keep them as Treasury stock, whereas in the U.K. it was only after 
December of 2003 that repurchased shares could be treated as Treasury stock. I 
hypothesise that when more stringent regulations concerning share repurchases are 
imposed, then the market reaction to share repurchasing announcements will be 
inversely related. Further, these three countries are a fertile ground for this research in 
order to help identify if any changes in regulations, under varying cultural and 
corporate governance backgrounds, are related to share repurchases and the respective 
market reaction to share repurchase announcements. As well as identifying if common 
law markets have higher market reaction to share repurchasing announcements than 
civil law markets. 
I would not expect the results obtained from the U.S. to hold as such for the 
Continental European countries, where stringent regulations are imposed on 
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repurchases. This argument is supported by Rau and Vermaelen (2002), Oswald and 
Young (2004) and Lasfer (2005), who report that U.K. firms announcing share 
repurchases, experience smaller abnormal returns around the announcement date, than 
those reported in the U.S. market. In addition, in Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) the 
reported abnormal returns appear to be different and lower than the ones reported in 
the U.K. studies, suggesting that the markets react differently across countries. 
Concerning the regulatory differences among countries, La Porta et al. (1996) 
and La Porta et al. (1997), show that legislation among countries differs significantly 
in areas such as shareholder protection, law enforcement and shareholder ownership 
concentration. From that perspective, Continental Europe countries can be 
distinguished into three categories. Common law countries, such as the UK, where the 
level of shareholders’ protection is the highest among Europe and firms have on 
average low levels of ownership concentration. German Civil law and Scandinavian 
Civil law where the level of protection and ownership concentration is moderate. And 
finally, French Civil law where, among the three countries of the research sample, the 
level of shareholder protection is the lowest and the ownership concentration is the 
highest. Consequently, different levels of shareholder protection and especially 
ownership concentration, will lead to different levels of information asymmetry in the 
market as well as different attitudes of shareholder value maximisation. For instance, 
in France where firms tend to be family owned, and in Germany where firms have 
higher levels of ownership concentration compared to the U.K., share repurchases 
would most likely be treated unreceptively. In contrast, in common law countries such 
as the U.K. and U.S., share repurchases should be more popular due to maximising 
shareholder value as being a firm’s primary goal. This is supported by Brounen et al., 
(2004), where they find that German and French companies are less interested in 
maximising shareholder value compared to U.K. firms. Therefore, I expect to find a 
stronger support for the signalling of undervaluation hypothesis and a higher market 
reaction in the U.K. than in Germany and France. 
In addition, the significance of the effect that different regulatory frameworks 
can have on share repurchases is highlighted by Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), where 
they report for a three year period (January 2000 to December 2002), 371 
repurchasing firms, relative to the 51 repurchase announcements made in the period 
1985 to 1998 (Lasfer, 2005). This was before the stringent regulations concerning 
share repurchases were relaxed. Until then corporations were to buyback their shares 
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only in rare circumstances, thus opening the way for corporations to repurchase their 
shares. Further, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) report that approximately 40% of 
Paris-listed firms repurchased their shares during their sample period indicating that 
many French firms expressed their interest in share repurchasing. 
Another important factor, that can have a significant impact on share 
repurchases is the tax differential between capital gains and personal income tax. 
Usually share repurchases are taxed as capital gains. Therefore, when capital gains tax 
rate is lower than the personal income tax rate, share repurchases become more 
attractive to investors. This is because a share repurchase should be more valuable to 
shareholders, from a tax perspective, than a dividend pay out (Grullon and Michaely, 
2002). 
The existing literature seems to disagree on the practical importance of tax 
considerations for share repurchases. For instance, Bagwell and Shoven (1989) and 
Dittmar (2000), find no evidence that the tax regulations can have a significant effect 
on payout policies. Similarly, Oswald and Young (2008) find no evidence that the 
increased repurchase activity was primarily driven by the tax credits that pension 
funds could receive from share repurchasing. On the other hand, a number of research 
studies such as Grullon and Michaely (2002), Lie and Lie (1999) and Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) report evidence that taxation is an important drive on firms’ payout 
decision making and when more favourable measures are taken towards share 
repurchases then both share repurchasing announcements and activity increase. 
 Further, Lie and Lie (1999) find evidence that shareholder tax implications 
affect how firms distribute cash to their shareholders. In addition, they report that 
managers are more sensitive to the shareholders’ tax threshold when a large fraction 
of the shares is owned by institutional investors, because they can be more capable 
and willing to inform managers about the tax implications of different cash 
disbursements. Therefore, the choice of distributing excess cash can be more tax 
sensitive when there is higher ownership concentration due to the pressure that can be 
applied to managers for considering the tax effect of a cash disbursement. As a 
consequence, the market reaction to share repurchase announcements will be lower 
for firms that have high levels of ownership concentration (and vice versa), since the 
choice to repurchase would be the outcome of their pressure to management to 
consider the tax implications in the case of an alternative pay out method. Thus, tax 
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can have a significant effect on the choice to repurchase and on the respective market 
reaction to such announcements. 
Moreover, Keswani et al. (2007), report a dramatic rise in the open market share 
repurchase activity in the U.K., (196 firms announced their intention to repurchase 
their shares), for the period April 1999 to December 2002, due to the abolition of 
advance corporation tax on 5 April, 1999. This is because the abolishment of ACT 
lifted the tax burden on both dividends and share repurchases, which made these two 
forms of payout attractive. 
Given the flexibility on the timing and execution, as well as the tax advantage of 
open market share repurchases compared to cash dividends, they can be viewed as 
substitutes to cash dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) find evidence in the U.S. 
suggesting that share repurchases substitute cash dividends. Furthermore, Skinner 
(2008) finds that younger firms that have not paid cash dividends are more prone to 
repurchase their shares instead of committing to pay cash dividends. In addition, he 
finds that the overall significance of dividend payers in the group of firms that make 
payouts is diminishing over time, suggesting that share repurchases will become the 
dominant form of payouts. 
However, DeAngelo et al. (2000), Jagannathan et al. (2000, and Dittmar (2000) 
in the U.S., and Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) in the Australian market, do not find 
any evidence that support the notion that repurchases are substitutes of cash 
dividends. Rather, they find that share repurchases are complements to cash 
dividends. This is also supported by Jagannathan et al. (2000) who find that firms 
repurchase their shares, when they experience unexpected earnings, whereas they pay 
cash dividends from more permanent earnings, hence suggesting that repurchases are 
complements rather than substitutes of dividends. 
For the U.K. I distinguish three tax changes and one regulatory change, thus 
yielding four time sub-periods for tax change effects and two time sub-periods for 
regulatory change effects. In detail, the tax changes for the U.K. are the following. 
First, the abolishment of the advance corporation tax (ACT) which became effective 
on 1st of April 1998. Prior to the abolishment of ACT, share repurchases were 
considered as cash distributions and as such they created an ACT charge. When there 
is no surplus ACT to offset against the additional ACT liability, then share 
repurchases would create an additional tax liability which made them unattractive to 
firms. Firms with surplus ACT faced a classical corporate tax system since the 
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imputation tax rate was reduced to zero (Acker et al., 1997). Therefore, the surplus 
ACT would be an additional cost bore by both firms and investors in the form of a 
higher tax rate on distributions. However, Rau and Vermaelen (2002) argue that 
during the imputation system and ACT, still investors belonging to high tax brackets 
would prefer open market share repurchases than cash dividends, whereas investors 
belonging to low tax bracket would prefer cash dividends over share repurchases. 
Nevertheless, the abolishment of ACT removed the tax disadvantage of share 
repurchases, thus increasing their popularity as a payout method. Therefore, 
corporations would be keener on repurchasing their shares which would be reflected 
on the market’s positive reaction on a firm’s announcement of intention to repurchase 
its shares. Second, is the change in the regulation that became effective on 30th of 
August 2001, where until then funds where taxed when selling their shares back to 
companies. After that date, funds could be protected from tax claims on share 
repurchases. Therefore, share repurchases could have a competitive tax advantage 
over cash dividends.  
Following the findings of Rau and Vermaelen (2002) and Lie and Lie (1999) 
that repurchase activity is influenced by the tax impact of share repurchases on 
pension funds, I expect to find an increased market reaction on share repurchase 
announcements since funds could be exempt from tax claims on share repurchases. 
Third, is the 1st of February 2005 where a payment made by a company on the 
purchase of its own shares would be subject to income tax, rather than capital gains 
tax which were taxed at a lower level than the respective level of income tax. Thus, I 
expect to see a reduction to the market reaction to share repurchases, since the tax 
benefit of share repurchases for the shareholders would be subsequently diminished. 
For regulatory change, I identify for the U.K., the 1st of December 2003 when 
companies were allowed the choice to keep the repurchased shares as Treasury stock. 
This gave corporations more flexibility to manage their capital, as well as the ability 
to use the stock as currency in future acquisitions which they would hope they would 
struck at a higher price than the level at which they bought the shares. In addition, 
firms would have the ability to reissue the repurchased shares at a later date, which 
could have a negative impact on the market reaction to repurchasing announcements. 
Furthermore, when companies are allowed to keep the repurchased shares as Treasury 
stock, by repurchasing their shares and re-issuing their stock when they deem it 
necessary, they can increase the firm’s stock liquidity and reduce short-term price 
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instability, thereby smoothing the price discovery (De Cesari et al., 2008). However, it 
must be noted that even in the case where U.K. firms would routinely continue to 
cancel all or at least a portion of the repurchased shares, still. , it is a flexible capital 
management tool that since the change in regulations is available to firms to make use 
of. 
For France, I distinguish one tax change that could affect the market reaction to 
the announcement of a share repurchase, thus yielding two time sub-periods. This 
change became effective on 1st of January 2005, where a considerable reduction on 
corporation tax by 15% became effective. Since the corporation tax was reduced, all 
else being equal, firms where able to funnel a larger portion of their earning to 
potential investment projects, or they could distribute them back to their shareholders 
through share repurchases. Thus, I expect to see an increase in the market reaction to 
share repurchase announcements. This is because the market would welcome this 
extra payment, but more importantly it would welcome the reduction of any potential 
agency costs that could arise form the available higher free cash flows. 
For Germany, I identify one tax change and one regulatory change that could 
affect share repurchases, thus yielding two pairs of time sub-periods respectively. 
First, the tax change took place on 1st of January 2001, which was the Tax Reform 
2000. Until then, an imputation tax system was in place, whereby the corporate 
income tax was credited against its shareholders’ individual income or corporate 
income tax. In addition the corporate tax level until then was lower than the personal 
income tax level. Therefore, since the legalising of share repurchases I expect to see a 
positive market reaction to share repurchasing announcements that occurred during 
that period. With the implementation of the Tax Reform 2000 only 50% for both 
dividends and capital gains received by individual shareholders were taxable. Since 
the marginal personal tax rate was reduced to 48.5% I would expect to see a decrease 
in the market reaction to share repurchases, since the tax advantage of share 
repurchases would be reduced. Finally, the regulatory change occurred on 1st of 
September 2002, when stricter regulations were imposed on the reporting of share 
repurchases and especially to open market repurchases, since they were treated as self 
tender offers to all shareholders, which entailed high costs and considerable 
administrative effort in a rigid timeline in order to comply with the law requirements. 
Therefore, this change in regulations takes away the flexibility of share repurchases 
and imposes a considerable cost on them, which makes share repurchases a more 
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credible signal to the market due to the costs it bears. As a consequence, I expect to 
find a higher market reaction to the announcement of intention to repurchase shares in 
Germany, due to the increased credibility of that signal to the market.  
By studying the market reaction to share repurchasing in these predefined time 
periods, I can identify if any changes in taxation and regulations, concerning share 
repurchasing, can have a significant effect on the market reaction towards these 
announcements. Additionally, this research strives to shed light concerning the 
signalling hypothesis for undervaluation, by delving into three of the largest and most 
important markets of Continental Europe. Thus, I will be able to test if the main 
motive for share repurchases is undervaluation and assess whether the respective 
market reaction is homogeneous across countries, or depends on country specific 
characteristics. This will be achieved by analysing the abnormal returns before, on 
and after the announcement of share repurchases in each market. 
Further, to the best of my knowledge, the existing literature has not tried so far 
to identify if there are any differences or variations on the market reaction between 
firms that announce their intention to repurchase their shares only once or make 
multiple repurchase announcements through time. Therefore, I analyse the differences 
in the market reaction between firms that announce a share repurchase only once and 
firms that make multiple announcements throughout the ten year period under study. I 
argue that the first announcement contains more information while multiple 
announcements are already expected by the market, and thus, have less information 
content. Therefore, I expect to find that firms that make only one share repurchase 
announcement will have a higher market reaction than firms that made multiple 
announcements. Moreover, I expect to find that for firms that made multiple 
announcements, the market reaction to the initial announcement will be higher than to 
the subsequent announcements, since information content of the initial announcement 
will be greater than in the following announcements.  
This chapter sets out to provide a comprehensive analysis of the market reaction 
on the announcement of intention to repurchase shares on the open market (not the 
actual trades) across a number of European countries. This allows me to test whether 
the proposed hypotheses hold for all three countries of this research or if different 
factors influence the market reaction in each respective country. Furthermore, I assess 
in this chapter whether the market has a different reaction between the initial and the 
subsequent announcements. In addition, it strives to identify any effects that country-
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specific regulations might have on share repurchases. This cross-country analysis 
allows to identify if the favourable market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements is attributed mostly to the payout mechanism itself. In addition, it 
allows to identify whether the market reaction is affected by various regulatory and 
tax regimes, and if changes in taxation and regulations impact the market reaction to 
share repurchases. Finally, by performing a cross-sectional analysis I identify which 
are the main aspects that affect the market reaction to repurchasing announcements. 
To summarise, the main hypotheses of this research are: (1) The market reaction 
to share repurchases will differ between the three countries and will be higher in the 
U.K., due to the different regulatory, cultural and tax regimes; (2) The market reaction 
will be higher to the initial announcement than the subsequent announcements, 
because the initial announcement carries more information to the market; (3) The 
level of ownership concentration will have a significant impact on the market reaction 
because it will lead to different levels of information asymmetries; (4) When stricter 
regulations are imposed on share repurchases, the market should have a higher 
reaction, because then the announcement of a share repurchase can be a more credible 
signal to the market; (5) When changes in taxation occur, such as the increase of the 
capital gains tax rate, compared to the personal income tax rate, then the market will 
have a lower reaction due to the tax disadvantage of share repurchases.  
3.3. Data and Methodology 
The sample is constructed by identifying all the announcements of intention to 
repurchase ordinary shares by hand-collected data reported in the news articles posted 
in Perfect Analysis and Factiva  databases from 1st of January 1997 through 31st of 
December 2006. The reason for selecting this time period is because it was not until 
1998 that share repurchasing was allowed to take place more freely in both Germany 
and France, thus allowing me to do the cross country analysis between the three 
different markets. These databases report any news announcements that were 
available in the press made by U.K. and European corporations on share repurchases. 
The sample is refined so as to involve solely firms that announce their intention to 
repurchase ordinary shares, thus excluding announcements concerning the repurchase 
of B-shares or preference shares. It should be noted that the sample contains solely the 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market, either as being 
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individual announcements or following the general shareholders meeting, though 
without being contaminated by other news, such as earnings estimates, earnings 
reporting, etc. Additionally, I control the sample for American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs) and for cross-country listings. Moreover, corporations included in the sample 
are required to have their share prices listed on DataStream. The sample contains 970 
announcements of intention to repurchase from corporations primarily listed in the 
United Kingdom (513 announcements), France (263 announcements) and Germany 
(194 announcements). 
For all empirical tests, daily data are employed and logarithmic stock returns are 
estimated. All time series are checked and adjusted for non-trading days in the sample 
period. The systematic market risk is measured by the relative general market index of 
the country where companies are primarily listed.  
This chapter aims to uncover significant equity returns during and/or around the 
announcement period. The methodology proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) is an 
event study approach and suits the purpose of this research. The standard OLS market 
model has been employed to derive the abnormal returns. The general form of the 
OLS market model is as follows: 
 
( )it it itAR R E R 
 (3.1) 
 
ARit  = Abnormal return for security i in period t 
Rit  = Actual stock return for security i in period t 
E(Rit) = Expected return for security i in period t 
Rmt  = Actual market return in period t 
 
ˆˆ( ) +( * )it i i mt itE R R     (3.2) 
 
The alphas ( ˆi ) and betas ( ˆ ) are the regression coefficient estimates for each 
firm, and are estimated from an ordinary least squares regression of each security i 
over the market index with an estimation period of -255 to -21 trading days prior to 
the repurchase announcement, following Peyer and Vermaelen (2005). The 
coefficients of the market model are calculated by running a regression of each firm’s 
raw returns against each firm’s country main market index. 
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Following the example of Ikenberry et al. (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) 
and Zhang (2005), the abnormal returns are computed over the -20 to +20 days 
relative to the announcement date. The average abnormal return (AAR) for each time 
t relative to the event day (day 0), is calculated as the sum of the abnormal returns at 
time t divided by the number of securities in the sample for each country. The average 
abnormal returns are mathematically expressed as in equation (3.3).  
 
1
1 N
t it
i
AAR AR
N       (3.3) 
 
The cumulative average abnormal returns are estimated as the sum of the 
average abnormal returns for all the securities in the sample of each country, over a 
specified time period. The cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) are 
examined for various intervals within a forty-day period before and after the event 
date (t =  0). Several event windows are analyzed in order to better evaluate the market 
reaction ex-ante, around, and ex-post the announcement. The cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) reflect the total market effect of an event across 
corporations and across a chosen time interval. The reported results are based on the 
straightforward market model.  
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In order to evaluate the statistical significance of the average abnormal returns 
(AAR) for each time period t and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for 
each time window 1 2( , )t t , the null hypothesis is that their respective values are zero. 
The test statistics for any time period t is the ratio of the average abnormal return 
(AAR) at the time period t to its estimated standard deviation. The standard deviation 
is estimated from the time series of the portfolio’s average abnormal returns (AAR) 
over its estimation period. The time series standard deviation test employs a single 
variance estimate for the portfolio. Hence, it does not account for unequal variances 
across the portfolio’s securities and avoids the potential problem of a cross-sectional 
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correlation of security returns. Therefore, the mathematical expression of the test 
statistics for the AAR at any time period t is as follows. 
 
t
t
AAR
AAR
AAR
t      (3.5) 
 
where AAR is the estimated variance of tAAR . Furthermore, the test statistics for 
assessing the statistical significance of the cumulative average abnormal returns over 
a time window 1 2( , )t t , is expressed as follows. 
 
1 2( , )
/t
t t
CAAR
CAAR
CAAR
t
T     (3.6) 
 
where CAAR is the estimated variance of 1 2( , )t tCAAR  and T is the time window 
where 2 1 1T t t   . The event study methodology in this context is likely to suffer 
from the correct definition of the event date. Given that the data is collected from 
financial publications as reported by Factiva , it is difficult to identify the exact date 
that the announcement event took place. The reason for this is that there is no 
established database that records the exact date and the targeted amount to be 
repurchased. Further in some countries such as France, companies are not obliged to 
announce publicly their intention to repurchase their shares, since they only have to 
get authorisation from the AMF (Autorité des marchés financiers10) in order to initiate 
the open market share repurchase. Therefore, for France I only include in the sample 
the announcements of intention to repurchase shares that were publicly disclosed 
voluntarily. Additionally, in order to overcome the drawback of identifying the exact 
date of the announcement and capturing the announcement effect for the three 
countries under study, following Ikenberry et al. (1995) results on the expanded event 
periods [-2, +2] and [-1, +1] are reported. 
 
                                                 
10
 The Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) is France’s financial regulatory system. 
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3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics concerning the annual average 
abnormal performance for each of the three countries of the sample, as well as the 
annual number of announcements to repurchase own shares. The vast majority of 
these announcements took place in the U.K. (562 announcements representing 
approximately 54% of the total). Rau and Vermaelen (2002) use a sample of 264 
firms in the U.K. for the period starting in January 1985 to January 1998 and Keswani 
et al. (2007) use a sample of 196 firms in the U.K. for the period starting in April 
1999 to December 2002. Oswald and Young (2004) report a sample of 268 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market, as reported in the 
Financial Times and the Regulatory News Service (RNS) during the period 1995 to 
2000. 
Moreover, Lasfer (2005) reports a sample of 465 repurchasing firms in the U.K. 
and 51 firms in France for the period 1985 to 1998. Furthermore, in France, 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) and Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) use a sample of 337 
firms (January 2000 to December 2002) and 381 (July 1998 to July 1999) 
respectively. Therefore, it is clear that in this more recent time period there has been 
an increasing trend in the number of firms that announce their intention to repurchase 
their shares. A better illustration of the number of open market share repurchase 
announcements is displayed in Figure 3.1. 
In the U.K., the majority of the announcements took place in 2005 
(approximately 16%) where they peaked, with a small decrease in the following year. 
In France, there is a steady increase for the two years after share repurchasing was 
made easier for firms to undertake, and it reaches its peak in 2000. Afterwards, the 
number of announcements seems to have a certain level of volatility but it seems to 
have a large increase in repurchasing announcements in 2006. Lastly, in Germany, the 
number of announcements of intention to repurchase shares follows a similar pattern 
with France and peaks in 2000. The large increase of repurchase announcements in 
France and Germany can be attributed to the regulatory amendments, which allowed 
corporations to engage in such practices. This illustrates the important effect that 
regulations can have on payout policies. 
 
 
107 
Figure 3.1 Share Repurchase Announcements. 
This figure illustrates the annual number of share repurchase announcements for each 
country.  
 
Furthermore, Table 3.1 reports the yearly average market reaction for each 
country and shows that in Germany and in the United Kingdom (to a certain extent) 
there is an increasing trend on the average market reaction at the time of the share 
repurchase announcement which declines from 2004 and onwards, whereas in France 
The average market reaction is volatile throughout the years without depicting any 
distinguishable trends. 
Table 3.2 reports the time gap between the initial and the subsequent 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market. The table shows 
that in all three countries, the time lapse between the initial and the subsequent 
announcements for almost half of the samples is less than a year, and the 
overwhelming majority is less than 3 years. Even by following Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
and apply a cut-off point of three years as a time gap for a subsequent announcement 
to be identified as such, the remaining announcements that are still identified as 
subsequent announcements compared to the overall sample in this study are 
significantly small to have any significant impact that would distort the findings of 
this research. However, it must be acknowledged that a small sample of subsequent 
announcements take place after 3 years or more following the initial announcement of 
intention to repurchase shares in the open market and therefore one be cautious when 
interpreting these results. 
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Table 3.1 Annual average market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market from 1997 to 2006, of which 513 took place in the U.K., 263 in France and 
the remaining 194 in Germany. The abnormal returns are calculated with the implementation of the market model, with the coefficients computed over the -255 to -21 days 
before the announcement date. This table reports the annual cumulative average abnormal returns for each country for the three days surrounding the announcement day (time 
window -1 to +1). The t-statistics, percentage of positive abnormal returns and the number of events are reported in parentheses for each year. ***, **, and * reported on the 
average abnormal returns indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 N 
United Kingdom 2.27%*** 3.15%*** 2.03%*** 2.03%*** 1.56%*** 2.76%*** 3.34%*** 1.47%*** -0.45%*** 0.90%*** 
 
 
(6.983, 
69%,13) 
(9.907, 
80%,40) 
(7.591, 
65%,31) 
(9.555, 
73%,30) 
(9.498, 
67%,42) 
(18.636, 
67%,67) 
(22.146, 
68%,59) 
(11.027, 
63%,73) 
(-2.017, 
48%,84) 
(5.621, 
57%,74) 513 
France -3.80% 2.47%*** -1.36%*** 0.30% 1.94%*** 0.69%** 1.72%*** 0.36% -0.29% 1.27%*** 
 
 
(-7.374, 
50%,2) 
(9.334, 
55%,20) 
(-4.693, 
42%,26) 
(1.222, 
47%,49) 
(5.218, 
63%,16) 
(1.960, 
49%,35) 
(4.705, 
67%,36) 
(1.361, 
54%,24) 
(-1.325, 
33%,15) 
(5.242, 
70%,40) 263 
Germany 
 
1.58% 1.78%*** 3.48%*** 3.91%*** 2.82%*** 3.22%*** 0.81%*** 1.22%*** 0.85%*** 
  
  
(1.702, 
100%,1) 
(3.752, 
78%,9) 
(9.851, 
57%,21) 
(7.663,  
56%,34) 
(9.308, 
63%,32) 
(7.196, 
59%,17) 
(2.568, 
44%,18) 
(5.325, 
71%,31) 
(3.614, 
48%,31) 194 
N 15 61 66 100 92 134 112 115 130 145 970 
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Table 3.2 Time-lapse of subsequent open market share repurchase announcements.  
This table reports the descriptive statistics on the time that lapses between the initial and the subsequent of the subsequent announcements from a 
sample of 211, 79 and 66 subsequent announcements made in the United Kingdom, France and Germany respectively. The total sample of 
announcements (including those firms that made only one announcement) is 513, 263 and 194 for the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
respectively. 
 
 
 UK  FR  GE 
Time 
period 
 
# 
Percentage 
relative to total 
subsequent 
announcements 
Percentage 
relative to 
total sample 
size  # 
Percentage 
relative to total 
subsequent 
announcements 
Percentage 
relative to 
total sample 
size  # 
Percentage 
relative to total 
subsequent 
announcements 
Percentage 
relative to 
total sample 
size 
<1 yr  153 70.18% 29.82%  36 46.15% 13.69%  41 63.08% 21.13% 
1 yr  32 14.68% 6.24%  14 17.95% 5.32%  15 23.08% 7.73% 
2 yr  14 6.42% 2.73%  8 8.97% 2.66%  4 6.15% 2.06% 
3 yr  8 3.67% 1.56%  8 10.26% 3.04%  2 1.54% 0.52% 
4 yr  2 0.92% 0.39%  11 14.10% 4.18%  2 3.08% 1.03% 
5 yr  1 1.83% 0.78%  0 0.00% 0.00%  2 3.08% 1.03% 
6 yr  1 1.38% 0.58%  2 2.56% 0.76%  0 0.00% 0.00% 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   Total  211 100% 42.50%  79 100% 29.66%  66 100% 33.51% 
 
110 
 
3.5. Empirical Evidence 
3.5.1. Market reaction to the announcement of intention to repurchase. 
Table 3.3 reports the Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) estimated for each 
country, for the ten year period under study. These results provide a broad illustration 
of the overall market reaction to open market share repurchase announcements. For 
days -20 to -2, henceforth referred to as pre-event period, the results on the AARs for 
the U.K. firms remain marginally positive, whereas for the French and German firms 
the results are close to zero, and mostly negative, particularly for Germany. On the 
announcement day (day 0), I find a high market reaction of 1.98% and 1.05% in 
Germany and U.K. respectively, which are statistically significant at the one percent 
confidence level and statistically different between them as well as from the market 
reaction in France. On the remaining part of the 41-day time window, days +2 to +20, 
for France the market does not have a favourable reaction towards repurchasing 
announcements, since after a few days the cumulative average abnormal returns 
bounce back to the negative side. In contrast, in Germany and especially in the U.K. 
there is a considerable increase in excess performance.  
The findings from the preliminary analysis of the daily excess returns do not 
provide strong support for the undervaluation hypothesis so far. Even though the 
excess returns prior to the repurchase announcement are negative or marginally 
different from zero, still they are not statistically significant. It is only during the days 
of the announcement that the market has a positive and statistically significant 
reaction, suggesting that share repurchases are perceived to be good news. In addition, 
I find that in France the market reaction to the repurchase announcement on the day 
which the announcement took place, is significantly low and particularly so when 
compared to the respective market reaction in the U.K. and Germany. Further, I split 
the samples between the initial and subsequent announcements. Hence, I can assess 
whether the market has a different reaction towards firms that made repurchasing 
announcements only once, and those that made multiple announcements through time. 
The results are reported in Table 3.4. I find that for all three countries under study, the 
market has a more favourable reaction on the first repurchase announcement made by 
a firm, rather on the subsequent ones. In detail, for all three countries, the AARs for 
the initial announcements are approximately double, compared to the ones from the 
subsequent announcements.  
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Table 3.3 Average abnormal returns per country. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open 
market of which 513 took place in the U.K., 263 in France and the remaining 194 in 
Germany. The abnormal returns are calculated with the implementation of the ordinary least 
squares market model with the coefficients computed over the -255 to -21 days before the 
announcement date, for the time period 1997 to 2006. The table reports the average abnormal 
returns for the forty days surrounding the announcement day of intention to repurchase shares 
from day -20 to day +20. ***, **, and * reported on the average abnormal returns indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. a, b, and c report the statistically 
significant difference in means for the average abnormal returns for the pairs U.K.-France (a), 
U.K.-Germany (b) and Germany-France (c) respectively at the 10% confidence level.  
  
Average Abnormal Returns 
Day U.K. France Germany 
-20 0.10% 0.09% -0.14% 
-19 -0.03% -0.13% -0.05% 
-18 0.01% -0.13% -0.23% 
-17 0.03% 0.04% 0.25% 
-16 0.05% -0.02% -0.01% 
-15 a, b0.22%*  a-0.32%* b-0.33% 
-14 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 
-13 -0.06% 0.11% -0.20% 
-12 -0.02% -0.13% 0.18% 
-11 -0.03% 0.00% -0.08% 
-10 -0.08% 0.16% -0.27% 
-9 -0.04% 0.06% -0.07% 
-8 0.00% -0.03% -0.24% 
-7 0.02% -0.14% 0.03% 
-6 -0.06% 0.02% -0.32% 
-5 0.01% 0.02% 0.17% 
-4 -0.01% 0.06% 0.08% 
-3 0.07% -0.10% 0.01% 
-2 -0.06% -0.08% -0.19% 
-1 b0.40%*** 0.24% b0.00% 
0 a, b, c1.05%*** a0.10%  b, c1.98%*** 
1 0.24%*** 0.40%** 0.34% 
2 0.17% 0.24% 0.15% 
3 0.16%  -0.16%  0.18% 
4 -0.08%  0.20%  0.01% 
5 0.00% 0.08% 0.18% 
6 a0.09%  a-0.44%** -0.09% 
7 0.09% 0.04% 0.14% 
8 0.09% -0.03% 0.02% 
9 0.06% 0.03% 0.09% 
10 a, c0.05%  a-0.45%** c0.25% 
11 -0.05% -0.02% -0.40% 
12 0.06% -0.03% 0.05% 
13 a0.04%  a-0.31%* -0.15% 
14 0.06% -0.03% 0.24% 
15 a0.06%  a0.39%** 0.36% 
16 b0.17%  0.10% b-0.51%* 
17 -0.11% -0.11% -0.12% 
18 0.04% -0.09% -0.20% 
19 -0.05% -0.06% -0.30% 
20 0.06% -0.05% 0.21% 
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Especially in Germany and in the U.K., on day 0 of the announcement, the 
AARs of the initial announcements amount to 2.49% and 1.43% respectively, 
compared to 1.12% and 0.64% of the subsequent announcements. Further, the AARs 
for U.K. and Germany for both the initial and subsequent announcements are 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level and statistically different from each 
other. Surprisingly, in France on day 0 the AAR for the initial announcements is -
0.11%, but not statistically significant. The market seems to have a somewhat delayed 
reaction to such news since it is on the first day after the announcement that there is a 
significant and positive AAR of 0.57%, whereas for the subsequent announcements 
the AARs amount to 0.63% (which is statistically significant) and -0.08% (which is 
not statistically significant), for days 0 and 1 respectively.  
Hence, the preliminary results, from splitting the sample of repurchase 
announcements between the initial and the subsequent announcements, show that the 
market has a higher reaction to firms that make only one as opposed to multiple share 
repurchase announcements. This finding is further investigated in order to identify the 
reasons for the difference in the market reaction. 
One should bear in mind however, that the AARs can only be looked at as 
indications so far. In order to have a more robust view, I estimate and assess below 
the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (henceforth referred to as CAARs), for 
the pre-event, event and post-event periods. The pre-event time windows I use are [-
20 to -3] and [-20 to -2]. The event time windows are [-2 to +2], [-1 to +1] and day 0, 
while the post-event windows are [+2 to +20] and [+3 to +20]. 
 
.  
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Table 3.4 Average abnormal returns for initial and subsequent announcements 
in each country. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market of 
which 513 took place in the U.K., 263 in France and the remaining 194 in Germany. The abnormal 
returns are calculated with the implementation of the ordinary least squares market model with the 
coefficients computed over the -255 to -21 days before the announcement date. The table reports the 
average abnormal returns for selected time-windows, for the two sub-groups of subsequent and initial 
announcements for the time period 1997 to 2006. Subsequent announcements are defined as the 
announcements succeeding the initial announcement that took place throughout the ten year period of 
this study. Initial announcements are defined as those announcements that appear for the first time in 
the sample through the ten year period of this study. ***, **, and * reported on the average abnormal 
returns indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. a, b, and c report the 
statistically significant difference in means for the average abnormal returns for the pairs U.K.-France 
(a), U.K.-Germany (b) and Germany-France (c) respectively for the initial announcements group, and 
the a’, b’ and c’ for the same pairs of the subsequent announcements group at the 10% confidence level. 
 
Average Abnormal Returns 
 
U.K. France Germany 
N 302 211 184 79 128 66 
Day Initials Subsequent Initials Subsequent Initials Subsequent 
-20 0.26% -0.12% -0.01% 0.28% -0.18% -0.06% 
-19 -0.04% -0.04% -0.28% 0.22% -0.17% 0.20% 
-18 0.12% -0.30%*** -0.01% -0.42%* -0.29% -0.09% 
-17 0.10% -0.07% 0.10% -0.05% 0.38% -0.04% 
-16 0.02% a’-0.02% -0.23% a’0.43% * -0.09% 0.07% 
-15 a, b0.29% * 0.09% a-0.32% -0.31% b-0.50% 0.00% 
-14 -0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 
-13 -0.07% -0.17% 0.31% -0.35% -0.04% -0.51%* 
-12 -0.11% 0.16% -0.20% 0.08% 0.12% 0.30% 
-11 -0.02% -0.05% -0.02% 0.01% 0.05% -0.39% 
-10 -0.21% 0.12% 0.08% 0.39% -0.36% -0.08% 
-9 0.02% -0.08% 0.15% -0.19% -0.05% -0.18% 
-8 0.01% -0.09% 0.00% -0.12% -0.26% -0.15% 
-7 -0.13% 0.13% -0.22% 0.00% -0.10% 0.37% 
-6 0.06% a’-0.22% *** -0.05% a’0.21% -0.29% -0.33% 
-5 0.02% -0.01% 0.02% 0.11% 0.11% 0.28% 
-4 -0.05% 0.00% 0.07% 0.10% 0.13% -0.13% 
-3 0.16% 0.00% -0.14% -0.03% 0.13% 0.02% 
-2 -0.09% -0.03% -0.02% -0.27% -0.12% -0.46% 
-1 0.54%*** 0.16% 0.28% 0.23% 0.08% -0.09% 
0 a, b1.43%*** 0.64%*** a,c-0.11% 0.63%*** b,c2.49% *** 1.12%*** 
1 0.37%*** 0.22%* 0.57%*** 0.08% 0.51% -0.12% 
2 0.26% -0.02% 0.33% -0.15% 0.14% 0.25% 
3 0.20% 0.11% -0.29% 0.17% 0.22% -0.08% 
4 -0.12% a’-0.07% 0.06% a’0.59% *** 0.11% -0.14% 
5 0.16% -0.21%* 0.12% 0.09% 0.22% 0.29% 
6 a0.28%* -0.20% a-0.46%** -0.32% 0.11% -0.48% 
7 0.10% 0.03% 0.13% -0.17% 0.26% -0.13% 
8 0.09% 0.00% 0.01% -0.19% -0.07% 0.05% 
9 0.09% -0.03% 0.07% -0.03% 0.11% 0.19% 
10 a0.08% 0.16% a,c-0.47% ** -0.33% c0.27% 0.16% 
11 -0.09% 0.00% -0.10% 0.17% -0.56%* -0.12% 
12 -0.03% 0.13% 0.05% -0.01% 0.12% -0.18% 
13 0.17% -0.14% -0.42%* -0.08% -0.42% 0.30% 
14 0.07% 0.02% -0.08% -0.02% 0.24% 0.20% 
15 0.04% 0.07% 0.41%* 0.40% 0.29% 0.48% 
16 0.17% 0.07% 0.07% 0.18% -0.54%* -0.47% 
17 -0.23% 0.11% -0.20% 0.14% -0.32% 0.34% 
18 0.07% -0.02% -0.14% -0.03% -0.11% -0.37% 
19 -0.02% 0.02% -0.06% -0.19% -0.47% 0.02% 
20 0.01% 0.14% -0.09% 0.03% 0.41% -0.14% 
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Table 3.5 reports the CAARs for the entire sample from each country as well as 
the respective CAARs for the initial and subsequent announcement sub-samples. For 
now though, I focus on the results for the entire sample from each country. For the 
pre-event period it can be seen that except for the U.K. where the CAARs are positive 
but marginally different from zero, for France and Germany the respective CAARs 
are negative. However, the CAARs for the pre-event period for none of the three 
countries are statistically significant. In detail, for the time window [-20, -3], I report a 
CAAR for the U.K. of 0.19% (but not statistically significant), where the CAAR 
reported in Lasfer (2005) for the same time window amounts to -0.31% (but not 
statistically significant). Additionally, the results seem to be different from Ikenberry 
et al. (1995), where the reported findings for the same time where amount to -3.07% 
(which are statistically significant). For the same time period, France seems to has a 
negative CAAR of -0.44%, which is consistent with my expectations, but not 
statistically significant, whereas firms in Germany for the same period seem to have  
an even poorer performance of -1.23%, but it is also statistically insignificant. 
Similarly, for the time window [-20, -2], the performance for the repurchasing firms 
in France and Germany remains negative, where in contrast, in the U.K. remains 
positive. It should be noted, that the CAARs reported for the time window [-20, -2] 
for the three countries of this research are not statistically significant. 
For the event time window [-2, +2], there is a considerable improvement in 
performance, since the CAARs for the U.K. and Germany are positive and amount to 
1.79% and 2.28% respectively, whereas in France there is a smaller market reaction of 
0.84% (which are statistically significant). The results from the U.K. and especially 
from Germany are in line with those reported in other research studies, for the same 
time window such as in Ikenberry at al. (1995), where a market reaction of 3.54% in 
the U.S is reported. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) report a reaction of 1.08% in the U.K., 
and Lasfer (2005) similarly reports an announcement reaction of 1.64% for the U.K. 
and 1.06% for Continental Europe. Additionally, Ikenberry et al. (2000) report a 
market reaction for the five days surrounding the announcement of 0.93% for the 
Canadian market. Further, the results reported for the French market seem to be more 
aligned with Ginglinger and L’Her (2006), since they report a market reaction in 
France of approximately 0.55%. 
For the alternative event time window [-1, +1], there is no significant change in 
the results (U.K. 1.68%; France 0.65%; and Germany 2.32%). The results for the 
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event window [-1, +1], seem to follow Li and McNally (1999) where a CAAR of 
0.87% is reported in Canada, Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) who report a CAAR of 
0.55% in France and finally, Oswald and Young (2004) who report a CAAR of 1.24% 
in the U.K. The market reaction in the U.K. and Germany for the three days 
surrounding the announcement is in line with the results reported in Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2005) and Grullon and Michaely (2002)11. 
For the post event period, in the case of the time period [+2, +20] the CAAR 
reported for the U.K., remains positive (0.91%) and statistically significant at the ten 
percent confidence level. In France and Germany, contrary to my expectations, for the 
same time window, the CAARs are marginally different from zero (-0.8% and 0.09% 
respectively) but are not statistically significant.  For the post-event window of [+3, 
+20] even though the results do not change significantly, the CAARs for none of the 
three countries are statistically significant. The post-event results from the U.K. are in 
line with the ones reported in Lasfer (2005) where the market reaction reported for the 
U.K. is 1.12% and for Continental Europe 0.62%, and Ikenberry at al. (1995) where it 
is reported for the post event time window [+3, +10] a CAAR of 0.91% for the U.S. 
market. The market reaction to share repurchase announcements for all three countries 
can be better portrayed in Figure 3.2. 
The results for all three countries, do not provide sufficient evidence in support 
of the undervaluation hypothesis, since the pre-event period excess performance, even 
though it is marginally different from zero in the U.K. and negative in France and 
Germany, it is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, I find strong evidence that the 
market has a strong and positive reaction to repurchase announcements, especially in 
the U.K. and Germany. Hence, this suggests that the market reacts positively to such 
news, for reasons other than potential undervaluation, such as the prospect of reducing 
potentially arising agency costs. This is also supported by the fact that the respective 
price performance remains positive, suggesting that the market reaction to repurchase 
announcement, was not an unjustified over-reaction. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 For the time period [-1, +1], Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) report a 
statistically significant CAAR of 1.81% and 2.57% respectively. 
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Table 3.5 Cumulative average abnormal results for selected event windows. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market of which 513 took place in the U.K., 263 in France, and the remaining 194 in 
Germany. The abnormal returns are calculated with the implementation of the ordinary least squares market model with the coefficients computed over the -255 to -21 days 
before the announcement date. The table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for selected time-windows, for the entire sample and the two sub-groups of initial 
and subsequent announcements, for the time period 1997 to 2006. Initial announcements are defined as those announcements that appear for the first time in the sample 
through the ten year period of this study. Subsequent announcements are defined as the announcements succeeding the initial announcement that took place through the ten 
year period of this study. The t-statistics of the differences in means between the two samples, initial and subsequent announcements, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
reported on the cumulative average abnormal returns indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. a, b, and c report the statistically significant 
difference in means for the average abnormal returns for the pairs U.K.-France (a), U.K.-Germany (b) and Germany-France (c) respectively for each of the three sample 
groups (Entire sample, Initials and Subsequent) at the 10% confidence level. 
 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
 
United Kingdom France Germany 
 
Entire Sample Initials Subsequent Entire Sample Initials Subsequent Entire Sample Initials Subsequent 
N 513 302 211 263 184 79 194 128 66 
CAAR -20,-3 0.19% 0.39% -0.66% -0.44% -0.70% 0.37% -1.23% -1.40% -0.67% 
 
 (-1.287)  (0.779)  (0.497) 
CAAR -20,-2 b0.13% 0.29% -0.68% -0.51% -0.72% 0.10% b-1.42% -1.51% -1.13% 
 
 (-1.235)  (0.574)  (0.261) 
CAAR -2,+2 a1.79%*** a2.50%*** 0.98%*** a,c0.84%** a,c1.05% ** 0.52% c2.28% *** c3.09% *** 0.69% 
 
 (-3.057)  (-0.778)  (-1.993) 
CAAR -1,+1 a1.69%*** a2.34%*** 1.02%*** a,c0.66%** a,c0.74% ** 0.94%* c2.32% *** c3.07%*** 0.90% 
 
 (-2.777)  (0.358)  (-2.070) 
CAAR DAY 0 a,b1.05%*** a,b1.43%*** 0.64%** a,c0.05% a,c-0.11% 0.63%* b,c1.98% b,c2.49% *** 1.12% 
 
 (-2.174)  (2.141)  (-1.602) 
CAAR +2,+20 a0.91%* a1.32%** 0.16% a-0.80% a-1.06% 0.25% 0.09% -0.01% 0.18% 
 
 (-1.668)  (1.185)  (0.082) 
CAAR +3,+20 a0.74% a1.06%* 0.18% a-1.05% a-1.39% * 0.39% -0.06% -0.14% -0.07% 
 
 (-1.325)  (1.663)  (0.032) 
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Figure 3.2 CAARs for Entire Sample. 
This graph illustrates the cumulative average abnormal returns for the forty-day period 
surrounding the announcement date [-20 to +20]. The respective pattern emerges from 
companies in the United Kingdom, France and Germany from the entire sample of 
announcements of intention to repurchase their shares in the open market through the ten year 
period under study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, in France, the performance of the repurchasing firms has only a very 
small improvement on the announcement, which is short lived since after a few days 
the market readjusts and firms return to a negative performance. Nevertheless, the 
findings in the French market are consistent with the existing literature. 
3.5.2. Market reaction to the Initial & Subsequent announcements. 
As previously argued, it is possible that by splitting the sample of 
announcements into two sub-groups between initial and subsequent announcements, I 
could get more robust results on the market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements. Additionally, it will help us understand if it is only the initial 
announcement that is looked upon favourably by the market, and whether the market 
becomes accustomed to such a pay out method, hence resulting to a smaller reaction 
on a firm’s share price performance.  
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Table 3.5 additionally reports the CAARs for each sub-group from each of the 
three countries under study. For the case of the U.K., the initial announcements group 
shows a better performance compared to the subsequent announcements group 
through all the pre-, event, and post-event periods. In detail, for the event period [-1, 
+1] I find that for the initial announcements, the market reaction is more than double 
compared to the market reaction to subsequent announcements, since the CAARs for 
the initial and subsequent announcements are 2.34% and 1.02% respectively.  
In the case of France, for the initial announcements sample, the excess returns 
prior to the announcement are negative, but not statistically significant. On the 
announcement event windows, I find that the market reaction to the initial, and the 
subsequent announcements is not significantly different, apart from the day of the 
announcement (day 0), where the excess returns between the two samples are 
significantly different. Furthermore, I find that for the initial announcements, the 
market readjusts on the post event period, where the excess returns are estimated to be 
-1.39% and statistically significant. This evidence suggests that the market overreacts 
to the repurchase announcement, and subsequently corrects itself. 
In Germany, the market has a similar reaction to the initial and subsequent 
announcements. The market reaction to both types of announcements show signs in 
support of the undervaluation hypothesis. But there is a correction in the post-event 
period since the abnormal performance is slightly negative or marginally higher than 
zero for both sub-groups (but not statistically significant). What is quite notable 
though, is the difference in the magnitude of the market reaction between the initial 
and the subsequent announcements. Specifically, for the three days surrounding the 
announcement, the abnormal performance from the initial announcements is quite 
high (3.09%), which is also similar to the average abnormal performance reported in 
the U.S. studies. In contrast, for the subsequent announcements, the abnormal 
performance is considerably lower (0.90%) compared to the initial announcements. 
More importantly, in the event day and event period, which shows the 
magnitude of the market reaction towards the repurchasing announcement, there is a 
significant difference in the CAARs of each event window, for all three countries 
under study. The difference in the market reaction to the initial and the subsequent 
announcements supports the hypothesis that the market has a more favourable view 
on the first announcement made by repurchasing firms. 
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In addition, the results in Table 3.5 show that the mean market reaction for the 
initial and the subsequent announcements in the U.K. and Germany is significantly 
different for the event period. Moreover, when testing for the differences in means 
across countries, I find significant differences even though the market reaction is 
positive for all three countries. The reaction in France appears to be significantly 
lower than the respective reactions in the U.K. and Germany. The differences in the 
market reaction to the first and subsequent announcements, between the three 
countries are clearly seen in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 CAARs for Initial and Subsequent Announcements. 
The graph illustrates the cumulative average abnormal returns for the forty-day period 
surrounding the announcement date [-20 to +20]. The respective pattern emerges from the two 
sub groups of the initial and the subsequent announcements of intention to repurchase shares 
in the open market, made by companies in the United Kingdom, France and Germany through 
the ten year period under study. 
 
 
 
 
The market reaction to the initial announcements during the post event period is 
quite puzzling. In the U.K., as expected, the market reaction for the initial 
announcements is higher than for subsequent announcements. However, the opposite 
holds for Germany and France. The post event market reaction to the initial 
announcement for these two countries is poorer than for the subsequent 
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announcements. This is contrary to my expectations of a higher market reaction to the 
initial announcement than the subsequent announcements. This is because the French 
and German markets show a quick share price correction. On the contrary, the U.K. 
market seems to have a longer term expectation of an improved future performance, 
since it carries on having a favourable reaction towards the repurchasing firms, and 
especially on the initial announcements.  
In sum, the evidence I get so far, when splitting the sample of announcements 
from each country under investigation into two sub-groups, between initial and 
subsequent announcements, do not provide a strong support for the undervaluation 
hypothesis, and especially in the case of the subsequent announcements. In these 
cases, even though there is a considerable improvement on the announcement period, 
it seems that their respective performance drops on the following days. Concluding, 
when comparing the results between these two groups, I find strong support for the 
notion that it is the initial announcement of intention to repurchase that contains more 
information than the subsequent announcements, which is reflected by the high and 
positive market reaction. 
3.5.3. The effects of Regulatory and Tax changes. 
In order to fully understand the magnitude of the market’s reaction to share 
repurchase announcements, apart from performing a cross country analysis and 
comparing the results that each country provides, it would be beneficial to perform an 
analysis that would test if any regulatory or tax changes, that could affect share 
repurchases, have any effect on the market reaction. I argue that the reason for this, is 
that the market can have a different perception of the news and the underlying signals 
that such a repurchasing announcement can have, which would accordingly lead to 
various levels of reaction on behalf of the market. For all three countries, I identify 
certain tax changes that could affect share repurchases and the respective market 
reaction, but it is only for the U.K. and Germany that I have identified changes in 
regulations concerning share repurchases.  
Table 3.6 reports the pre-, event, and post-event CAARs during each sub-period 
where a tax or regulatory change has been identified, for all three countries under 
study. Panel A reports the CAARs during each sub-period, and Panel B reports the 
matrix containing the differences in CAARs between every sub-period for each 
country. The results show that there is a clear improvement of performance on the 
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event period which carries on during the post-event period. A minor exception could 
be sub-period (3) from the tax changes, where the pre- and post event-performance 
are similar. Nevertheless, there is a significant market reaction on the three days 
surrounding the announcement. Similarly in Germany, there is a considerably poor 
performance on the pre-event period, especially during the sub-periods (1) and (2), 
which are followed by a significant improvement on the event period. Further, the 
improved performance carries on, except for the sub-periods (2) and (1) from the tax 
and regulatory changes respectively. The evidence from France point to the notion 
that the market has a positive reaction to the announcement of share repurchases. 
However, during the post-event period, the market quickly corrects itself, suggesting 
that the market overreact on the open market share repurchase announcement. 
The results during the event window show that the market reaction is more than 
2% through the first three time sub-periods, which significantly declines after the 
change in taxation, where share repurchases are subject to income tax. The fact that 
open market share repurchases lost their competitive tax advantage over cash 
dividends is reflected on the significant decline of the market reaction. Therefore, I 
find that certain tax changes, and in particular when share repurchases are subject to 
income tax, have a significant impact on the market reaction to open market share 
repurchase announcements. 
For the post-event period, there are no significant differences between the 
various time sub-periods. When testing for the effect of the regulatory change on 
share repurchases in the U.K., I find that the market reaction is diminished after the 
change became effective, since the market reaction has decreased from 2.52% to 
0.6%, which is a significant reduction, which is also statistically different. This can be 
translated to the fact that by allowing firms to keep the repurchased shares as Treasury 
Stock, it made the market to take a more cautious stance on the announcement of 
share repurchases. Overall, the results from the U.K. show a strong support for the 
hypothesis that regulatory and tax changes that occurred during the sample period, 
have a significant effect on the market’s perception and interpretation of share 
repurchasing news announcements.  
 
 
  
122 
Table 3.6 Impact of regulatory and tax changes on the market reaction to the 
announcement of intention to repurchase ordinary shares. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market from 
1997 to 2006, of which 513 took place in the U.K., 263 in France and the remaining 194 in Germany. 
The abnormal returns are calculated with the implementation of the market model with the coefficients 
computed over the -255 to -21 days before the announcement date. Panel A reports the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns for selected time-windows. Panel B reports the matrix containing the 
differences in CAARs between every sub-period for each country. The number of observations for each 
sub-period is in brackets. ***, **, and * reported on the average abnormal returns indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. The p-values of the differences in mean market 
reaction between each sub-period are reported in parentheses in Panel B. Tax changes time sub-
periods: (a) U.K.. After 31/3/1998 the abolishment of advance corporation tax and a reduction of 
corporate tax became effective. After 29/8/2001 mutual funds could have tax credits on share 
repurchases. After 31/1/2005 share repurchases were subject to income tax. (b) France. After 
31/12/2004 large corporate and income tax cuts took place. (c) Germany. After 31/12/2000 a reduction 
of income and capital gains tax became effective. Regulatory changes time sub-periods: (a) U.K.. After 
31/11/2003 repurchased shares were allowed to be treated as Treasury stock. (b) Germany. After 
1/9/2002 stricter regulations concerning share repurchases became effective. 
 
Panel A. Impact of Regulatory and Tax Changes per Country 
Time Periods  -20 to -2 -1 to +1 +2 to +20 
United Kingdom 
Tax Changes    
01/01/1997 to 31/03/1998 [56] (1) -0.16% 2.52%*** 0.47% 
(Abolishment of ACT)    
01/04/1998 to 29/08/2001 [95] (2) -0.79% 2.23%*** 0.69% 
(Tax credits on Mutual Funds)    
30/08/2001 to 31/01/2005 [213] (3) 1.07% 2.29%*** 1.27%** 
(Repurchases subject to income tax)    
01/02/2005 to 31/12/2006 [149] (4) -0.73% 0.14%* 0.63% 
χ2 (4) 0.268 0.739 0.077 
    
Regulatory Changes    
01/01/1997 to 31/11/2003 [275] (1) 0.42% 2.52%*** 1.14%* 
(Repurchased shares kept as 
Treasury)    
01/12/2003 to 31/12/2006 [238] (2) -0.33% 0.60%*** 0.59% 
χ2 (2) 0.031 0.659 0.195 
    
France 
Tax Changes    
01/01/1997 to 31/12/2004 [208] (1) -0.82% 0.62%** -0.30% 
(Large corporate and income tax cuts)    
01/01/2005 to 31/12/2006 [55] (2) -0.71% 1.32%*** -1.11% 
χ2 (2) 0.016 0.029 0.206 
    
Germany 
Tax Changes    
01/01/1997 to 31/12/2000 [31] (1) -1.74% 2.92%*** 1.42% 
 (Reduction on income & cap. gains 
tax)    
01/01/2001 to 31/12/2006 [163] (2) -1.35% 2.21%*** -0.16% 
χ2 (2) 0.034 0.096 0.086 
    
Regulatory Changes    
01/01/1997 to 31/08/2002 [92] (1) -2.43%* 3.07%*** -0.09% 
(Stricter regulations on repurchases)    
01/09/2002 to 31/12/2006 [102] (2) -0.50% 1.65%*** 0.25% 
χ2 (2) 0.172 0.192 0.019 
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Table 3.6 Continued.                                          Panel B. Differences in Means per Country 
 -20, -2 -1, +1 +2, +20 
United Kingdom 
Tax Changes                   
01/01/1997 to 31/03/1998 [56] 1    1    1    
                 
01/04/1998 to 29/08/2001 [95] -0.63% 1   -0.29% 1   0.22% 1   
  (0.780)    (0.754)    (0.907)    
30/08/2001 to 31/01/2005 [213] 1.23% 1.86% 1 -0.23% 0.06% 1 0.80% 0.58% 1 
  (0.557) (0.150)   (0.763) (0.943)   (0.588) (0.673)   
01/02/2005 to 31/12/2006 [149] -0.57% 0.06% -1.80%*** -2.38%*** -2.09%*** -2.15%*** 0.16% -0.06% -0.64% 
  (0.779) (0.964) (0.052) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.915) (0.968) (0.445) 
 
         
Regulatory Changes                
01/01/1997 to 31/11/2003 [275]   1     1     1   
                 
01/12/2003 to 31/12/2006 [238]   -0.75%     -1.92%***     -0.55%   
  
  (0.391)     (0.000)     (0.477)   
France 
Tax Changes                   
01/01/1997 to 31/12/2004 [208]   1     1     1   
                 
01/01/2005 to 31/12/2006 [55]   0.11%     0.70%     -0.81%   
    (0.925)     (0.196)     (0.483)   
Germany 
Tax Changes                   
01/01/1997 to 31/12/2000 [31]   1     1     1   
                 
01/01/2001 to 31/12/2006 [163]   0.39%     -0.71%     -1.58%   
    (0.820)     (0.475)     (2.489)   
 
         
Regulatory Changes                
01/01/1997 to 31/08/2002 [92]   1     1     1   
                 
01/09/2002 to 31/12/2006 [102]   1.93%     -1.42%     0.34%   
    (0.242)     (0.195)     (0.901)   
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In France, changes in corporate and income tax rates did not have a significant 
impact on the market reaction to share repurchases. It can be seen however, that the 
announcement of open market share repurchases had an improving, but temporary 
effect, on the firms’ market performance during the event window. However, the 
change in the market reaction during the event window between the pre- and post-tax 
change sub-periods is not statistically significant. Therefore, I do not find any 
evidence that tax changes have a significant impact on open market share repurchases 
in France. 
Finally, the results from Germany are similar to those from France. The changes 
in tax and regulations did not have a significant effect on the market reaction to share 
repurchases. Despite the fact that the differences in mean market reaction through the 
different time sub-periods are not statistically significant, it appears that the 
imposition of stricter regulations on share repurchasing, thus making share 
repurchases more credible signals (sub-period (2) of the regulatory changes), the 
market reaction, contrary to my expectations, for the event window has decreased 
from 3.07% to 1.65%. I argue that this is perhaps a learning phenomenon, which 
means that the market had a more positive stance to share repurchases in the earlier 
years when they were first made legal. In addition, I argue that the market has realised 
that the announcement of intention to repurchase was not a positive signal for future 
growth and that perhaps the targeted shares were not actually repurchased. 
Concluding, the results show that only in the U.K., tax and regulatory changes that 
occurred during the ten year period of this study have a significant impact on the 
market reaction to share repurchases.  
3.5.4. The drivers of the market reaction to the announcement of share 
repurchases 
In order to test the hypotheses discussed in this research and identify the drivers 
of the market reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase, the following cross-
sectional regressions are estimated for each country: 
 
(U.K.) CAARit = β0 + β1LEVi(t-1) + β2 MKBK(t-1) + β3CASHi(t-1) + β4RETi(t-1) + β5Log(SIZE)i(t-1) +  
β6OWNCONi(t-1) +  β7DDIVi(t-1) + β8D_INITIAL i(t-1) + β9DTAX_1 i(t-1) + β10DTAX_2 i(t-1) +  
β11DTAX_3 i(t-1) + β12DREG i(t-1) 
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(France)  CAARit = β0 + β1LEVi(t-1) + β2 MKBK(t-1) + β3CASHi(t-1) + β4RETi(t-1) + β5Log(SIZE)i(t-1) +  
β6OWNCONi(t-1) +  β7DDIVi(t-1) + β8D_INITIAL i(t-1) + β9DTAX_1 i(t-1) +  
 
(Germany)  CAARit = β0 + β1LEVi(t-1) + β2 MKBK(t-1) + β3CASHi(t-1) + β4RETi(t-1) + β5Log(SIZE)i(t-1) +  
β6OWNCONi(t-1) +  β7DDIVi(t-1) + β8D_INITIAL i(t-1) + β9DTAX_1 i(t-1) + β9DREG i(t-1) 
 
where i represents the firm, t represents time measured by the calendar year end, 
and CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the three respective days surrounding 
the announcement day. I perform the multivariate analysis for each country 
individually, in order to identify if there are different factors that influence the market 
reaction, and if that is the case, which exactly are these country-specific factors that 
influence the market reaction to share repurchases. However, it must be noted that the 
drawback with this analysis is that it does not control for any information specific to 
each open market share repurchase announcement. The reason for this is that the 
overwhelming majority of announcements made by French and German firms are 
routinely targeting the maximum shares permitted by the respective regulatory 
authorities. In the United Kingdom however, it is less than half of the entire sample 
that provide specific information concerning their announcement of intention to 
repurchase shares on the open market (i.e. the nominal value intended to be utilised 
for the repurchase programme, and/or the number of shares intended to be 
repurchased, and/or the portion of shares targeted relative to the total number of 
common shares outstanding). Due to these limitations it is difficult to distinguish the 
true impact the announcement specific information has on the market reaction. 
Therefore, one should approach the findings of this analysis and their respective 
interpretation with caution, since it fails to control for information specific to the 
repurchase announcement which could add significantly on the explanatory power of 
the analysis. 
The first hypothesis tested, is the optimal leverage hypothesis, according to 
which firms tend to repurchase their shares when their leverage ratio is below their 
target level ratio. As a proxy for a firm’s leverage ratio, following Dittmar (2000) and 
Grullon and Michaely (2002), I use the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEV I) at the 
end of the calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement, in order to test the 
market reaction in relation to a firm’s leverage ratio. Further, for robustness check of 
the optimal capital structure hypothesis, as in Dittmar (2000), I replicate the 
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multivariate analysis with LEV II, which is defined as the difference of net debt (total 
debt minus cash and equivalents) to total assets ratio from the median net debt to total 
assets ratio of each respective industry of the repurchasing firm, in the end of the 
calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement. 
 Further, according to the undervaluation hypothesis, firms repurchase their 
shares when their current share price does not reflect the true value of the firm, since 
management is better informed than the market. Therefore, firms that repurchase their 
shares have a high degree of information asymmetry. According to Vermaelen (1981) 
small firms are more likely to have higher information asymmetry, since they have 
less coverage by analysts and the media. Moreover, when there is a higher ownership 
concentration, there would be a higher level of information asymmetry. Therefore, I 
expect to find a positive relationship between the levels of ownership concentration 
and the market reaction. Thus, I include OWNCON which is the percentage of closely 
held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding.  
In addition, following Dittmar (2000) and Grullon and Michaely (2002), I use 
SIZE, which is the natural logarithm of the book value of a firm’s total assets. 
Furthermore, I have replicated the multivariate analysis with the market capitalisation 
as a size proxy, and the results have remained unchanged. Nevertheless, information 
asymmetry is only one of the factors that can lead to undervaluation, since a firm’s 
share price has to be less than its true value. As suggested in the current literature (e.g. 
Ikenberry et al., 1995; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Dittmar, 2000), a reduction 
of the stock price is observed almost entirely prior to a share repurchase 
announcement, thus suggesting potential undervaluation. In order to capture a 
potential undervaluation, I use RET, which is the daily cumulative market adjusted 
return for the period of 255 prior to 2 days prior to the announcement of a share 
repurchase.  
Moreover, Ikenberry et al. (1995) report that firms with low book-to-market 
ratios earn abnormal returns in the subsequent periods, which is in line with the 
undervaluation hypothesis. Thus, I include in the regression MKBK, which is the 
market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Further, MKBK can be 
used in order to control for a firm’s potential investment opportunity.  
In order to test for the excess cash flow hypothesis, according to which firms 
repurchase their stock in order to distribute their excess capital and reduce potentially 
arising agency costs, I follow Dittmar (2000), and I include in the regression the 
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variable CASH, which is defined as the firm’s ratio of net income before taxes plus 
depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges to total assets, 
at the end of the year prior to the share repurchase announcement. If the firm’s motive 
to repurchase its shares is to distribute the excess capital instead of misplacing it to 
negative NPV projects, then it should be positively related to the market reaction, 
since it distributes its excess capital back to its shareholders. 
Further, in order to control whether the market takes into account if a firm is 
repurchasing its shares as a substitute or complement to its overall payout policy, I 
include the dummy variable DDIV. DDIV takes the value of one if a firm has paid 
dividends in the year prior to the repurchasing announcement and zero if it has not 
paid dividends. Moreover, I test if the initial announcement has a greater market 
reaction than the subsequent announcements. For this purpose, I include D_INITIAL 
which takes the value of one if it is the initial announcement made by each firm and 
zero otherwise. Further, for testing the effect on the market reaction of each tax and/or 
regulatory change, I include DTAX_1 to DTAX_3 which are dummy variables that 
take the value of one when an announcement of intention to repurchase took place 
after a change occurred in tax regulations, that I hypothesise that could affect the 
market reaction on such announcements (for each country). DREG is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one when an announcement of intention to 
repurchase took place after a change occurred in regulations that could significantly 
affect the market reaction on the announcement of intention to repurchase (for each 
country). 
Table 3.7 reports the descriptive statistics for the proxy variables employed in 
the cross-sectional analysis. It is notable that in all three countries firms that announce 
their intention to repurchase their shares have lower leverage relative to the industry 
as denoted by the average negative net debt differential. Furthermore, firms in the UK 
have higher growth relative to France and Germany proxied by the market-to-book 
ratio. With respect to firms’ cash holdings, in all three countries firms have similar 
cash levels and similar size levels. However, the table shows that firms in Germany 
experience a negative performance prior to the announcement of approximately 
10.7% relative to the smaller in magnitude performance of 2.8% in France and 0.6% 
in the U.K. Finally, the ownership concentration for U.K firms is lower relative to 
German and French firms as expected. 
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Table 3.7 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum respectively for each of the three samples of the market reaction to the 
announcement of an open market share repurchase programme and the respective explanatory variables employed on the cross-sectional regressions for each of the three countries 
under analysis (UK, France and Germany) over the period 1997 to 2006. The table reports the number of observations, the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each 
of the reported variables. CAAR is the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the share repurchase announcement. LEV I is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the 
repurchasing firm in the end of the calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement. LEV II is the difference of the net debt to total assets ratio from the median net debt (total debt 
minus cash and equivalents) to total assets ratio of each respective industry of the repurchasing firm in the end of the calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement. MKBK is 
the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the year-end prior to the repurchase announcement. CASH is the firm’s ratio of net income before taxes plus 
depreciation and changes in deferred taxes and other deferred charges to total assets at the end of the year prior to the share repurchase announcement. RET is the daily cumulative 
market adjusted return for the period of 255 days prior and 2 days prior to the announcement of a share repurchase. SIZE is the book value of a firm’s total assets reported in millions 
of US dollars. OWNCON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Closely held shares include shares held by management, 
corporations, benefit/pension schemes and individuals that hold 5% or more of the common shares outstanding. DDIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a 
repurchasing firm paid dividends in the year prior to the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. D_INITIAL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is the initial 
announcement made by each firm and zero otherwise. DTAX_1 to DTAX_3 are dummy variables that take the value of one when an announcement of intention to repurchase took 
place after a change occurred in tax regulations that I believe that could affect the market reaction on such announcements (for each country). DREG is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of one when an announcement of intention to repurchase took place after a change occurred in regulations that could significantly affect the market reaction on the 
announcement of intention to repurchase (for each country). 
CAAR(-1+1) LEV I LEV II MKBK CASH RET SIZE OWNCON DDIV D_INITIAL DTAX_1 DTAX_2 DTAX_3 DREG 
 
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
 
Observations 513 482 512 468 476 513 482 468 475 513 513 513 513 513 
Mean 0.019 0.230 -0.051 2.804 0.114 -0.006 33,671 15.570 0.829 0.589 0.947 0.715 0.304 0.456 
Std. Dev. 0.056 0.185 0.310 4.627 0.129 0.329 131,418 17.568 0.376 0.493 0.224 0.452 0.460 0.499 
Min -0.275 0.000 -1.309 0.000 -1.148 -1.676 3.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.386 0.928 0.685 44.960 0.640 1.022 1,333,350 71.809 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Fr
an
ce
 
Observations 263 258 263 226 240 263 256 226 255 263 263 
Mean 0.008 0.236 -0.035 2.470 0.118 -0.028 43,234 42.544 0.812 0.700 0.209 
Std. Dev. 0.049 0.161 0.295 2.309 0.105 0.385 165,727 24.703 0.392 0.459 0.407 
Min -0.180 0.000 -1.732 0.001 -0.516 -1.631 3.817 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.193 0.800 0.606 16.240 0.485 1.350 1,482,838 88.182 1.000 1.000 1.000 
G
er
m
an
y Observations 194 193 194 122 184 194 178 122 192 194 194 194 Mean 0.023 0.147 -0.067 3.094 0.120 -0.107 53,173 38.498 0.667 0.675 0.840 0.526 
Std. Dev. 0.074 0.154 0.268 3.408 0.175 0.599 189,656 23.199 0.473 0.469 0.367 0.501 
Min -0.329 0.000 -0.866 0.200 -1.649 -2.330 11.702 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Max 0.345 0.758 0.692 20.230 0.505 1.864 1,165,378 86.073 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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The results from the cross-sectional regressions are shown in Table 3.8. It is 
only in the U.K. that he net debt difference from the median of each industry has a 
significant impact, whereas in France it is the first proxy for leverage used (total debt 
over total assets) that appears to be significant. Furthermore, I do not find leverage to 
be significant in the case of Germany.  
Moreover, the market-to-book proxy is not significant for either of the three 
countries. However, in order to get robust evidence concerning the undervaluation 
hypothesis, I find evidence, as expected, that the past market adjusted return which is 
an alternative proxy for undervaluation, is inversely related to the market reaction in 
the U.K.. This means that the market perceives a share repurchase announcement as a 
positive signal, especially when it is preceded by poor past share price performance. 
This finding is consistent with Stephens and Weisbach (1998), who show that firms 
repurchase their stock after a period of negative share price performance. However, 
this is not the case for France and Germany where the past market-adjusted returns 
have a positive relationship with the market reaction on the day of the repurchase 
announcement. An explanation for this can be that even though firms that make share 
repurchase announcements show a positive share price performance, by making this 
announcement, the market believes that the firms’ share price is still undervalued, 
which in turn the market reacts positively to that signal.  
For Germany I find, contrary to my expectations, that a firm’s excess cash flow 
is inversely related to the market reaction, but it is only for the German market that 
the excess cash proxy is significantly related to the market’s reaction. The inverse 
relationship of cash with the market reaction implies that the market would prefer to 
see the excess cash being invested instead of being given back to the shareholders as a 
payout in the form of share repurchases.  
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Table 3.8 Cross sectional analysis per country on the drivers of the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the following cross-sectional regression for each respective country: 
 
CAARit = β0 + β1LEVi(t-1) + β2 MKBK(t-1) + β3CASHi(t-1) + β4RETi(t-1) + β5Log(SIZE)i(t-1) +  β6OWNCONi(t-1) +  β7DDIVi(t-1) + β8D_INITIAL i(t-1) + β9DTAX_1 i(t-1) +  
β10DTAX_2 i(t-1) + β11DTAX_3 i(t-1) + β12DREG i(t-1) 
The sample consists of firms in the U.K., France and Germany that announced a share repurchasing programme over the period 1997 to 2006. CAAR is the five-day 
cumulative abnormal return around the share repurchase announcement. LEV I is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the repurchasing firm in the end of the calendar year 
prior to the repurchase announcement. LEV II is the difference of the net debt to total assets ratio from the median net debt  (total debt minus cash and equivalents) to total 
assets ratio of each respective industry of the repurchasing firm in the end of the calendar year prior to the repurchase announcement. MKBK is the market value of equity 
divided by the book value of equity at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. CASH is the firm’s ratio of net income before taxes plus depreciation and changes 
in deferred taxes and other deferred charges to total assets at the end of the year prior to the share repurchase announcement. RET is the daily cumulative market adjusted 
return for the period of 255 days prior and 2 days prior to the announcement of a share repurchase. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of a firm’s total assets. 
OWNCON is the percent of closely held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Closely held shares include shares held by management, corporations, 
benefit/pension schemes and individuals that hold 5% or more of the common shares outstanding. DDIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a repurchasing 
firm paid dividends in the year prior to the repurchase announcement and zero otherwise. D_INITIAL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if it is the initial 
announcement made by each firm and zero otherwise. DTAX_1 to DTAX_3 are dummy variables that take the value of one when an announcement of intention to 
repurchase took place after a change occurred in tax regulations that I believe that could affect the market reaction on such announcements (for each country). DREG is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when an announcement of intention to repurchase took place after a change occurred in regulations that could significantly affect 
the market reaction on the announcement of intention to repurchase (for each country). The standard errors of the coefficients have been adjusted for heteroskedasticity using 
White’s procedure. The p-values of the cross-sectional regressions are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level 
respectively based on the p-values. 
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Dependent Variable CAAR(-1,+1) 
                            United Kingdom France Germany 
C 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.094*** 0.088***  0.063** 0.084*** 0.067** 0.081***  0.168** 0.159** 0.182*** 0.172*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.019) (0.002) (0.020) (0.003)  (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) 
LEV I 0.025 0.021    0.058*** 0.048***\    -0.033 -0.025   
 
(0.288) (0.297)    (0.002) (0.011)    (0.413) (0.534)   
LEV II   0.023** 0.023***    0.000 0.000    -0.002 0.000 
 
  (0.014) (0.008)    (0.875) (0.929)    (0.941) (0.989) 
MKBK -0.001  -0.001   0.002  0.001   -0.002  -0.002  
 
(0.141)  (0.138)   (0.323)  (0.470)   (0.312)  (0.346)  
CASH 0.007 -0.020 0.006 -0.022  -0.028 -0.048 -0.047 -0.060*  -0.220*** -0.197** -0.218*** -0.196** 
 
(0.794) (0.362) (0.826) (0.333)  (0.405) (0.154) (0.185) (0.060)  (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) 
RET -0.033*** -0.026** -0.036*** -0.029*  0.554*** 0.577*** 0.561*** 0.577***  0.326* 0.369* 0.335* 0.376* 
 
(0.006) (0.021) (0.003) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.085) (0.053) (0.079) (0.051) 
SIZE -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003***  -0.004** -0.004*** -0.003* -0.003**  -0.008** -0.008** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.011) (0.009)  (0.015) (0.005) (0.069) (0.024)  (0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) 
OWNCON 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.100) (0.128) (0.095) (0.129)  (0.315) (0.341) (0.473) (0.482)  (0.514) (0.391) (0.645) (0.489) 
DDIV -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004  -0.010 -0.012 -0.011 -0.013  0.029* 0.023 0.031* 0.025 
 
(0.719) (0.922) (0.487) (0.662)  (0.278) (0.172) (0.227) (0.157)  (0.081) (0.124) (0.074) (0.118) 
D_INITIAL 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004  -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007  -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 
(0.699) (0.571) (0.691) (0.551)  (0.283) (0.221) (0.324) (0.270)  (0.678) (0.549) (0.535) (0.439) 
DTAX 1 -0.023 -0.019 -0.024* -0.020  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  -0.026 -0.027 -0.029 -0.029 
 
(0.072) (0.134) (0.059) (0.109)  (0.849) (0.902) (0.844) (0.884)  (0.250) (0.193) (0.201) (0.166) 
DTAX 2 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.011           
 
(0.136) (0.228) (0.136) (0.222)           
DTAX 3 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009           
 
(0.768) (0.423) (0.391) (0.180)           
DREG -0.020** -0.018** -0.015* -0.014*       0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.073) (0.070)       (0.830) (0.796) (0.831) (0.818) 
Adjusted R2 
(%) 9.73 8.31 10.43 9.16  28.79 31.49 25.68 29.36  17.88 18.30 17.53 18.11 
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Further, as expected, a firm’s size is inversely related to the market reaction to 
open market share repurchase announcements for all three countries, which is aligned 
to the findings of Ikenberry at al. (1995) and Grullon and Michaely (2002). Regarding 
the ownership concentration, the results provide week evidence, suggesting that the 
market reaction cannot be explained by the respective ownership concentration levels. 
As shown earlier, the market reaction to the initial announcement during the 
event window is significantly higher. Therefore, I expect to find in the cross-section 
analysis, that the dummy variable that captures the initial announcement D_INITIAL 
is positive and significant. Nevertheless, when controlling for other variables as well, 
D_INITIAL is proven to not be statistically significant. After conducting further tests 
(not reported), in order to determine why this variable is not significant, I find that it 
is the variable SIZE and the respective tax and regulatory change dummies in each 
country that cancel out the significance of the dummy variable D_INITIAL. This can 
be explained by the fact that it is expected to be large firms, in terms of size, that are 
likely to announce their intention to repurchase their shares in the open market. In 
addition, it should be large firms as well, that are more likely to make subsequent 
announcements. Hence, size cancels out the significance of the dummy variable 
D_INITIAL.  
Moreover, I find some evidence that firms which pay dividends have a higher 
market reaction to the announcement of a share repurchase, but only in Germany. This 
suggests that the German market welcomes this extra payout what will come in the 
form of share repurchases. Finally, as expected from the univariate analysis, I find 
that it is only for the U.K. market that both the change in taxation, where ACT was 
still effective, and the change in regulations where firms were allowed to keep the 
repurchased shares as Treasury Stock, have a significant and negative effect on the 
market reaction. The evidence on the tax impact is consistent with Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) and Lie and Lie (1999) which suggest that repurchase activity is 
influenced by the tax impact of share repurchases. Furthermore, the results show that 
by lifting any tax and/or regulatory constrains from share repurchases, the market 
shows a more favourable reaction. 
Following, I assess whether the market reacts significantly different to firms that 
have specific varying firm characteristics. The firm characteristics under investigation 
are the ownership concentration, leverage, market-to-book ratio and the cumulative 
one year stock returns prior to the announcement. For assessing the impact of these 
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characteristics on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements, I perform 
the following analysis. First, I split the samples into two groups in each country. 
Those firms that have a level of ownership concentration lower than the median of the 
entire group of firms, that have announced their intention to repurchase their shares in 
each country, and those that have higher than the respective median level. I repeat the 
same process for the variables market-to-book, leverage, and one year cumulative past 
returns. Then I perform a univariate analysis between these two sub-groups for the 
pre-, event, and post-announcement time windows, for each variable in question, 
individually. The results are reported in Table 3.9.  
Regarding the impact of ownership concentration on the market reaction to 
share repurchases, the findings show that for all three countries, there is no significant 
difference in the market behaviour prior and post the announcement between the two 
sub-groups. Nevertheless, I find that only in the U.K. and Germany, firms that have 
higher ownership concentration (higher than the median) have a significantly higher 
market reaction on the event window. This confirms the previous finding on the effect 
of ownership concentration, where less diversely owned firms have higher levels of 
information asymmetry which lead to a higher market reaction, but only at the time of 
the announcement.  
The evidence for leverage shows that it is only in Germany that firms that have 
lower (than the median) leverage, experience a post-announcement negative 
performance. I argue, that this is due to the high market reaction to the repurchase 
announcement made by firms with low leverage, which after the announcement, the 
market corrects itself, and hence reflecting a negative share price performance during 
the post-event window. 
Furthermore, the findings show that in the U.K., firms that are more likely to be 
undervalued, since their respective market-to-book ratios are below the median, 
experience a significantly higher market reaction during the event window. In 
addition, the market makes a small adjustment on the post-event period for firms with 
low market-to-book ratios. In contrast, for firms with higher market-to-book ratios, 
the market under-reacts during the event window, since their stock performance is 
positive and significantly different, compared to firms with lower market-to-book 
ratios during the post-event window.  Similarly, I find in the U.K., that for firms with 
lower past share price performance the market reaction is significantly higher, which 
remains positive on the post-event period, as opposed to firms with higher past share 
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price performance, for which the market shows a correction of its initial reaction 
during the event window. Furthermore, I find that in France, firms with higher past 
share price performance have a negative share price performance during both the pre- 
and post-event windows.  
The evidence on the impact that size has on the market reaction, show 
consistently in all three countries, that firms which are smaller in size, have a 
considerably higher market reaction to the repurchase announcement during the event 
window. Additionally, it is notable that the market reaction during the event window 
of the share repurchase announcements made by smaller firms, is significantly high 
and statistically significant. The results on size, confirm the earlier findings on the 
cross-section analysis that size is inversely related to the market reaction to 
repurchase announcements, which is also in line with the findings of Ikenberry at al. 
(1995) and Grullon and Michaely (2002). I argue that the reason for this is that 
smaller firms experience higher information asymmetries. Therefore, by announcing 
their intention to repurchase their shares, as argued by Bhattacharya and Dittmar 
(2003), they attract the market’s scrutiny, which consequently leads to a high market 
reaction. In sum, the results from this analysis support the findings derived from the 
cross-section analysis. 
Concluding, I find evidence in support of the undervaluation hypothesis, that the 
ownership concentration has a statistically significant but marginal impact on the 
market reaction to share repurchase announcements, and that firm size is inversely 
related to the market reaction. Finally, for the U.K., I find strong evidence that 
changes in taxation and regulations do have a significant and negative impact on the 
market reaction to open market share repurchase announcements.  
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Table 3.9 Individual firm specific characteristics’ impact on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. 
The sample consists of 970 announcements of intention to repurchase shares on the open market of which 513 took place in the U.K., 263 in France and the remaining 194 in 
Germany, for the period 1997 to 2006. The abnormal returns are calculated with the implementation of the ordinary least squares market model with the coefficients 
computed over the -255 to -21 days before the announcement date. The table reports the cumulative average abnormal returns for selected time-windows, for the entire 
sample and for the two sub-samples of firms that have a respective ownership concentration, market-to-book ratio, leverage ratio, cumulative past one year returns prior to the 
repurchase announcement, and size,  below and above the median respective values for each country. The p-values of the differences in means between the two sub-samples 
(below and above the median) are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * reported on the average abnormal returns indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Magnitude of 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Magnitude of Market-
to-Book 
Magnitude of 
Leverage 
Magnitude of 
Cumulative Past 
Returns 
 
Magnitude of Size 
Entire 
Sample 
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median  
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median  
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median  
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
 Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
 
United Kingdom 
-20, -2 0.13% 0.24% -0.01% 0.76% -0.54% 0.02% 0.22% 0.56% -0.30%  0.42% -0.14% 
(0.778)  (0.128) (0.821) (0.314)  (0.521) 
-1, +1 1.68%*** 1.32%*** 2.52%*** 2.27%*** 1.43%*** 2.00%*** 1.74%*** 2.42%*** 1.30%***  2.79%*** 1.05%*** 
(0.018)  (0.091) (0.595) (0.024)  (0.001) 
+2, +20 0.91%* 1.04%* 0.76% -0.46% 2.35%*** 1.09%* 0.75% 2.87%*** -1.05%**  0.90% 0.92%** 
(0.709)  (0.000) (0.656) (0.000)  (0.977) 
 
 
N 513 282 231 263 250 241 272 257 256  241 272 
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Table 3.9  Continued 
Magnitude of 
Ownership 
Concentration 
Magnitude of Market-
to-Book 
Magnitude of 
Leverage 
Magnitude of 
Cumulative Past 
Returns 
 
Magnitude of Size 
Entire 
Sample 
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median  
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median  
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median  
Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
 Below 
Median 
Above 
Median 
 
France 
-20, -2 -0.51% -0.90% -0.03% -0.44% -0.58% -0.44% 0.44% 0.81% -1.84%*  -1.50% 0.44% 
-0.567  -0.924 -0.486 -0.08  -0.201 
-1, +1 0.66%** 0.80%** 0.79%* 0.90%* 0.69% 0.53% 1.05%* 1.16%* 0.43%  1.57%*** 0.05% 
-0.979  -0.733 -0.386 -0.227  -0.012 
+2, +20 -0.80% -0.58% -0.80% -0.44% -0.92% -1.43% 0.05% 0.93% -2.30%***  -0.94% -0.42% 
-0.854  -0.688 -0.216 -0.006  -0.665 
 
N 263 146 117 132 131 132 134 132 131  129 134 
 
Germany 
-20, -2 -1.42% -1.30% -1.61% -1.34% -1.49% -0.95% -1.88%* -1.41% -1.42%*  -1.78% -0.96% 
-0.861  -0.926 -0.569 -0.991  -0.573 
-1, +1 2.32%*** 1.84%*** 3.13%*** 2.20%*** 2.44%*** 3.18%*** 1.46%** 2.84%*** 1.80%***  4.08%*** 0.56%* 
-0.023  -0.821 -0.108 -0.331  -0.001 
+2, +20 0.09% 1.70% -2.64% 0.34% -0.16% -2.36% 2.55%** 1.08% -0.89%  -0.96% 1.14% 
-0.18  -0.848 -0.061 -0.454  -0.424 
 
N 194 122 72 97 97 97 97 97 97  97 97 
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3.6. Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive cross-country 
analysis of the market reaction to the announcement of open market share repurchases 
in the U.K., France and Germany. I expect to find that the market’s perception and 
reaction to share repurchase announcements differs in each country, due to their 
differences in institutional, tax and regulatory frameworks. Moreover, I expect to find 
support in the U.K. market, of the undervaluation hypothesis documented in the U.S. 
studies, due to the structural and market similarities between the U.K. and the U.S. In 
addition, I test if any changes in the regulatory frameworks or in the respective tax 
regimes can have a significant effect on the market reaction to share repurchases. I 
expect to find that both regulatory and tax changes can have a significant effect on 
share repurchases, since these changes can affect the flexibility and advantages that 
share repurchases can offer. Further, this chapter tests if there is any significant 
difference on the market reaction to firms that announced only once their intention to 
repurchase their shares and firms that made multiple announcements of their intention 
to repurchase their shares, throughout the ten year period under study. I expect to find 
that the market will become accustomed to such announcements, and it will have a 
more positive reaction to the initial announcement of intention to repurchase. Finally, 
I strive to establish the significant drivers of the market reaction to share repurchase 
announcements by performing a cross-sectional analysis.  
In this chapter a comprehensive sample of 970 open market share repurchase 
announcements is used. The overwhelming majority of these announcements took 
place in the U.K. This is aligned with the notion that share repurchases are a more 
popular way of returning cash back to the shareholders, as well as the fact that the 
stringent regulations and tax regimes were preventing firms from undertaking share 
repurchases in France and Germany.  
The initial results do not provide a strong support for the undervaluation 
hypothesis, since even though the share price performance is quite poor during the 
pre-announcement period, it is not statistically significant in all three countries. 
Nevertheless, the market reaction during the time of the repurchase announcement 
significantly increases, suggesting that the markets perceive the announcement of a 
share repurchase programme as being positive news. Over the post-event period, the 
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U.K. market seems to continue having a positive reaction, whereas the German 
market seems to rebalance its initial reaction to the announcement, and finally the 
French market seems to have an even more negative reaction compared to the one it 
had prior to the announcement. Nevertheless, the performance of the German firms 
remains on the positive side, due to a strong positive reaction in the event period. 
Further, when splitting the sample between the initial and subsequent 
announcements, it appears that for all three countries the respective markets have a 
much more favourable reaction to the initial announcements during the event period. 
Therefore, the markets have a considerably more favourable reaction towards the 
initial announcement of intention to repurchase. But it is only for the U.K. that the 
initial announcements have a better market reaction during the post-event period. 
Even though these results provide a good indication on the difference of the market 
reaction between initial and subsequent announcements and their respective 
information content, one should approach these findings with caution. This is due to 
the fact that the results of the univariate analysis omit other important factors such as 
time and size that can impact the market reaction to repurchase announcements. 
Additionally, this chapter tests if there are any changes in regulations and 
taxation (capital gains, income tax and corporate tax), that have a significant impact 
on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements. The results show that both 
regulatory and tax changes do have a significant impact on the market reaction in the 
U.K. market. Moreover, the results show that the market reaction to open market 
share repurchase announcements varies among countries, which suggests that 
institutional, regulatory, firm specific and tax factors explain the market valuation of 
share repurchases in these three European countries. Contrary to the U.K. evidence, 
the market reaction in France and Germany is not significantly affected by regulatory 
and tax changes. Finally, when performing a cross-sectional analysis I find evidence 
of undervaluation, and that size has a significant and inverse relationship to the 
market reaction. Finally, I find that for the three different countries it is the interaction 
of different firm specific characteristics that have a significant impact on the market 
reaction in each country.  
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Chapter 4. 
4. Share Repurchase Announcements and Actual Trades: 
Completion Rates, Managerial Timing and Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I investigate the actual share repurchase trades of 196 publicly 
announced open market share repurchase programmes, and their respective 
completion rates, that took place in the U.K. during the ten year period from 1996 to 
2006. I find that repurchasing firms have, on average, a completion rate of 74%. In 
addition, the evidence show that managers trade strategically, in order to provide 
price support. Moreover, I find that repurchasing firms experience a significant 
decline in systematic risk during the days when the actual repurchase trades took 
place, which increases significantly following the conclusion of the open market 
share repurchase programme. Finally, for robustness check, I perform a risk 
decomposition of the sample firms’ total risk, to its systematic and idiosyncratic risk, 
which confirms the findings on risk changes. 
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4.1.  Introduction 
Share repurchases and especially open market share repurchases have become a 
common payout method over the recent years. Moreover, it is well documented that 
open market share repurchases are more popular than fixed-price tender offers or 
Dutch auctions (see Ikenberry et al. 1995; Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Grullon and 
Michaely 2004; Ginglinger and Hamon 2007; and Ikenberry et al., 2000). However, 
under the open market share repurchase method, companies are not required to 
repurchase their shares. Therefore, this practice raises a number of questions, namely, 
what is the completion rate of the intended repurchase programme? What are the firm 
specific characteristics that influence the completion rates of share repurchase 
programmes? Do managers repurchase shares strategically? Do the repurchase 
announcement and the reporting of the repurchase trades have an impact on firms’ 
risk?  
For addressing these questions, I use a sample of 196 announcements of 
intention to repurchase shares in the open market in the U.K., over the period 1997 to 
2006. I find that approximately 30% of the sample firms did not repurchase their 
shares at all. In addition, I find that firms repurchase on average 74% of the shares 
targeted on the announcement. Furthermore, I investigate whether managers trade 
strategically, and the evidence suggests that managers are willing to pay a higher 
price compared to the average weighted price of previous days, which supports the 
price support hypothesis. Moreover, I analyse if any risk change occurs due to open 
market share repurchase announcements, and I find some evidence that it is firms that 
pay out less dividends, that experience a decline of systematic risk after the 
repurchase announcement.  
Apart from the announcement effect on firm risk, I analyse if any risk change 
occurs during the actual implementation of the repurchase programme, and I find that 
firms experience a significant decline in systematic risk during the days when the 
actual repurchase trades took place. In addition, I find that repurchasing firms have 
significantly higher systematic risk compared to their peers of similar valuation 
throughout the entire process of share repurchases. Finally, for robustness check I 
perform a risk decomposition of the sample firms’ total risk to its systematic and 
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idiosyncratic risk. The results confirm the findings that firm risk significantly declines 
during the days of the actual repurchase trades. 
The existing literature has been focusing mostly on what is the information 
content of share repurchase announcements and the respective underlying theories. 
As discussed earlier, the most prevailing theories are undervaluation, agency theory, 
capital restructuring, dividend substitution, and management compensation incentive 
hypotheses. However, the majority of the literature concerning share repurchases 
focuses on the U.S. market (see Allen and Michaely, 2003). In this chapter I analyse 
the actual share repurchase trades and the completion rates of the announced open 
market share repurchase programmes. Further, I identify if managers trade 
strategically or if they repurchase for price support. Finally, I perform a thorough 
examination on the effect that open market share repurchase announcements, and the 
implementation of the actual repurchase trades, can have on firm risk.  
In the U.S., it is difficult to follow the completion rates of the announced share 
repurchase programmes, because the only disclosure requirement is the quarterly 
number of shares outstanding in the financial statement. Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) find in the U.S., that it takes on average three years for firms to complete their 
repurchase programme. In addition, they find that firms repurchase approximately 80 
percent of the shares targeted in the announcement. In Canada, Ikenberry et al. (2000) 
find that the mean completion rate is only 28.6%. In addition, the authors report 
evidence suggesting that managers trade strategically. Nevertheless, these studies 
employ quarterly and monthly data, hence making it difficult to analyse the 
completion rates of the announced repurchase programmes, and the respective timing 
of execution.  
In order to overcome this limitation, Oswald and Young (2004) in the U.K., 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) in France and Zhang (2005) in Hong Kong, employ 
daily data on share repurchases and the respective actual repurchase trades. Oswald 
and Young (2004), even though they test the impact of undervaluation on the decision 
to repurchase, they do not focus on the actual timing of the repurchase trades in order 
to achieve a clear understanding of managers’ timing ability. Nevertheless, the 
authors find that as share prices fall, managers tend to repurchase more shares. The 
evidence from Hong Kong shows, that firms repurchase their shares following price 
drops, and show a positive short-term performance after the repurchases. Hence, it 
suggests that managers time their repurchase trades and trade against market trends, 
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which supports the market timing hypothesis. In contrast, the evidence from France, 
shows that firms repurchase their shares following periods when share prices have 
been falling, but show no improvement of share price performance after the 
repurchase trades, which supports the price support hypothesis. 
Berk et al., (1999) argue that good news is associated with a reduction in 
systematic risk, whereas bad news is associated with an increase in systematic risk. 
Since share repurchases can be an effective method for reducing potential agency 
costs, the announcement, and the actual implementation of share repurchases can 
convey information to the market, that the firm is experiencing a reduction in future 
investment opportunities. Moreover, a number of research studies (Dann et al., 1991; 
and Hertzel and Jain, 1991, on fixed price tender offers) and (Bartov, 1991; and 
Grullon and Michaely, 2004, on open market share repurchases) find evidence that 
firms in the U.S. experience a significant decline in systematic risk after the 
announcement of the respective share repurchase programme. In contrast, Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) argue that the abnormal returns obtained with Ibbotson’s RATS 
methodology cannot be explained as the market’s underreaction to risk changes. In 
addition, Denis and Kadlec (1994) find no evidence of systematic risk changes after 
adjusting for potential estimation bias. 
Given the recent growth in share repurchase activity, and the relatively 
unexplored area of the actual repurchase trades, as well as the completion rates of the 
announced repurchase programmes, fresh evidence from the U.K. market can provide 
a vigorous insight in the ambiguous area of share repurchasing. The reason for this is 
that in the U.K., firms are only required to get their shareholders’ approval for 
initiating a share repurchase programme. They are not required to announce publicly 
their intention to repurchase their shares, yet a number of firms do. Moreover, firms 
in the U.K. are required to disclose the repurchased shares on the day when the actual 
repurchase trades took place, until the start of the following trading day. Therefore, 
by employing U.K. data in this research, I can identify what is the information 
content of open market share repurchases.  
The evidence on the U.K. market are comparable to the U.S. and international 
findings, hence the contribution of this chapter is significant. To this end, I add to the 
knowledge on the completion rates of open market share repurchases, and I 
investigate if managers repurchase strategically (i.e. market timing or price support 
hypotheses). Additionally, I investigate if open market share repurchases have 
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information content that can affect firm risk, an area that has not been vigorously 
investigated, apart from Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Bartov (1991) where both 
studies focus only on the announcement and the respective risk changes, and only on 
the U.S. market. Moreover, I analyse the actual daily repurchase trades and 
investigate if the market follows up on them, which will be reflected on the respective 
risk changes. Finally, I provide a broad and clear picture on overall firm risk, by 
performing a risk decomposition surrounding the entire process of open market share 
repurchases, from the announcement of the repurchase programme and its initiation, 
to the short term period after its completion.  
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
current literature and sets the hypotheses that are to be tested. Section 4.3 presents the 
data and an overview of the descriptive statistics. In addition the methodology applied 
in this chapter is discussed. Section 4.4 contains the discussion of the empirical 
results and their implications. The conclusions are in Section 4.5.  
4.2.  Literature Review & Hypotheses Setting 
In this section I discuss the theories that have been developed over the actual 
repurchases and the completion rates of the announced repurchase programmes, as 
well as the change of firm risk surrounding share repurchases. Furthermore, I develop 
and set my hypotheses for each of the contending theories that are tested. This 
enables me to identify if firms in the U.K. actually repurchase the intended amount 
they have announced, if managers trade strategically, and finally, if there are any 
significant risk changes surrounding share repurchase announcements and the 
respective actual share repurchase trades. 
4.2.1. Actual Repurchases and Timing 
Open market share repurchases are, nowadays, one of the most common ways 
for companies to distribute their excess cash back to their shareholders. One of the 
most prominent motives for a firm undertaking a share repurchase, which has been 
well documented in the current literature, is the signalling hypothesis. The signalling 
hypothesis implies that a share repurchase signals the management’s belief that the 
firm’s current stock price is undervalued. A number of research studies for the U.S. 
market (e.g. Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998), 
Canada (Ikenberry et al., 2000) and Europe (Lasfer, 2005; Ginglinger and L’Her, 
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2006), report negative abnormal returns prior to share repurchase announcements 
which are followed by a period of positive abnormal returns, which support the 
signalling hypothesis.  
One of the most advantageous attributes of open market share repurchases is 
their ample flexibility on the timing and execution of the repurchase programme. 
However, the announcement of a share repurchase programme poses no commitment 
to the firm, and quite often is not fully implemented, or firms may choose not to 
repurchase any shares at all. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report evidence from the 
U.S. market, that firms repurchase either a substantial fraction of the announced 
shares or almost none at all. Specifically, they find that firms repurchase 
approximately 80% of the shares targeted at the time of the announcement. In 
addition they find that it takes approximately three years for firms to complete the 
announced repurchase programme. Finally, they find that 30% of their sample of 
firms, continue to repurchase their shares after completing the initially announced 
repurchase programme. In Europe, the open market share repurchase completion rates 
are even lower. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) find that firms repurchase only 37% in the 
U.K., and Ginglinger and Hamon (2003) report that firms in France repurchase only 
10% of the intended amount.  
This lack of commitment for completing the announced open market share 
repurchase programmes makes the signalling hypothesis quite controversial, since an 
open market share repurchase is not a costly signal (meaning that it could be imitated 
even by a bad firm), thus lacking credibility. On the other hand though, Bhattacharya 
and Dittmar (2003) argue that an open market repurchase announcement can 
nevertheless be a credible positive signal, because by making such an announcement, 
the company will attract the market’s attention upon itself. Consequently, the bad 
firm cannot mimic the good firm, because the bad firm would want to avoid any 
possible scrutiny by the market. Further, Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2003) argue that 
the more a firm is undervalued, or ignored by the market, the greater the scrutiny will 
be, which in turn could lead to a greater benefit and profit by discovering this 
information about the firm. 
It can be argued that a firm’s management could have more firm-specific 
information about their firm, which could lead to a better judgment concerning the 
true value of their firm as being a good investment or not. Comment and Jarrell 
(1991) find evidence that firms tend to announce a share repurchase programme when 
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their stock price is most likely to be undervalued. Their findings suggest that 
managers do possess superior information compared to the market.  
But what is not clear however, is whether managers are able to identify and 
exploit opportunities in making actual share repurchases, suggesting that managers 
have timing ability in conducting the actual share repurchase trades and not just in the 
announcement of the share repurchase programme. In contrast, one could argue that 
outside institutional and professional investors could have as much information as 
firm insiders since they could even have similar or even greater ability to process this 
information.  
In the U.S. it is difficult to follow if firms actually repurchase the amount of 
shares they have targeted on the announced share repurchase programmes. This is due 
to the fact that U.S. corporations can announce share repurchase programmes without 
implementing them, and can repurchase their shares without making any 
announcements. The only disclosure requirement they have is the number of shares 
outstanding at each quarterly financial statement. In order to overcome this obstacle, 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) use the quarterly change in a firm’s common shares 
outstanding as a proxy of the actual repurchased shares. In a different approach, Cook 
et al. (2004) use voluntarily disclosed repurchase trading data, and find that firms 
repurchase their shares following price drops and that prices stabilise following 
repurchase trades. But the drawback with these findings, is that the provided data are 
voluntarily disclosed, therefore lacking credibility.  
Nevertheless, there has been a recent regulatory change concerning the 
disclosure requirements of open market share repurchases that was introduced in 17th 
of December, 2003. According to this Exchange Act12, U.S. listed firms are required 
to report on a monthly basis, the exact volume and price data of their repurchase 
activity in their prerequisite quarterly filings. De Cesari et al. (2009) report that firms 
repurchase their shares at relatively lower prices, within each month of repurchase 
activity and buy more shares when market prices are relatively low. Hence the 
authors find evidence suggesting that firms in the U.S. market have timing ability on 
repurchasing their shares. In contrast, Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) in the U.S., find no 
evidence of undervaluation as having an impact on the actual share repurchase trades. 
                                                 
12
 The change in disclosure requirements for repurchase activity was introduced as Purchases of 
Certain Equity Securities by the Issuer and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8335, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8335.htm. 
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Rather, they find that share repurchases are responses to cyclical business waves, and 
not potential undervaluation, since they find no evidence of the market-to-book ratio 
and share price performance to have an impact on share repurchase activity. 
However, since the U.S. repurchase activity information is not publicly 
available in a timely manner, this could not allow answering the question if the 
market truly follows upon the completion progress of an announced open market 
share repurchase programme. For the Canadian market, Ikenberry et al. (2000) use 
monthly repurchase data, since firms are required to report each month the number of 
actual shares they have repurchased. In this study, they find evidence that price 
changes have a significant impact on repurchase activity, suggesting that managers 
demonstrate timing ability since they manage to trade strategically. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that these studies rely on quarterly or monthly data 
(Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 2000; Dittmar and Dittmar, 2008), or 
they use voluntary questionnaires (Cook et al., 2004) it is difficult to get a precise 
understanding of the proportion of the actually repurchased shares. In addition it 
would be difficult to get a precise understanding of the completion rates of the 
announced repurchase programmes as well as for the timing of the repurchase 
execution. 
In order to overcome this limitation, Zhang (2005) investigates the share price 
performance surrounding actual share repurchases in the Hong Kong market, where 
firms are required to disclose the actual share repurchases by the following business 
day, therefore providing accurate measurements. In this study, the author reports 
evidence of negative share price performance for the twenty day period prior to 
repurchases, which becomes positive for the twenty days after the repurchase trades. 
Hence, it suggests that managers go against the market trends and repurchase shares, 
which also supports the market timing hypothesis.  
Ginglinger and Hamon (2006) study the French market, where listed firms are 
required to disclose data on repurchases for a given month at the beginning of the 
following month. Nevertheless, the authors obtain precise trading days and find that 
firms repurchase their shares during periods subsequent to falling shares prices, 
suggesting that managers trade opportunistically. The market timing hypothesis 
implies that a firm’s share price should be lower on repurchase days, compared to 
subsequent non-repurchase days. Nevertheless, they find no significant price 
increases after the actual repurchases have taken place, thus not finding any evidence 
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for the market timing hypothesis. Rather, the authors find evidence supporting the 
price-support hypothesis, according to which a firm’s share price should be lower on 
repurchase days than on prior non-repurchase days.  
Oswald and Young (2004) investigate the U.K. market, and find that as prices 
fall, managers tend to repurchase more shares. Nevertheless, they focus mostly on the 
undervaluation hypothesis and the effect it has on the actual trades, without testing for 
the actual timing of execution of each trade. Therefore, it is not clear, whether 
managers time their repurchases, or if they repurchase in order to provide price 
support. In another research study focusing on the U.K. market, Keswani et al. (2007) 
investigate whether open market share repurchases provide price support during 
firms’ close periods13. Their findings provide mixed evidence on price support since 
for final close period announcements the results are not statistically significant. 
However, the results from the interim close period announcement provide strong 
evidence which support the price support hypothesis. In addition, the authors find that 
open market share repurchases have a stronger price support effect for firms 
announcing large repurchase programmes during the period instantly adjacent to the 
close period. 
In order to shed light on the controversy of the market timing hypothesis, I 
employ data from the London Stock Exchange. U.K. data are of particular interest 
because firms, similarly to the Hong Kong stock exchange, must report the number of 
actual shares repurchased no later than the beginning of the following business day. 
In contrast, U.S. reporting requirements make it difficult to accurately measure the 
completion rate of an announced share repurchase programme (Stephens and 
Weisbach, 1998). Further, even though in Canada firms have to report the actual 
repurchased shares on a monthly basis, it poses a great difficulty for testing if 
managers have a timing ability, since daily data on actual repurchases are not 
available.  
Consequently, the data I employ allows me to accurately measure the 
completion rates of the announced share repurchase programmes, as well as 
determining if managers’ motivation is market timing or price support. Hence, the 
results can be compared to the previous studies in the U.S. and Canadian markets, and 
                                                 
13
 According to the regulations of the London Stock Exchange, firms are prevented from repurchasing 
their shares during period prior to the announcement of a firm’s financial results (for details, please see 
the Financial Services Authority Model Code LR 9.2, Annex 1). 
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even more so, to the findings in Paris and Hong Kong stock exchanges. In order to do 
this, I calculate the number of repurchased shares, and I estimate the respective 
completion rates, depending on the targeted dollar value or the targeted proportion of 
the current common shares outstanding at the time of the announcement. Moreover, 
following Ginglinger and Hamon (2006), I examine the relative prices for repurchase 
and non-repurchase days.   
4.2.2. Risk Changes 
An additional motive for announcing and implementing a share repurchase 
programme, that has been extensively discussed in the literature, is the agency cost of 
the free-cash-flow hypothesis (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Furthermore, 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) do not find any evidence in the U.S. market that firms 
announcing a share repurchase experience an increase in future profitability compared 
to their peers. In addition, the authors find that the capital expenditure levels, as well 
as the cash reserves for the respective share repurchasing firms, decline over time. 
Finally, Grullon and Michaely (2004) find that the market reaction is strongest to 
share repurchase announcements made by firms that are most likely to over-invest.  
Hence, the authors argue that this evidence points to the fact that firms increase 
their payouts as a reaction to their decline in investment opportunities. Since firms are 
more likely to have lower future growth opportunities, their value is more likely to be 
determined by their assets in place, which in turn will lead to a reduction of 
systematic risk (Berk et al., 1999). The authors argue that given the expectations of 
security payoffs, the systematic risk across securities should be correlated to their 
respective market value. Further, they argue that firms that tend to perform well are 
those that have discovered positive investment opportunities and as they venture into 
those investment opportunities, their systematic risk changes.  
In addition, good news is on average associated with a decline in systematic 
risk, whereas bad news is associated with an increase in systematic risk (Berk et al., 
1999). Further, the authors assume that firms own only two kinds of assets. First, their 
assets in place and their currently generated cash flows, and second, options to make 
positive investments in the future. With the passing of every time period, the firm 
matures and the generated cash flows could die off and new investment opportunities 
could be found by the company. A potential investment that bears low systematic risk 
will look attractive to the firm, and by investing in it, it will subsequently lead to the 
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firm’s increase in value. Nevertheless, by investing in lower risk investment 
opportunities, the firm’s average systematic risk will decline, which in turn will lead 
to lower returns. In contrast, if a firm loses a low systematic-risk asset, then, in turn, 
its current value will decline and its average systematic risk will increase.   
Therefore, a firm’s reinvestment rate will lead to free cash flows which, in turn, 
can increase the likelihood of managers overinvesting. In order to reduce potential 
agency costs, shareholders will pressure management to give out cash. Hence, share 
repurchases could convey information to the market that the firm is experiencing a 
reduction in investment opportunities. Thus, share repurchases can be associated with 
a reduction in systematic risk (Grullon and Michaely, 2004).  
Grullon et al., (2002) argue that the market could be more aware of the 
reduction in profitability than the firm’s respective decline in systematic risk. 
Therefore, a share repurchase announcement increases the market’s awareness of both 
the decline in future profitability and systematic risk. This is also supported by the 
evidence reported in Lintner (1956) and Brav et al., (2005) according to which 
managers are more inclined to increase pay outs when they feel that their firm’s 
future cash flows are less risky. Further, Dann et al., (1991) studying any potential 
risk changes surrounding tender offer share repurchase announcements in the U.S. 
market, report evidence that repurchasing firms’ risk declines both prior and post the 
tender offer repurchase announcement, and that firm leverage is not affected by the 
repurchase. Hertzel and Jain (1991) in a similar study concerning tender offer share 
repurchases in the U.S. market, report evidence that firm risk has a permanent decline 
from the year before to the year after the announcement. Hence, these findings 
suggest that share repurchase announcements convey information about the riskiness 
of the firm’s assets.  
In a study of open market share repurchase announcements in the U.S. market, 
Bartov (1991) reports evidence suggesting that firms announcing an open market 
share repurchase, have significantly higher risk compared to their matched control 
firms for the year prior to the year of the announcement, which is reduced during and 
after the year of the announcement. Even though the average risk for the repurchasing 
firms remains marginally, but statistically, higher than the average risk of the control 
firms during and after the year of the announcement, the evidence points to the fact 
that open market share repurchase announcements convey information, which leads 
to a decline in repurchasing firms’ risk.  
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This is supported by Grullon and Michaely (2004) where they examine the six 
year period surrounding open market share repurchase announcements and they find 
that repurchasing firms experience a significant decline in their systematic risk, 
relative to their non-repurchasing peers. Even though this is an indication that their 
investment opportunities are declining after share repurchase announcements, and 
thus should be considered as bad news, still, the market has a positive reaction to such 
news announcements. Therefore, the information content of share repurchases is 
about the reduction in agency costs. Consequently, since the market is already aware 
of the decline in potential investment opportunities, share repurchases can be 
considered as being good news, which in turn could explain the positive market 
reaction (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Thus, these findings support the agency costs 
of the free-cash-flow hypothesis. Furthermore, Oswald and Young (2008) analyse the 
relationship between the open market share repurchases and firm ownership in the 
U.K., and find that the level of external shareholder monitoring, as well as the level of 
managerial ownership have a positive effect on share repurchases. Moreover, when 
comparing repurchasing firms with non-repurchasing firms that have similar 
investment and cash flow characteristics, they find that non-repurchasing firms 
consistently overinvest retained cash when they have a scarcity of investment 
opportunities. Therefore, suggesting that share repurchases can act as preventive 
measures against cash retention decisions that could alternatively prove to be costly 
for shareholders, hence encouraging such payouts. Consequently, because the market 
already knows that the likelihood of overinvesting is high, then this expectation is 
reflected by the market’s positive reaction to share repurchases.  
In contrast, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) argue that the risk change hypothesis 
is inconsistent with the abnormal returns that are obtained with Ibbotson’s RATS 
methodology, where monthly adjustments for risk changes after the event are 
performed. Therefore, if the systematic risk changes after the announcement of a 
share repurchase, then the coefficients are allowed to change on a monthly basis in 
order to reflect such risk changes (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009). Nevertheless, they 
find excess returns. Therefore, long-term returns cannot be explained as the market’s 
underreaction to risk changes. Moreover, they find that it is firms with the lowest pre-
announcement share price performance that had the highest long-term returns. Hence, 
the authors argue that managers do not necessarily announce a share repurchase 
because they have private information concerning the firm’s future profitability, but 
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instead, due to the fact that they believe that the firm’s current share price does not 
reflect the true value of the firm. Consequently, a share repurchase announcement 
does not mean that a firm is undervalued because future performance will improve, 
but it is undervalued because the market wrongfully believes that the firm’s future 
performance will decline (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009). Moreover, Denis and Kadlec 
(1994) perform a thorough examination of potential changes in systematic risk due to 
fixed price tender offers in the U.S. The authors find that the change in systematic 
risk following the repurchase is due to estimation bias, rather than reflecting the 
actual change in risk. 
It is notable that Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) 
test if any change in risk occurs by using monthly data. However, there can be a 
drawback with this estimation method. This is due to the fact that it could not be 
possible to estimate with a high degree of certainty, if the market follows up the 
announcement of the repurchase, and more importantly, the actual trades in a timely 
manner. In addition, in the U.S. there is no time limitation for the initiation and 
completion of open market share repurchases. Oswald and Young (2008) focus on the 
U.K. market but investigate the likelihood to execute an actual share repurchase trade 
from a free cash flow and agency costs perspective, and not the impact that additional 
firm characteristics have on the actual trades on the completion rates, and more 
importantly, on the potential effect it can have on a firm’s systematic risk. 
Moreover, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that in the U.S. the announced 
open market share repurchase programmes are completed, on average, over a period 
of three years. In contrast, in the U.K. the announced repurchase programmes are 
valid for a period of eighteen months (Companies Act 1985, article 166 §4; Kim et 
al., 2004). After this period, if the management wishes to continue the repurchase 
programme, then it needs to renew its authorisation from its shareholders. Therefore, 
I argue that by replicating the Grullon and Michaely (2004) methodology for 
estimating any changes in firms’ risk with the implementation of monthly data for the 
72 months surrounding the repurchase announcement, it will not be possible to timely 
and accurately capture any changes in systematic risk for the shorter time period of 18 
months. Nevertheless, for comparability reasons I replicate this estimation method for 
the U.K market in this chapter. 
Further, I argue that a firm’s total risk could change because the market could 
follow up on the completion rates, since firms have to report the actual trades. 
 152 
Therefore, if that is the case, then the market’s expectation on the firm’s future cash-
flows and growth can change, hence, a firm’s total risk could change. Nevertheless, 
the announcement of an open market share repurchase is not a commitment to the 
firm. Hence, there might not be a significant change on the market’s expectation 
about the future cash-flow and growth expectations, and consequently leading to 
firms’ change in total risk. But since firms in the U.K. are required to report the actual 
trades on their repurchased shares by the start of the following day after the actual 
trade took place, the market could follow up on the actual trades, and if the firm is 
actually moving towards the completion of the announced repurchase programme. 
Thus, the actual trades could be more informative, and could have a significant 
influence on the market’s expectation concerning the firm’s future cash flows. This in 
turn, can lead to a change on the firm’s total risk. Therefore, I replicate my 
estimations for changes in risk with the employment of daily data, and not only on the 
announcement, but on the actual trades as well.  
Nevertheless, a potential decline in equity betas could be due to a decline in the 
firm’s financial leverage, or a decrease on the firm’s underlying riskiness of assets, or 
finally, due to the information conveyed on the repurchase programme regarding the 
firms’ future performance and profitability (Dann et al., 1991). However, since the 
net impact of these effects cannot be determined ex ante, in order to take into account 
the effect that share repurchases can have on leverage and vice versa, I replicate the 
estimations on risk change with the implementation of Hamada’s (1972) approach14 
for robustness check. Hamada (1972) predicts that equity betas are an increasing 
function of financial leverage, therefore equity betas should increase following share 
repurchases due to the changes in financial leverage. Even after employing Hamada’s 
(1972) approach the results remain unaltered. 
In order to get a better insight on risk changes surrounding share repurchases, I 
perform a risk decomposition estimation process15. In order to do this, within the 
context of the CAPM, I analyse a firm’s total risk (with the assumption that it is based 
on the portfolio’s variance) into two components: the systematic risk and the 
respective idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, I decompose the total risk for the portfolio of 
repurchasing companies before and after the repurchase announcement. Finally, I 
                                                 
14
 Hamada’s (1972) approach is explained in detail in the methodology section. 
15
 The risk decomposition is performed under the assumption that the common one factor market 
model applies. For more details see Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966).  
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decompose the portfolio’s total risk before the repurchase announcement, during the 
repurchase programme excluding the days where the actual repurchase trades took 
place, the time period where only the actual trades took place, and the period after the 
completion of the repurchase programme.  
4.3.   Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The sample is constructed by identifying all the announcements of intention to 
repurchase ordinary shares in the open market from hand-collected data, reported in 
the news articles posted in Perfect Analysis and Factiva  databases from 1st of January 
1997 through 31st of December 2006. These databases report any news 
announcements that were available in the press, made by U.K. corporations on open 
market share repurchases.  
The sample is refined so as to involve solely those firms that announce their 
intention to repurchase ordinary shares in the open market, thus excluding 
announcements concerning the repurchase of B-shares or preference shares. 
Additionally, I control the sample for American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and 
cross-country listings. Furthermore, the firms included in the sample are required to 
have their share prices listed on DataStream and their accounting data on 
Worldscope. Finally, I require firms to include in their repurchase announcement 
either the dollar value that they are targeting to utilise for their repurchase 
programme, or the proportion of the common shares outstanding that they plan to 
repurchase. Hence, the final sample contains 197 announcements of intention to 
repurchase shares in the open market from corporations primarily listed in the United 
Kingdom. For these 197 announcements of intention to repurchase I have hand-
collected and identified approximately 34,000 actual share repurchase trades.  
The announcements containing the actual share repurchase trades are collected 
by Factiva, which contains all public announcements that are made by the press or 
any regulatory news service e.g. Dow Jones Newswires, Regulatory News Service 
(RNS), Financial Times, etc.. Hence, it is possible to accurately measure the number 
of the repurchased shares and in a timely manner since they are reported on a daily 
basis16. For estimating the completion rate of the announced share repurchase 
                                                 
16
 It should be noted that for a small sample of ten test firms the total number of repurchased shares has 
been collected by their respective fiscal year statements in order to validate the completion rates 
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programme, the total number of the reportedly repurchased shares is divided by the 
intended amount of shares targeted at the time of the open market share repurchase 
announcement which has been explicitly stated as a total number of shares, or 
extrapolated by the firms’ market value with the current price at the time of 
announcement when they stated a target percentage of shares to be repurchased, or 
extrapolated by the relative value of the shares at the time of the announcement when 
the firms’ announcement targeted a specified monetary value. 
Table 4.1 reports the distribution of the open market share repurchase 
announcements by calendar year. It is clear that the majority of the announcements 
are located in the second half of the ten year research period, which is consistent with 
the recent trend and popularity of share repurchases in the United Kingdom. In 
addition, I find that repurchasing firms are large, since their respective average 
(median) market capitalisation is $12.76 ($2.15) billion U.S. dollars and the average 
(median) market-to-book ratio is 2.59 (1.63). Moreover, the average (median) 
dividend yield for repurchasing firms is 2.98 (2.88). The average size of the sample 
firms is similar to the average size of repurchasing firms reported in Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) and Cook et al., (2004), but the respective market-to-book and 
dividend yield ratios of the sample firms, are slightly higher than the respective 
values reported in their research.  
Table 4.2 reports the average completion rates of the announced repurchase 
programmes and the ranked percentages out of the total sample firms based on the 
completion rates. I find that approximately 31% of the firms that have announced 
their intention to undertake an open market share repurchase programme, have not 
repurchased any of their shares. In addition I find that 40% of the sample firms 
repurchase less than 20% of the shares targeted on the announcement and the average 
(median) completion rate for all repurchasing firms is 74% (54%). This finding is 
higher than the completion rates reported in Rau and Vermaelen (2002). However, it 
is similar to the U.S. completion rates of approximately 70% and 80%, respectively 
reported in Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Jagannathan et al. (2000). Finally, I 
find that firms conduct the first actual repurchase trade on average (median) 69 (21) 
days after the announcement of their intention to repurchase their shares.   
                                                                                                                                           
estimated from the collection of the daily actual share repurchase trades and they show no significant 
statistical differences. 
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Table 4.1 Yearly distribution of firm characteristics and their completion rates. 
This table reports the number of share repurchasing firms on a yearly basis and the respective 
proportion of the overall sample for 1997 to 2006. In addition, the table reports the average and median 
values per annum of the completion rates of the intended amount targeted at the time of the repurchase 
announcement and the respective values of size (MKTCAP), valuation (MKBK) and dividend payout 
(Div Yield). MKTCAP is defined as the market capitalisation at the year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. MKBK is defined as the market-to-book ratio at the year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. Div Yield is defined as the dividend yield at the year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement.  
 
Year 
 
No. (%) of 
Total 
Sample 
Completion Rates 
(%) 
MKTCAP ($bn) MKBK Div Yield 
   Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
1997 6 3% 62.97 62.97 2.80 3.30 2.21 1.72 3.99 3.90 
1998 14 7% 47.34 41.59 13.78 3.33 1.62 1.01 3.84 4.36 
1999 12 6% 34.55 24.68 16.47 3.24 1.77 1.27 2.80 2.80 
2000 11 6% 93.32 60.83 4.13 2.51 1.78 1.54 4.30 3.09 
2001 23 12% 62.47 62.70 18.66 0.33 1.95 1.00 2.84 2.31 
2002 30 15% 45.42 18.73 7.59 1.01 2.99 2.13 3.22 3.52 
2003 14 7% 60.67 71.73 10.27 0.45 2.07 1.04 3.03 2.82 
2004 29 15% 85.29 65.59 12.37 2.59 2.59 1.60 3.74 4.16 
2005 31 16% 89.55 53.21 16.90 2.88 3.73 2.22 2.19 2.34 
2006 26 13% 102.87 98.24 15.37 2.02 3.35 2.42 2.35 2.22 
Total 196 100% 74.33% 50.77% 12.76 2.15 2.59 1.63 3.06 3.13 
 
Table 4.2 Share repurchase completion rates in the United Kingdom. 
This table reports the statistics for the completion rates and the number of days from the day of the 
announcement to the day of initiation of the announced share repurchase programmes, for the total of 
197 sample firms for 1997 to 2006. In addition, the table reports the number and percentage of firms 
from the sample of firms that have actually repurchased their shares (Repurchasing) and those that 
have not repurchased any of their shares (Non-Repurchasing), as well as the cumulative share 
repurchase activity in percentiles. 
 
  
Difference in days of 
initiation 
Completion 
Ratio 
Mean 69.32 74.17% 
Median 21.00 54.00% 
  
Repurchasing firms                136  (69.39%) 
Non-Repurchasing firms                  60  (30.61%) 
Total                 196   (100%) 
  
  
Percentiles Pct of Firms 
 
<20 52% 
21-40% 7% 
41-60% 10% 
61-80% 6% 
>81% 25% 
 156 
4.3.2. Methodology 
In order to test the market-timing, and alternatively, the price-support 
hypotheses, in the spirit of Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), I examine the share prices 
surrounding the share repurchase announcement and the actual trades. In order to do 
so, I compute the daily value weighted average price, estimated as the average price 
obtained from the daily high and low price, weighted by the daily trading volume of 
the stock17. Afterwards, I compare the relative weighted average price paid for the 
actual repurchase trades to the respective non-repurchase days. For the weighted-
average price paid during the non-repurchase days, I use the time periods of n 
months. Where n takes the values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 12, before and after each actual 
repurchase trade takes place (excluding other repurchase days in between). Then, I 
compute and analyse the ratio of the reported value weighted average price paid on 
the repurchase day (VWAPR) over the value weighted average price of the remaining 
days where no repurchase trades took place during each time period under 
investigation (VWAP), for the n months prior and post the actual trade (VWAPR / 
VWAP (n)). Then, I compare it with the ratio of the value weighted average price 
(VWAPNR) of the days that the actual trades took place but excluding the repurchase 
trades, and divided by the value weighted average price over the same set of time 
windows before and after the n months the actual repurchase trades took place 
(VWAPNR / VWAP (n)). Afterwards, I test whether these two ratios are significantly 
different.  
For estimating if the risk changes in the portfolio of companies that have 
announced their intention to repurchase their shares, I follow two approaches. In the 
first approach, I estimate the systematic risk for the portfolio of repurchasing 
companies, by employing the one factor market model based on the CAPM. I 
estimate the same model by calculating the daily returns before and after the event 
day (-1 to +1). Individual daily stock prices and daily index prices are collected from 
Thomson DataStream, for a period of 251 trading days before and 251 trading days 
after, relative to each announcement. The FTSE All Share index is used as a proxy for 
the market returns. Logarithmic returns are then calculated for each stock and the 
index. Hence, the mathematical expression of the equities’ systematic risk is the 
following:  
                                                 
17
 I replicate this estimation with the calculation of the equally-weighted average price and the results 
remain unaltered.  
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                    (4.1) 
 
where,     is the return of stock i at time t, α is the intercept, β the market coefficient,     is the market index return i at time t, and     is the error term with the usual 
properties. The above equations are estimated for the pre-event period (day -251 to 
day -2) and the post-event period (day +2 to day +251) separately. I apply this 
estimation model on the announcement day of the repurchase programme as being the 
event period. According to Hamada (1972) the equity betas are an increasing function 
of the financial leverage as depicted below in equation (4.2). 
 
( ) ( / )e a a d D E       (4.2) 
 
where, e  is the equity beta (systematic risk of the firm), a  and d is the beta of the 
asset and the debt respectively, whereas /D E  is the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio 
(financial leverage). Assuming that the beta of the debt is zero and the asset betas 
remain constant, then the change in the equity beta should be associated with the 
change in capital structure which is expressed in the following equation: 
 
 ( / )e a D E       (4.3) 
 
Therefore, according to Hamada’s (1972) model, equity betas should increase 
following share repurchases. In order to determine if any changes in equity betas 
surrounding share repurchase announcements are not simply a reflection of changes 
in capital structure, I perform the following procedure for robustness check. First, 
each firm’s asset beta is estimated prior to the repurchase announcement. I then 
compute the change in the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio from the end of year prior to the 
announcement, to the end of year following the share repurchase announcement. 
Then, I compare the new equity beta (re-levered asset beta) following the 
announcement with the initially estimated post-announcement beta from the OLS 
regression from equation 4.1, and I find that the two betas are quite similar. In sum, 
even after correcting for potential biases in beta estimates, the results and conclusions 
on the magnitude of changes in beta after the share repurchase announcement remain 
unaltered.  
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In addition to the test sample of firms that have announced an open market 
share repurchase, I construct a control sample using two matching methods, that yield 
a size matched control sample, and a market-to-book matched control sample. For the 
control firms, I apply a random selection following a uniform distribution (in order to 
avoid potential selection bias) and on a one-to-one basis, meaning that for every 
sample firm there is an equivalent and unique control firm. The control firms need to 
fulfil the following criteria in order to be selected. First, following Bartov (1991) for 
the size matching method, they need to have the same two-digit SIC industry code, 
thus controlling for industry effects, and their respective market value needs to fall 
within a twenty percent range above or below the respective level of each sample firm 
at the end of the year prior to the repurchase announcement. Second, for the MKBK 
matching method, they need to have the same two-digit SIC industry code, thus 
controlling for industry effects, and their respective market-to-book ratio needs to fall 
within a twenty percent range above or below the respective level of each sample firm 
at the end of the year prior to the repurchase announcement, thus controlling for any 
undervaluation. 
In the second approach for estimating the systematic risk changes, following 
Grullon and Michaely (2004), I apply the simple market model and replicate the same 
estimation with the employment of the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. For 
each firm that has announced its intention to repurchase its shares in the open market, 
I estimate the monthly regressions for the three years prior to the month of the 
announcement (t0-36) and for the three years after the month of the announcement 
(t0+ 36). The two market models are mathematically expressed as follows: 
                         (       )       (       )             (4.4) 
                         (       )       (       )                                                      (4.5) 
 
where,     is the monthly return on stock i,     is the monthly return on three-month 
U.K. Treasury Bill,     is the monthly return on the FTSE All shares index, and    is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if t≥t0 and zero otherwise, where t0 is the 
month of the repurchase announcement.      is the difference between the monthly 
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return of a small firms portfolio from a portfolio of large firms.      is the 
difference between the monthly return of a portfolio of high book-to-market firms 
from a portfolio of low book-to-market firms. For estimating       FTSE 100 index 
is used as a proxy for large firms’ portfolio and FTSE Small Cap index is used as a 
proxy for small firms’ portfolio. For estimating     , FTSE 350 Value index is used 
as a proxy for a low market-to-book firms’ portfolio and FTSE 350 Growth index is 
used as a proxy for a high market-to-book firms’ portfolio.  
In addition, following Grullon and Michaely (2004) I replicate the two models 
by calculating an adjusted measure of risk, where I control for any systematic 
evolution of risk. I accomplish this by employing two sets of control firms 
constructed with the industry-size and industry-MKBK matching methods, as 
discussed earlier. The adjusted measure of risk, is equal to the estimated factors for 
the sample firms (repurchasing), subtracting the estimated factors for the control 
firms (non-repurchasing).  
Additionally, in order to examine the possible changes in the risk of 
repurchasing firms, I employ a risk decomposition approach within the CAPM 
context. In the context of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) the risk 
decomposition is based on variance (  ). Hence, the risk decomposition is expressed 
as: 
                       (4.6) 
 
where      is the total risk,         is the market component (systematic risk) of total 
risk and      is the idiosyncratic (firm specific) risk component. In detail, total risk is 
defined as the variance of an equally weighted index of all stock returns, while 
market risk is defined as the variance of an equally weighted index of the returns of 
the index. The market risk coefficient and the idiosyncratic risk component for each 
firm are obtained by employing equation (4.1). The betas are then squared and 
averaged across firms while the variance of the average residuals is used as a measure 
of idiosyncratic risk.  
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4.4.   Empirical evidence 
4.4.1. Market-Timing 
According to the market timing hypothesis, the firm’s share price should be 
lower during repurchase days, compared to subsequent non-repurchase days. Whereas 
the price support hypothesis implies that the firm’s share price should be lower during 
repurchase days, compared to prior non-repurchase days (Ginglinger and Hamon, 
2007). Therefore, in order to test these hypotheses, I compute the value weighted 
average price paid relative to the value weighted average price over a set of time 
windows before and after the actual repurchase trades took place VWAPR/VWAP(n 
months). Then, I compare it with the ratio of the value weighted average price of the 
days that the actual trades took place – excluding the repurchase trades – relative to 
the value weighted average price over the same set of time windows before and after 
the days the actual repurchase trades took place VWAPNR/VWAP(n months). It 
should be noted though that according to the regulatory framework in the United 
Kingdom, firms are not allowed to repurchase their shares at a price that is higher 
than 5% above the average market value of the company’s shares for the 5 business 
days prior to the day the repurchase is made18. This can limit firms’ flexibility on 
timing their repurchase trades in the case where their incentive is to provide price 
support. Nevertheless, firms still have some level of flexibility for timing the actual 
repurchase trades when their motive is to either exploit any potential undervaluation 
or to provide price support. 
The results from the VWAPR ratios analysis are reported in Table 4.3. Panel A 
reports the VWAPR ratios for the days prior to the repurchases and Panel B reports 
the VWAPR ratios estimated for the period after the repurchases took place. For the 
period prior to the repurchases, I find that the VWAPR/VWAP(1 month) for the 
actual trades is significantly higher (17.9%) than the respective VWAPNR/VWAP(1 
month) ratio for the repurchase days excluding the actual trades, for the period prior 
to the repurchases. Similarly, for the short-term period of two and three months prior 
to the repurchases I find that the VWAPR ratio is significantly higher by 19.1% and 
17.9% respectively, compared to the VWAPNR ratio.  
  
                                                 
18
 For more details please see the FSA Handbook, L.R. 12.4. 
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Table 4.3 Univariate tests of strategic trading. 
The sample consists of 136 firms that were subject to at least one share repurchase transaction over the 
period 1997 to 2006. The value weighted average price is calculated as the average price obtained from 
the daily high and low price, weighted by the daily trading volume of the stock. Then the relative value 
weighted average price paid for the actual repurchase trades to the respective non-repurchase days is 
compared. For the value weighted average price paid during the non-repurchase days, the time periods 
of n months (excluding other repurchase days in between) are used. Then the ratio of the reported 
average price paid on the repurchase day (VWAPR) over the value weighted average price of the non-
repurchase days (VWAP) for the n months prior and post the actual trade (VWAPR / VWAP (n)) is 
computed. Finally, it is compared with the ratio of the value weighted average price (VWAPNR) of the 
days that the actual trades took place (excluding the repurchase trades) divided with the value weighted 
average price over the same set of time windows before and after the n months the actual repurchase 
trades took place (VWAPNR / VWAP (n)). Panel A. reports the results for the n months prior to the 
repurchases. Panel B. reports the equivalent results for the n months after the repurchases. For the 
difference in means the t-test p-values are reported. For the differences in medians the 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test p-values are reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10% level respectively, based on the p-values. 
 
Panel A. VWAPR/VWAP (with 
Actual trades) mean 
(median) 
VWAPNR/VWAP (without 
actual trades) mean 
(median) 
Difference in 
means 
(p-value) 
Difference in 
medians 
(p-value) 
1 month pre 1.156 0.977 0.179* 0.003 
(0.988) (0.985) (0.055) (0.177) 
2 months pre 1.168 0.978 0.191** 0.020* 
(1.000) (0.980) (0.045) (0.095) 
3 months pre 1.153 0.974 0.179* 0.020 
(0.991) (0.972) (0.056) (0.115) 
4 months pre 1.158 0.972 0.186** 0.021* 
(0.987) (0.966) (0.046) (0.085) 
6 months pre 1.099 0.963 0.137* 0.021* 
(0.989) (0.968) (0.062) (0.094) 
12 months pre 1.103 0.972 0.131* 0.014 
(0.991) (0.977) (0.092) (0.122) 
 
Panel B. VWAPR/VWAP (with 
Actual trades) mean 
(median) 
VWAPNR/VWAP (without 
actual trades) mean 
(median) 
Difference in 
means 
(p-value) 
Difference in 
medians 
(p-value) 
1 month post 1.050 0.958 0.092 0.039 
(0.890) (0.851) (0.278) (0.181) 
2 months post 1.044 0.951 0.093 0.039 
(0.897) (0.858) (0.252) (0.167) 
3 months post 1.042 0.945 0.097 0.050 
(0.905) (0.855) (0.209) (0.131) 
4 months post 1.033 0.935 0.097 0.047 
(0.909) (0.862) (0.183) (0.123) 
6 months post 1.031 0.931 0.100 0.046 
(0.914) (0.868) (0.149) (0.113) 
12 months post 1.040 0.931 0.109* 0.021* 
(0.913) (0.892) (0.088) (0.095) 
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The results remain the same for the extended period of four, six and twelve 
months, where the differences in means of the VWAPR ratios remain significantly 
higher (by 18.6%, 13.7% and 13.1% respectively), compared to the non-repurchase 
days of the VWAPNR ratio for the repurchase days excluding the actual trades. When 
looking at the VWAPR ratios estimated for the post-repurchase period in Table 4.3. 
Panel B, I find that it is only for the twelve month period that the VWAPR for 
repurchase days is significantly higher (by 1.09%) compared to VWAPNR for the 
post non-repurchase days. 
Even though the results show that the VWAPR(n) ratios for the reported prices 
paid for the actual repurchases are significantly higher than the VWAPNR(n) ratios 
for the n months prior to the repurchases, I argue that the results still provide support 
for the price support hypothesis. These results show that managers are willing to pay 
a higher price for the actual repurchases compared to the firm’s value weighted 
average price of prior non-repurchase days, hence trying to support the price on the 
market itself by offering a higher price. Also with their willingness to pay a higher 
price they signal to the market that they believe that the firm’s current share price 
should be higher, and even though they are paying a higher price they still believe 
that the current price paid could be a bargain for them. Hence, I conclude that the 
managerial incentive for undertaking the actual repurchases is price support rather 
than market timing.  
However, these results contradict the findings of De Cesari et al. (2009), where 
they report that firms in the U.S., repurchase shares at relatively lower prices and that 
they tend to repurchase more shares during months when the prevailing market prices 
are relatively low. Nevertheless, the authors employ monthly data which could be one 
of the reasons that lead to the difference in the findings of timing ability, along with 
the difference in cultural and institutional differences between the U.S. and the U.K. 
markets. Moreover, the interpretation of these findings is still consistent with the 
findings of Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) where they conclude that the incentive for 
the actual repurchases is price support. 
4.4.2. The determinants of share repurchase completion rates 
Next I consider the factors that influence the completion rates of the announced 
share repurchase programmes. In order to test which factors and firm characteristics 
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have a significant impact on the completion rate of the announced open market share 
repurchase programmes, the following cross-sectional regression is estimated: 
                ሺ   ሻ         ሺ   ሻ       ሺ   ሻ        ሺ ሻ         ሺ   ሻ          ሺ ሻ          ሺ   ሻ         ሺ ሻ            ሺ   ሻ               ሺ ሻ           ሺ   ሻ           ሺ ሻ              ሺ   ሻ         ሺ ሻ             ሺ ሻ                      (4.7) 
Where t represents time measured by the calendar year end when the share 
repurchase announcement took place, and CR is the percentage of the actually 
repurchased shares relative to the amount targeted at the time of the announcement, 
for company i, and e is the error term. In order to control for firm size, following Rau 
and Vermaelen (2002), I include the proxy variable SIZE, which is the natural 
logarithm of total assets for firm i at the year end prior to the repurchase 
announcement. By including the size proxy I also capture the firm’s information 
environment (Brockman and Chung, 2001). Moreover, Ikenberry et al., (2000) argue 
that smaller firms have less scrutiny and are less efficiently priced. Hence, I expect to 
find that firm size has a negative relationship with the completion rate of the 
announced share repurchase programme.  
Assuming that undervaluation has a significant influence on managers’ decision 
to repurchase, I expect to find that stock price movements have a significant impact 
on the decision to repurchase, and consequently, on the respective completion rates. 
In order to test the hypothesis that undervaluation plays an important role that leads 
managers to repurchase shares, I include MKBK in the analysis, which is the ratio of 
market value for each company i to its respective book value of assets at the year end, 
when the repurchase announcement took place. According to the information 
asymmetry and the undervaluation hypotheses, I expect to find a negative relationship 
between the market-to-book ratio (MKBK) and the completion rates, because a low 
MKBK value would suggest that the firm is undervalued, whereas a high MKBK ratio 
would suggest that the market value is reflecting the true fundamental value of the 
firm. If undervaluation is an important motive for executing share repurchases, then 
one would expect to find that value firms will have higher completion rates compared 
to growth companies Ikenberry et al. (2000).  
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If managers are trading strategically in order to take advantage of potential 
undervaluation, then an increase in stock prices should deter them from buying back 
shares, whereas a decline in prices should lead to an increased motivation for 
repurchasing shares. Nevertheless, I have previously found evidence suggesting that 
managers’ motivation for trading is price support. Therefore, one would expect 
managers to trade when the company’s share prices are decreasing and not when they 
are increasing. Therefore, in order to test if managers repurchase shares because they 
believe the share price is undervalued, following Cook et al. (2004) I include the 
proxy variable ER which is the cumulative excess return of firm i relative to the FTSE 
All Share index for the period of 255 to 2 days prior to the announcement . Moreover, 
since the change on the firm’s share price during the implementation of the 
repurchase programme would alter the attractiveness for the actual share repurchase 
trades, in the spirit of Ikenberry et al. (2000) I include the proxy variable ΔER which 
is the change in the cumulative excess return for the period of 255 to 2 days following 
the day of the announcement relative to the cumulative excess return for the period of 
255 to 2 days prior to the announcement.  If managers’ motive for repurchasing is 
price support, then I expect to find a positive relationship between ER and ΔER with 
the completion rates. Alternatively, if managers trade strategically in order to exploit 
the firm’s undervaluation, then I should find a negative relationship between ER and 
the completion rates. 
Furthermore, if a firm has excess debt capacity, then it can utilise it by 
increasing its debt levels and funnelling the extra funding as a payment to its 
shareholders in the form of share repurchases. Consequently, this will lead to higher 
completion rates of the announced share repurchase programmes. Hence, I argue that 
firm leverage can have a significant impact on share repurchasing. Following Grullon 
and Michaely (2002), I proxy for leverage with the variable LVG which is defined as 
firm’s i total debt to its book value of total assets at the year end prior to the 
announcement of the repurchase programme. I expect to find that the firms’ leverage 
ratio will be negatively related to the repurchase completion rates, suggesting that the 
lower leverage, the more financial flexibility a firm has either to adjust its capital 
structure or to increase its debt levels in order to finance its payout programme. 
Furthermore, in order to capture the effect that any changes in a firm’s leverage 
exposure can have on the repurchase completion rates, I include the proxy variable 
ΔLVG, which is the change in a firm’s leverage at the year end after the 
 165 
announcement of the repurchase programme, relative to the respective leverage 
exposure at the year end prior to the announcement. I expect to find a positive 
relationship between the proxy ΔLVG and the completion rates, suggesting that firms 
are taking more debt in order to repurchase the intended shares. This, in turn, can be 
interpreted as firms using share repurchases in order to achieve their optimal leverage 
ratio and restructure their capital. 
Brockman and Chung (2001) argue that firms with relatively large cash flows 
will be more likely to distribute the extra cash to their shareholders via share 
repurchases, and therefore being less likely to repurchase due to underpricing as 
being a strong motive. In addition, firms will varyingly adjust the execution of the 
announced share repurchase programme depending on their cash flow position, 
leading to varying repurchase completion rates. In addition, Guay and Harford (2000) 
and Bartram et al. (2009) find evidence that share repurchases are associated with 
temporary and unsustainable cash flows. In addition, Oswald and Young (2008) 
compare non-repurchasing firms that have similar investment and cash flow 
characteristics with repurchasing firms in the U.K. market, and find that non-
repurchasing firms are more likely to overinvest. This suggests that firms that 
experience unexpected earnings are more likely to repurchase more of their shares. 
 Hence, I follow Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and I include two proxy 
variables for measuring a firm’s cash flow levels. The first proxy is the expected cash 
flow ሺ     ሻ, which is defined as firm’s i income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation expense, divided by its total assets at the year end prior to the 
announcement of a share repurchase programme. The second proxy is the unexpected 
cash flow ሺ    ሻ, which is defined as the change of firm’s i cash flow at the year end 
following the repurchase announcement relative to its cash flow to the year end prior 
the repurchase announcement. I expect to find a positive relationship for both cash 
flow proxies with the completion rates, suggesting that firms repurchase their shares 
when they experience positive past cash flows and the respective completion rates 
will be even higher when firms experience positive unexpected cash flows following 
the announcement of the repurchase programme. In the spirit of Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), even though a firm has expectations on future cash flows, still they 
can differ significantly from the actual realised unexpected cash flow which will 
result into different levels of cash utilisation and payouts. 
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It has been widely discussed in the literature that when a company’s existing 
capital exceeds its potential investment opportunities, the firm can either retain the 
excess cash or distribute it back to its shareholders in order to reduce the potentially 
arising agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; and Jensen, 1986). Further, as argued by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), agency costs are incurred between the controlling and the 
minority shareholders. Thus, the higher the ownership concentration, the less it is 
possible for minority shareholders to influence the firm’s decision making. Therefore, 
controlling shareholders can wreak substantial costs to other shareholders by 
redistributing the firm’s wealth. Consequently, the lower the ownership concentration 
the more it is possible for the minority shareholders to influence a firm’s decision 
making on the excess cash utilization. This is in line with Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), who argue that if the costs are lower than the benefits from reducing the 
respective agency costs, then it could be for the management’s benefit to repurchase 
shares in the market and reduce ownership dispersion. In addition, Bartram et al. 
(2009) find evidence that the higher the ownership concentration, the more likely it is 
for a firm to choose dividends as a payout method instead of repurchases. Moreover, 
Oswald and Young (2008) find that ownership concentration in the U.K. market has a 
significant impact on the decision to repurchase, and the higher the ownership 
concentration the higher will be the propensity for a firm to actually repurchase its 
shares.  
Hence, I expect to find that a firm’s completion rate of the intended repurchase 
programme will be associated with a firm’s ownership concentration level, as a 
consequence of the pressure applied from the minority shareholders for reducing 
potential agency costs. In order to test this, following Mitchell and Dharmawan 
(2007) and Bartram et al. (2009) I use as a proxy for the level of ownership 
concentration the variable (OWN CON), which is the percent of closely held shares 
divided by the number of total common shares outstanding at the year end prior to the 
repurchase announcement. In addition, I include the variable (ΔOWN CON) which is 
the change in the level of ownership concentration at year end after the open market 
share repurchase announcement, relative to the respective level at the year end prior 
to the share repurchase announcement. I expect to find a negative coefficient for 
(OWN CON), suggesting that the lower the ownership concentration, the higher the 
completion rate will be, and the larger the decrease (increase), the higher (lower) the 
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completion rate will be from the resulting shift in influence of the minority 
shareholders on the firm’s distribution of its excess cash flows. 
According to the dividend substitution hypothesis, firms repurchase their stock 
as an alternative way of distributing their excess cash to their shareholders. Share 
repurchases can be more tax efficient and can be more valuable (from a tax 
perspective) for shareholders than a dividend payout when capital gains are taxed at a 
lower rate compared to the personal income tax rate (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
Hence, in order to test if the tax flexibility of share repurchases has a significant 
impact on managers’ incentive to repurchase and consequently to the respective share 
repurchase completion rates, in the spirit of Mitchell and Dharmawan (2003) and 
McNally (1999) I proxy for the average tax rate of their shareholder clienteles with 
DIV_Y which is the dividend yield ratio for each firm i at the year end prior to the 
announcement of the repurchase programme. In addition, for testing the 
substitutability of dividends by share repurchases, I include the proxy variable (ΔDIV) 
as in Grullon et al. (2002), which is defined as the yearly change of cash dividends at 
the year end following the repurchase announcement, relative to the firm’s previous 
year cash dividends. If share repurchases are substitutes to dividends, then I expect to 
find a negative relationship between these two variables and the respective 
completion rates, suggesting that firms prefer to distribute their excess cash flow 
through share repurchases. Finally, for the substitutability of dividends and the tax 
advantage, following Dittmar (2000) and Swaminathan et al. (2002), I employ the 
proxy variable DIV/NI which is defined as the ratio of common cash dividends 
relative to the reported net income for each firm i at the year end prior to the open 
market share repurchase announcement.  
Finally, I include two additional control variables in the cross sectional analysis. 
The first control variable is the dummy variable REP  that takes the value of one if the 
firm has made previously a open market share repurchase announcement during the 
ten year period under study, and zero otherwise. Ikenberry et al. (2000), report that in 
their sample a number of firms had consecutive repurchase programmes. Moreover, 
they argue that managers in these firms could behave opportunistically and 
repurchase shares only when their respective prices are falling. Therefore, these firms 
should have lower completion rates, since their motive for share repurchasing is this 
opportunistic and strategic trading and not the distribution of the excess cash to their 
shareholders. Hence, I expect to find a negative relationship between the dummy 
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variable REP  and the completion rates of the announced share repurchase 
programmes.  
The second additional control variable is the DAY_DIF  proxy, which is the 
number of days from the day of the announcement to the initiation of the repurchase 
programme. I argue that if firms are not trading strategically and their primary goal 
for undertaking a share repurchase is to give their excess cash back to their 
shareholders, then I would expect to see firms commencing the open share repurchase 
programme as early as possible, without any delays. Therefore, if a firm starts its 
repurchase programme as early as possible, this could be taken as the firm’s 
commitment to its repurchase programme. Hence, I expect to find a negative 
relationship between the completion rates and the variable DAY_DIF , suggesting that 
the sooner a firm initiates the repurchase programme following the announcement the 
more committed the firm is on initiating and completing the announced payout. 
The results from the multivariate analysis are shown in Table 4.4. It should be 
noted that the correlations between the variables are lower than 0.5, as reported in the 
correlation matrix reported in Appendix E. Moreover, in cases where independent 
variables are statistically correlated with one another, auxiliary regressions are 
employed in order to make them orthogonal. 
I find that the existing excess debt capacity (LVG) and the change of the firm’s 
respective leverage ratio (ΔLVG) both have a positive relationship with firms’ 
repurchase completion rates. This can be interpreted as firms repurchasing more of 
their shares when they have excess debt capacity prior to the repurchase 
announcement and they tend to increase their existing debt thus moving closer 
towards their desired debt level. Additionally, I find that firms that pay higher 
dividends and have higher tax bracket shareholder clienteles, have higher repurchase 
completion rates, as indicated by the positive relationship of the completion rates with 
the respective variables DIV/NI and DIV_Y. However, I find no evidence of the 
dividend substitution hypothesis having a strong influence on the completion rates 
since the change in dividends (ΔDIV), from the time prior to the time post the 
announcement, is not statistically significant. Rather, the evidence support the notion 
that share repurchases can be used as supplements to dividends. 
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Table 4.4 Determinants of share repurchase programmes’ completion rates. 
This table reports the estimated coefficients of the following cross-sectional regression : 
                ሺ   ሻ         ሺ   ሻ       ሺ   ሻ        ሺ ሻ         ሺ   ሻ          ሺ ሻ          ሺ   ሻ         ሺ ሻ            ሺ   ሻ               ሺ ሻ           ሺ   ሻ           ሺ ሻ              ሺ   ሻ         ሺ ሻ             ሺ ሻ        
 
The sample consists of 197 firms in the U.K. that have announced their intention to repurchase 
their shares and have stated either the proportion of common shares outstanding that were willing 
to repurchase, or the cash amount they were intending to utilise for the repurchase. CR is the 
completion rate of the announced open market share repurchase programme, defined as the 
percentage of the actually repurchased shares relative to the intended amount at the time of the 
announcement. SIZE is a firm’s natural logarithm of total assets at the year end prior to the time of 
the announcement. MKBK is the ratio of a firm’s market value relative to its book value at the 
year end prior to the announcement. ER is a firm’s cumulative excess return relative to the FTSE 
All Share index for the period of 255 to 2 days prior to the announcement.  ΔER is the change in 
the cumulative excess return for the period of 255 to 2 days following the day of the 
announcement relative to the cumulative excess return for the period of 255 to 2 days prior to the 
announcement. LVG is a firm’s total debt relative to its total assets at the year end prior to the 
repurchase announcement. ΔLVG is the change in leverage from the year end prior to the year end 
subsequent the announcement.       is a firm’s income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation expense, divided by its total assets at the year end prior to the announcement of a 
share repurchase programme.      is the change of a firm’s cash flow at the year end following 
the repurchase announcement relative to its cash flow to the year end prior the repurchase 
announcement. OWN CON is the percentage of closely held shares divided by the number of total 
common shares outstanding at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. ΔOWN CON is 
the change in the level of ownership concentration at year end after the repurchase announcement 
relative to the respective level at the year end prior to the repurchase announcement. DIV_Y is the 
dividend yield ratio at the year end prior to the announcement of the repurchase programme. 
ΔDIV is the yearly change of cash dividends at the year end following the repurchase 
announcement, relative to the firm’s previous year cash dividends. DIV/NI is the ratio of common 
cash dividends, relative to the reported net income for each firm at the year end prior to the 
repurchase announcement. REP is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has 
previously made a share repurchase during the ten year period under study, and zero otherwise. 
DAY_DIF is the number of days from the day of the announcement to the initiation of the 
repurchase programme. The standard errors of the coefficients have been adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity using White’s procedure. The p-values of the cross-sectional regressions are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level 
respectively, based on the t-test p-values. 
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Dependent Variable: Repurchase Completion Rate 
 
 Eq.1 Eq.2 Eq.3 Eq.4 
C -1.305 -1.089 -1.420 -0.800 
(0.045) (0.086) (0.021) (0.185) 
SIZE 0.075* 0.079** 0.085** 0.083** 
(0.066) (0.045) (0.010) (0.036) 
MKBK 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.027 
(0.135) (0.147) (0.120) (0.419) 
ER -0.209 -0.252 -0.189 0.002 
(0.486) (0.413) (0.511) (0.995) 
ΔER  0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
(0.444) (0.419) (0.404) (0.473) 
LVG  1.321** 0.942 1.284** 1.411** 
(0.022) (0.106) (0.021) (0.015) 
ΔLVG  0.095* 0.092* 0.036 
(0.081) (0.094) (0.489) 
CF EXP -0.441 -0.601 -0.371 -0.089 
(0.577) (0.479) (0.643) (0.899) 
CF UN 0.052 0.040 0.043 -0.044 
(0.413) (0.527) (0.483) (0.470) 
OWN CON (%) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 
(0.566) (0.506) (0.557) (0.391) 
ΔOWN CON -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.014) 
DIV_Y 0.169** 0.142** 0.169**  
(0.013) (0.044) (0.014)  
ΔDIV -0.033 -0.043 -0.024 -0.035 
(0.495) (0.363) (0.588) (0.219) 
DIV/NI 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*** 0.002** 
(0.054) (0.070) (0.001) (0.046) 
REP 0.100 0.047 0.028 
(0.617) (0.818) (0.886) 
DAY_DIF -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Adjusted R2 (%) 23.65 17.86 24.25 11.23 
 
 
 
 
Concerning the influence of ownership concentration to the completion rates, I 
find that firms that are becoming more widely owned, by decreasing the holdings 
owned by the majority shareholders, have higher repurchase completion rates. This 
shows that when firms are becoming more widely held then the minority shareholders 
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attain greater influence on management’s decision for the firm’s cash utilisation, and 
subsequently, on the firm’s payout and share repurchase programmes completions. 
Moreover, and consistent with my expectations, I find that firms that have smaller 
time intervals between the time of the announcement and the repurchase programme 
initiation, have higher completion rates. This shows that firms, which are truly 
committed on materialising their intention to return their excess cash back to their 
shareholders through a share repurchase, initiate the open market share repurchase 
programme as soon as possible.  
Furthermore, I find that larger firms have higher completion rates on the 
announced share repurchase programme, as denoted by the positive coefficient of 
SIZE. This is contrary to my expectations and the findings of Ikenberry et al. (2000), 
where they report evidence of a negative relationship between firm size and the 
respective completion rates. Nevertheless, the results on size are consistent with the 
findings of Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) where they report a positive relationship 
between size and share repurchase frequency. The interpretation of the positive 
relationship of size with the completion rates, is that firms do not repurchase their 
shares due to their potential undervaluation (since larger firms have lower 
information asymmetries and hence are more efficiently priced), but due to the fact 
that they are already large firms with lower growth opportunities. Consequently, these 
firms repurchase their shares in order to reduce potential agency costs.  
In addition, I find no evidence of undervaluation having an influence on the 
repurchase completion rates, since the proxy variables MKBK, ER and ΔER are not 
statistically significant. Moreover, the fact that the market-to-book ratio has no 
impact on the completion rates of the announced open market share repurchase 
programmes is consistent with the findings of Dittmar and Dittmar (2008), where 
they find no evidence that past or future market-to-book ratios have any effect on 
repurchase activity. Finally, I find no evidence of the excess cash flow having a 
significant influence on a firm’s repurchase programme completion rate, as well as no 
evidence of a relationship between the completion rates and a repetition of a 
repurchase programme.   
In sum, I find that large firms with lower excess debt capacity that pay out 
dividends and decrease their ownership concentration after the share repurchase 
announcement, and especially those firms that initiate the announced repurchase 
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programme as soon as possible after the announcement, are more likely to have 
higher share repurchase completion rates. 
4.4.3. Risk Change and Risk Decomposition 
When a firm announces and undertakes a share repurchase programme, it can 
usually fund this programme by increasing its leverage and/or by using its excess 
cash flow. If a firm uses leverage, this can be associated with a firm’s increase in 
systematic risk. Nevertheless, if managers knowingly increase leverage because they 
anticipate that their firm’s risk will decline, then the market will recognise this, thus 
leading to a reduction of the firm’s stock risk (Brav, 1991). If a firm uses its excess 
cash flow to fund its share repurchase programme that could mean that the firm 
experiences a reduction in investment opportunities, which could be considered as 
bad news. In general, good news is on average associated with a decline in systematic 
risk, whereas bad news is associated with an increase in systematic risk (Berk et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, the market could still be aware of the firm’s existing decline in 
investment opportunities, thus the reduction in excess cash can lead to a reduction of 
management’s likelihood of overinvesting. Therefore, share repurchases can convey 
information to the market that can be associated with a reduction in systematic risk 
(Grullon and Michaely, 2004). In this section, I report evidence on risk related 
information conveyed to the market through share repurchases.  
Table 4.5 reports the summary statistics on the comparison of the observed 
common stock betas and the respective risk changes before and after the repurchase 
announcement, for the repurchasing firms as well as for the control firms selected 
with both matching methods (industry-size and industry-mkbk). I find that 
repurchasing firms experience a marginal decline in systematic risk after the 
announcement, but it is not statistically significant. Similarly, I do not find evidence 
of a decline in systematic risk for the non-repurchasing firms. The evidence I get so 
far is contradicting the findings reported in Bartov (1991), where a statistically 
significant decline in the average beta is reported during the year of the repurchase 
announcement. Nevertheless, these results are aligned with Denis and Kadlec (1994) 
where they find no evidence of a firm’s systematic risk declining after a fixed price 
tender offer repurchase, after controlling for potential estimation bias. 
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Table 4.5 Repurchase announcement effect on risk change (daily returns). 
This table reports the mean and median estimated systematic risk (β parameter of the market model) 
for the test sample as well as the control samples constructed with the industry-size and industry-mkbk 
matching methods. The test sample consists of 132 firms in the U.K. that have announced their 
intention to repurchase their shares. The industry-size and industry-mkbk control samples consist of 80 
and130 firms respectively. The systematic risk is estimated using the daily stock returns and equally 
weighted market returns for the periods of -255 to -2 days (prior-period) and for +2 to +255 days (post-
period) relative to the day of the repurchase announcement. Only firms with a minimum of fifty daily 
returns in each of the two periods were included. Δβ is the difference between the beta of each 
company for the year prior to the year subsequent the announcement. For the difference in means the t-
test p-values are reported in parentheses. For the differences in medians the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney 
test p-values are reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level 
respectively based on the p-values. 
 
Repurchase announcement effect on risk change 
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) 
Period relative to  
the repurchase  
announcement 
Test 
Sample 
 
β 
Control Sample 
(Industry-Size-
Matched) 
β 
Control Sample 
(Industry-MKBK-
Matched) 
β 
Δβ test and 
size-
matched 
control 
samples 
Δβ test and 
mkbk-
matched 
control 
samples 
Prior 
mean 0.628 0.557 0.330 0.071 
(0.239) 
0.298*** 
(0.000) 
median 0.620 0.413 0.211 0.207 (0.109) 
0.410***  
(0.000) 
 
 
   
Post 
mean 0.623 0.605 0.380 0.017 (0.7814) 
0.242*** 
(0.000) 
median 0.615 0.587 0.268 0.028 (0.741) 
0.347***  
(0.000) 
 
 
     Δβ 
(Prior 
- 
Post) 
 
mean 0.005 (0.911) 
-0.049 
(0.528) 
-0.050 
(0.290) 
  
median 0.006 
(0.788) 
-0.173 
(0.415) 
-0.057 
(0.184) 
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However, I find that repurchasing firms experience a statistically significant 
higher risk, compared to their peers of similar valuation as captured by the market-to-
book ratio for both ex-post and ex-ante periods, relative to the open market share 
repurchase announcement. Even though, I do not find any evidence that share 
repurchase announcements convey risk related information to the market, I find that 
repurchasing firms are already experiencing a higher risk compared to non-
repurchasing firms of the same industry and similar valuation. This means, that the 
market already recognises that repurchasing firms are already experiencing a possible 
decline of investment opportunities, hence the market believes that these firms belong 
to a higher risk bracket, compared to their matched peers of similar valuation.  
To further investigate whether the announcement for an open market share 
repurchase conveys risk related information to the market, I follow Grullon and 
Michaely (2004) and measure the unadjusted and adjusted changes in risk, as 
captured by firms’ betas in the one factor market model, and the changes in risk and 
the factor loadings estimated with the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. 
The results shown in Table 4.6 confirm that there is no significant change in firm risk 
after the share repurchase announcement, as captured by the firm betas. For the entire 
samples however, for both the unadjusted and adjusted measures of risk, I find that it 
is only the change in the SMB beta that is significantly higher after the share 
repurchase announcement. 
The positive change in the SMB beta suggests that after a repurchase 
announcement, firms behave more like growth firms rather than large and mature 
firms, which prefer to make a payout to their shareholders through share repurchases 
in the open market, which are more flexible to undertake. This is also confirmed, 
when analysing firms that pay dividends per share lower than the median of the entire 
sample, where the change in market risk is significant as well as the SMB loading 
factor, where it is positive and significant.  
The same applies as well in the MKBK matching method on the adjusted 
measure of risk in Panel B, where firms paying lower dividends have a significant 
decline in risk for the single factor market model and a positive and significant SMB 
factor loading. In sum, I find that firms paying lower cash dividends experience a 
decline in risk and retain the behaviour of a growth company rather than that of a 
large and mature company, since they prefer to undertake a share repurchase. 
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Table 4.6 Repurchase announcement effect on risk change (monthly returns). 
This table reports the cross-sectional mean and median values of the estimated coefficients of the 
simple market model:                         (       )       (       )     
and the Fama-French (1993) three factor model:                         (       )       (       )                                           
where,     is the monthly return on stock i,     is the monthly return on three-month U.K. Treasury Bill,     is the monthly return on the FTSE All shares index, and    is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if t≥t0 and zero otherwise, where t0 is the month of the repurchase announcement. Panel 
A. reports the unadjusted changes in risk characteristics. Panel B reports the adjusted changes in risk 
characteristics. For each firm that has announced its intention to repurchase its shares in the open 
market, I estimate the monthly regressions for the three years prior to the month of the announcement 
(t0-36) and for the three years after the month of the announcement (t0+ 36). SMB is the difference 
between the monthly return of a small firms portfolio from a portfolio of large firms. HML is the 
difference between the monthly return of a portfolio of high book-to-market firms from a portfolio of 
low book-to-market firms. For estimating SMB, FTSE 100 index is used as a proxy for large firms’ 
portfolio and FTSE Small Cap index is used as a proxy for small firms’ portfolio. For estimating HML, 
FTSE 350 Value index is used as a proxy for a high book to market firms’ portfolio and FTSE 350 
Growth index is used as a proxy for a low book to market firms’ portfolio. b−i, s−i, and h−i are the 
factor loadings (betas) of firm i during the three years prior to the share repurchase announcement. bΔi, 
sΔi, and hΔi are the changes in the factor loadings after the share repurchase announcement. α−i is the 
abnormal return of firm i before the share repurchase announcement, and αΔi is the change in abnormal 
return after the announcement of the share repurchase programme. The adjusted regression coefficient 
is equal to the unadjusted coefficient minus the regression coefficient of each of the two control 
samples (industry-size and industry-mkbk matched) at the end of year −1, respectively. To reduce the 
effect of estimation errors and eliminate the possibility of negative values for the cost of capital, I 
exclude from the sample all observations in which the absolute value of the change in cost of capital is 
greater than the cost of capital before the share repurchase announcement. I also exclude from the 
sample all observations in which the cost of capital before the share repurchase announcement is 
negative. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively, for the 
reported mean (median) values based on a two tailed t-test (two-tailed Wilcoxon rank test). 
 
Panel A. Unadjusted Changes in Risk 
Magnitude of  
Dividends per share 
Market Model Test Firms Below Median Above Median     Mean -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
Median -0.002 -0.011 0.003     (Δ in market beta) Mean -0.067 -0.205* 0.069 
Median -0.017 -0.178* 0.067 
N 191 92 99 
Three Factor Model     Mean 0.003 0.005 0.002 
Median 0.000 -0.005 0.001     (Δ in market beta) Mean -0.022 -0.146 0.077 
Median 0.013 -0.220* 0.103     (Δ in small firm beta) Mean 0.105* 0.202** 0.006 
Median 0.084 0.195** 0.052     (Δ in B/M beta) Mean -0.078 -0.066 -0.077 
Median 0.027 0.097 -0.076 
N 191 92 99 
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Table 4.6 Continued.  
 
Panel B. Adjusted Changes in Risk 
Magnitude of  
Dividends per share 
Market Model MKBK Matched Below Median Above Median     Mean -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
Median -0.010 -0.012 -0.011     (Δ in market beta) Mean -0.093 -0.243* 0.044 
Median -0.125 -0.225 -0.090 
N 182 91 91 
Three Factor Model     Mean 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
Median -0.006 -0.012 -0.006     (Δ in market beta) Mean -0.023 -0.210 0.151 
Median -0.062 -0.236 -0.050     (Δ in small firm beta) Mean 0.263** 0.321** 0.213 
Median 0.102* 0.182* 0.056     (Δ in B/M beta) Mean -0.051 0.317 -0.482 
Median 0.102 0.183 -0.087 
N 182 91 91 
Magnitude of  
Dividends per share 
Market Model Size Matched Below Median Above Median     Mean 0.003 0.000 0.008 
Median 0.000 -0.006 0.005     (Δ in market beta) Mean -0.137 -0.296* 0.126 
Median -0.130 -0.300** 0.081 
N 117 73 44 
Three Factor Model     Mean 0.000 -0.002 0.003 
Median -0.003 0.003 -0.004     (Δ in market beta) Mean -0.211 -0.374* 0.061 
Median -0.086 -0.292 -0.043     (Δ in small firm beta) Mean 0.225* 0.266 0.159 
Median 0.148 0.097 0.200     (Δ in B/M beta) Mean -0.096 -0.194 0.067 
Median -0.076 0.195 0.097 
N 117 73 44 
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Moreover, I perform a more in-depth analysis on the impact that the actual 
share repurchases can have on the change of a firm’s risk, apart from the 
announcement itself. I do this by estimating the firms’ systematic risk (betas) for the 
year prior to the announcement of the open market share repurchase programme, 
during the implementation of the programme excluding the actual trades, the days 
when the actual repurchase trades took place, and finally, the year after the 
completion of the repurchase programme.  
Since I do not have strong evidence that the announcement itself, of an open 
market share repurchase, conveys risk related information to the market, by analysing 
the risk changes during the different stages of the share repurchase implementation, I 
can see if the market follows up on the reporting of the actual repurchase trades and if 
it has a significant impact on a firm’s market risk. The results reported in Table 4.7 
suggest that there is no change in market risk between the period prior to the 
repurchase programme and the period during the implementation of the repurchase 
programme, since the difference in the mean betas is not statistically significant. It is 
notable however, that when estimating the betas only for the days when the actual 
repurchase trades took place, I find a significant decrease of market risk, since the 
mean (median) beta estimated for the period during the implementation (without the 
actual trades) are significantly higher than the mean (median) beta estimated for only 
the actual trades. In addition, I find that the beta for the actual trading days is 
significantly lower compared to the period during the repurchase implementation and 
the period after the completion of the repurchase programme. Hence, since I find 
evidence of a significant risk change between the period after the repurchase and the 
period prior or during the repurchase, I conclude that the actual repurchase trades and 
their respective reporting convey risk related information, which is followed up by 
the market.  
Further, I find that non-repurchasing firms of the same industry, and of similar 
size, have consistently higher market risk and especially for the period during the 
actual trades, where the difference in mean (median) betas between the repurchasing 
and non-repurchasing firms is statistically significant. In contrast, the evidence 
suggests that non-repurchasing firms of the same industry and similar valuation 
(proxied by the market-to-book ratio) have consistently a lower and statistically 
significant risk compared to repurchasing firms. This finding, in combination with the 
fact that repurchasing firms have a significant decline in market risk during the days 
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Table 4.7 Risk changes surrounding the actual share repurchases. 
This table reports the mean and median estimated systematic risk (β parameter of the market model) 
for the test sample as well as the control samples constructed with the industry-size and industry-mkbk 
matching methods. The test sample consists of 132 firms in the U.K. that have announced their 
intention to repurchase their shares. The industry-size and industry-mkbk control samples consist of 80 
and 130 firms respectively. Panel A. reports the respective estimated mean (median) betas for the test 
sample of firms, for the four periods surrounding share repurchases and the difference in means 
(medians) between the test and control samples. Panels B, C, and D, report the mean and median 
values of systematic risk and the respective differences between each pair of time periods under study, 
for the sample and control firms respectively. The systematic risk is estimated using the daily stock 
returns and equally weighted market returns for the periods of -255 to -2 days (pre-period), the daily 
returns for the period starting after the announcement of the programme (during clean), excluding the 
actual repurchase trades and ending at the day of the last repurchase of the programme, the daily 
returns on the days where the actual repurchase trades took place (actual trades period) and for +2 to 
+255 days (post-period) relative to the day of the repurchase announcement. Only firms with a 
minimum of fifty daily returns in each of the pre-announcement and post-completion periods were 
included. Δβ is the difference between the beta (β) of each company for the year prior to the year 
subsequent the announcement. The p-values for the differences in means and medians are reported. ***, 
**
, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively based on the p-values. 
 
Panel A. Test sample Control sample (Industry-Size) 
Control sample 
(Industry-MKBK) 
Δβ test 
and size-
matched 
control 
samples 
means 
(medians)  
Δβ test and 
mkbk-
matched 
control 
samples 
means 
(medians) 
β mean, 
(median) Δβ   
β mean, 
(median) Δβ   
β mean, 
(median) Δβ   
Pre - announcement 0.649 - 0.659 - 0.259 - -0.011 0.390*** 
(0.613) - (0.474) - (0.170) - (0.139) (0.443)*** 
During clean 0.707 -0.058 0.685 -0.026 0.366 -0.107 0.021 0.341*** 
(0.700) -0.087 (0.526) -0.052 (0.189) -0.019 (0.174) (0.511)*** 
Actual trades period 0.559 0.148** 0.815 -0.129 0.357 0.009 -0.256** 0.202*** 
(0.521) 0.178*** (0.893) -0.368 (0.284) -0.095 (-0.372)***  (0.237)*** 
Post - completion 0.680 -0.121** 0.658 0.157 0.369 -0.012 0.022 0.31*** 
(0.688) -0.167** (0.638) 0.255 (0.256) 0.028 (0.050) (0.432)***  
Anova F-test (p-value) 0.058 0.719 0.378 
Welch F-test (p-value) 0.061 0.881 0.205 
Med.    0.208 0.224 0.523 
Adj. Med.    0.269 
 
0.317 
 
0.649 
  
 
Panel B. Test sample 
β mean, 
(median) Δ β means (median) 
Pre - announcement 0.649 - 
(0.613) - 
During clean 0.707 -0.058 -   
(0.700) (-0.087) -   
Actual trades period 0.559 0.090* 0.148** - 
(0.521)  (0.092)* (0.178)*** - 
Post - completion 0.680 -0.031 0.027 -0.121** 
(0.688) (-0.075) (0.011)  (-0.167)**  
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Table 4.7 Continued. 
 
of the actual repurchase trades, supports the argument that the actual open market 
share repurchase trades are perceived to be good news due to the reduction in agency 
costs. 
For robustness check, I analyse the repurchasing firms’ total risk, measured by 
the total variance of the stock returns, to its two primary components: the systematic 
risk and the idiosyncratic (firm specific) risk. I do this in two stages. First, for the 
one-year period before and after the share repurchase announcement. Second, for the 
four distinct time periods surrounding share repurchases. In detail, these time periods 
are, the year prior to the repurchase announcement, the period during the repurchase 
programme, excluding the actual repurchase trades, the days where only the actual 
repurchase trades took place, and finally the period after the repurchase programme 
was completed. For robustness check, I replicate the estimations for both the industry-
size and industry-mkbk control samples. 
  
Panel C. Control sample (Industry-Size) 
Beta mean, 
(median) Δ β means (median) 
Pre - announcement 0.659 - 
(0.474) - 
During clean 0.685 -0.026 - 
(0.526) (-0.052) - 
Actual trades period 0.815 -0.155 -0.129 - 
(0.893) (-0.420) (-0.368) - 
Post - completion 0.658 0.002 0.028 0.157 
 (0.638) (-0.165) (-0.113) (0.255) 
 
 
Panel D. Control sample (Industry-MKBK) 
Beta mean, 
(median) Δ β means (median) 
Pre - announcement 0.259 - 
(0.170) - 
During clean 0.366 -0.107 - 
(0.189) (-0.019) - 
Actual trades period 0.357 -0.098 0.009 - 
(0.284) (-0.114) (-0.095) - 
Post - completion 0.369 -0.110 -0.003 -0.012 
(0.256) (-0.086) (-0.067) (0.028) 
 180 
Table 4.8 Risk Decomposition surrounding share repurchase announcements. 
This table reports the components of a firm’s total risk and their respective shift in relative importance 
on the overall risk for 1997 to 2006. The test sample consists of 132 firms in the U.K. that have 
announced their intention to repurchase their shares. The industry-size and industry-mkbk control 
samples consist of 80 and 130 firms respectively. Panels A, B, and C, report the respective estimated 
means of the risk components for the test- and the two control firm samples. The risk components are 
derived based on the simple market model.      is a firm’s variance of returns (total risk).          is the 
market component of total risk.      is a firm’s idiosyncratic risk. All the variance terms have been 
multiplied by 104 for reporting purposes. The risk decomposition is estimated using the daily stock 
returns and equally weighted market returns for the periods of -255 to -2 days (pre-period) and for +2 
to +255 days (post-period) relative to the day of the repurchase announcement. Only firms with a 
minimum of fifty daily returns in each of the pre-announcement and post-completion periods were 
included. The p-values for the differences in means are reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively based on the p-values. 
 
Panel A. Test Sample 
  
Estimated Variance 
(    ) Systematic risk ሺ        ሻ Idiosyncratic Risk ሺ    ሻ 
 
Pre 4.089 0.500 3.583 
 
(100%) (12.37%) (87.63%) 
 
Post 3.948 0.600 3.388 
 
(100%) (14.17%) (85.83%) 
 Δ in means 0.141 -0.054 0.195 
p-value 0.783 0.540 0.693 
 
Panel B. Control sample (Industry-Size) 
  
Estimated Variance 
(    ) Systematic risk ሺ        ሻ Idiosyncratic Risk ሺ    ሻ 
 
Pre 6.458 0.400 6.036 
 
(100%) (6.54%) (93.46%) 
 
Post 6.994 0.500 6.464 
 
(100%) (7.58%) (92.42%) 
 Δ in means -0.536 -0.108 -0.428 
p-value 0.732 0.331 0.773 
Panel C. Control sample (Industry-MKBK) 
  
Estimated Variance 
(    ) Systematic risk ሺ        ሻ Idiosyncratic Risk ሺ    ሻ 
 
Pre 10.174 0.200 10.020 
 
(100%) (1.51%) (98.49%) 
 
Post 9.423 0.200 9.204 
 
(100%) (2.32%) (97.68%) 
 Δ in means 0.750 -0.065 0.815 
p-value 0.222 0.678 0.702 
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Table 4.8 reports the results on the effect that an open market share repurchase 
announcement can have on a firm’s risk. The results show that there is no statistically 
significant change on the average total risk, or on the systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk. Hence, these results confirm the previous findings that the announcement itself 
does not convey risk related information to the market.  
Panel A of Table 4.9 reports the results for the risk decomposition for the four 
time periods surrounding share repurchases. Panels B and C report the risk 
decomposition for the four time periods surrounding share repurchases for the two 
control samples. Panel D reports the respective differences in total risk between each 
time period of the estimation. The results show, that repurchasing firms’ total risk 
during the days where the actual trades are taking place is significantly lower, 
compared to the total risk for the time period prior to the repurchase announcement as 
well as compared to the period after the completion of the repurchase programme. In 
addition, I find that the repurchasing firms’ total risk for the period after the 
repurchase programme completion is significantly higher compared to the period 
prior to the announcement and the period during the repurchase programme 
implementation. I repeat the estimations for the two control samples, and I find no 
significant differences in average risk for any of the four time periods surrounding 
share repurchases.  
In sum, I find that the open market share repurchase announcements do not 
convey information to the market that can affect a firm’s risk. However, I find that 
the actual share repurchase trades and their respective reporting do provide risk 
related information to the market. Moreover, repurchasing firms experience a 
significant decline in total risk as well as in systematic and idiosyncratic risk during 
the days when the actual repurchase trades take place. In addition, I find evidence that 
repurchasing firms’ risk increases significantly after the completion of the repurchase 
programme.  
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Table 4.9 Risk Decomposition surrounding the actual share repurchases 
This table reports the components of a firm’s total risk and their respective shift in relative importance 
on the overall risk for 1997 to 2006. The test sample consists of 132 firms in the U.K. that have 
announced their intention to repurchase their shares. The industry-size and industry-mkbk control 
samples consist of 80 and 130 firms respectively. Panel A. reports the respective estimated average risk 
components for the test sample of firms, for the four periods surrounding share repurchases and the 
difference in means between the test and control samples. Panels B, and C, report the average values of 
the total risk components. Panel D, reports the respective differences in means for each risk 
component, between each pair of time periods under study, for the sample firms and control firms 
respectively. The risk components are derived based on the simple market model.      is a firm’s 
variance of returns (total risk).          is the market component of total risk.      is a firm’s 
idiosyncratic risk. All the variance terms have been multiplied by 104 for reporting purposes. The risk 
decomposition is estimated using the daily stock returns and equally weighted market returns for the 
periods of -255 to -2 days (pre-announcement), the period starting after the announcement of the 
programme (during clean), excluding the actual repurchase trades and ending at the day of the last 
repurchase of the programme, the daily returns on the days where the actual repurchase trades took 
place (actual trades period) and for +2 to +255 days (post-completion) relative to the day of the 
repurchase announcement. Only firms with a minimum of fifty daily returns in each of the pre-
announcement and post-completion periods were included. The p-values for the differences in means 
are reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively based 
on the p-values. 
 
Panel A. Test Sample 
Estimated Variance 
(    ) Systematic risk ሺ        ሻ Idiosyncratic Risk ሺ    ሻ 
Pre - announcement 3.359 0.471 2.888 
(100%) (14.02%) (85.98%) 
During clean  3.187 0.549 2.638 
(100%) (17.23%) (82.77%) 
Actual trades period 3.017 0.743 2.274 
(100%) (24.61%) (75.39%) 
Post – completion 4.587 0.787 3.800 
(100%) (17.16%) (82.84%) 
Anova F-test 0.001 0.074 0.003 
 
Panel B. Control sample (Industry-Size) 
Estimated Variance 
(    ) Systematic risk ሺ        ሻ Idiosyncratic Risk ሺ    ሻ 
Pre - announcement 5.579 0.462 5.116 
(100%) (8.28%) (91.72%) 
During clean  6.485 0.848 5.637 
(100%) (13.08%) (86.92%) 
Actual trades period 10.810 1.534 9.276 
(100%) (14.19%) (85.81%) 
Post – completion 6.536 0.693 5.843 
(100%) (10.60%) (89.40%) 
Anova F-test 0.124 0.000 0.247 
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Table 4.9 Continued. 
Panel C. Control sample (Industry-MKBK) 
Estimated Variance 
(    ) Systematic risk ሺ        ሻ Idiosyncratic Risk ሺ    ሻ 
Pre - announcement 8.020 0.095 7.924 
(100%) (1.19%) (98.81%) 
During clean  9.852 0.808 9.044 
(100%) (8.20%) (91.80%) 
Actual trades period 6.883 0.153 6.730 
(100%) (2.22%) (97.78%) 
Post – completion 7.713 0.351 7.362 
(100%) (4.55%) (95.45%) 
Anova F-test 0.898 0.462 0.940 
 
Panel D. Differences in Means of Total Risk (    ) 
Test Industry – Size Industry – MKBK 
Pre - announcement 1 1 1 
During clean  0.172 1 -0.906 1 -1.832 1 
(0.651) (0.523) (0.504) 
Actual trades period 0.342* 0.170 1 -5.232 -11.717 1 1.137 -8.715 1 
(0.081) (0.280) (0.199) (0.180) (0.799) (0.610) 
Post - completion -1.228** -1.400** -1.570*** -0.957 -0.051 -18.253 0.306 2.138 -16.428 
(0.026) (0.020) (0.002) (0.456) (0.970) (0.155) (0.861) (0.475) (0.867) 
 
 
 
 
These results confirm that firm risk significantly declines during the days where 
the actual trades take place. This suggests that the actual share repurchase trades are 
followed up by the market and are perceived as being good news. Hence, witnessing a 
decline in firm risk (Berk et al., 1999). Moreover, I argue that the findings on the 
decline in risk during the actual repurchase trades, and not on the open market share 
repurchase announcement, is in line with Grullon and Michaely (2004), who argue 
that the market is already aware of the decline in future investment opportunities. 
Hence, the actual repurchases are perceived to be good news for the reduction of the 
agency costs. Therefore, I find that risk changes during the actual share repurchase 
trades, and not on the open market share repurchase announcement, which is not a 
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commitment to the firm. Finally, the increase of repurchasing firms’ risk for the 
period after the completion of the repurchase programme, compared to the period 
during the repurchase programme, and especially compared to the period prior to the 
repurchase announcement, reflects the expected decline in future investment 
opportunities. 
4.5. Summary and Conclusions 
The goal of this chapter is to identify whether firms in the U.K. complete the 
announced open market share repurchase programmes and to what proportion, and 
the determinants that underlie the respective completion rates. In addition, this study 
aims to identify whether managers trade strategically (i.e. market timing or price 
support), and if there are any significant risk changes surrounding the entire cycle of 
open market share repurchases from the time of the announcement, to the 
programmes’ initiation and completion. For achieving this goal I identify 197 
announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market from 
corporations primarily listed in the United Kingdom, from 1st of January 1997 
through 31st of December 2006.   
I find that U.K. firms repurchase on average (median) 74% (54%) of the shares 
intended to repurchase at the time of the announcement, and it takes on average 
(median) 69 (21) days after the announcement for firms to initiate their repurchase 
programme. In addition, I find that 31% of the firms that have announced their 
intention to repurchase their shares, have not bought back any of their shares. 
Furthermore, I find that firms that increase their leverage, pay out dividends, and 
decrease their ownership concentration after the share repurchase announcement, and 
especially those firms that initiate the announced share repurchase programme as 
soon as possible after the announcement, have higher share repurchase completion 
rates. Concerning the managers’ potential strategic trading, the evidence show that 
the managerial incentive for undertaking the actual repurchases is price support rather 
than market timing. In addition, the announcement of intention to repurchase shares 
does not have a significant effect on firm risk.  Nevertheless, I find that the actual 
repurchase trades and their respective reporting do provide risk related information to 
the market. Moreover, repurchasing firms experience a significant decline in total 
risk, as well as in systematic and idiosyncratic risk, during the days when the actual 
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repurchase trades take place. Finally, I find evidence that repurchasing firms’ risk 
increases significantly after the completion of the repurchase programme which 
reflects the expected decline in future investment opportunities.  
The contribution of this chapter is the investigation of the U.K. firms’ 
completion rates of open market share repurchases, and the identification of the firm 
specific characteristics that influence the respective completion rates. In addition, it 
contributes by investigating if managers repurchase strategically (i.e. market timing 
or price support hypotheses), as well as analysing if open market share repurchases 
convey information that can affect firm risk, an area that has not been vigorously 
investigated. Finally, this chapter contributes by analysing if the market follows up on 
the actual daily repurchase trades, which will be reflected on the respective risk 
changes, and by providing a broad and clear picture on overall firm risk. This is 
accomplished by performing a risk decomposition surrounding the entire process of 
open market share repurchases, from the announcement of the repurchase programme 
and its initiation, to the short term period after its completion.  
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Chapter 5.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In recent years, share repurchases, and in particular open market share 
repurchases, have been gaining an increasing popularity as a payout method of excess 
cash to shareholders, apart from regular cash dividends. It is notable, that in the turn 
of the millennium, for the first time, the amount spent by corporations in the United 
States for repurchasing shares surpassed the respective amount spent on cash 
dividends. Even though this does not apply on the European markers, an increasing 
number of corporations in Continental Europe recently announced their intention to 
repurchase their shares in the open market. This is due to a number of regulatory 
restrictions in a number of European countries that rendered open market share 
repurchases either illegal or quite complicated to undertake. Due to the upcoming 
popularity of open market share repurchases, a number of theories have been 
developed by the literature in order to identify and establish why it is only recently 
that share repurchases are commonly employed and what are their effects, as well as 
the information content of such decisions. The most commonly accepted theories that 
have been developed in the literature to explain the decision to repurchase, are the 
agency costs of free-cash-flows, the signalling of undervaluation, capital 
restructuring, taxation, and dividend substitution hypotheses.  
The motivation of this thesis are the conflicting results derived from the 
investigation of the aforementioned hypotheses, the lack of international, and 
especially European data, and particularly the fact that the literature so far has been 
investigating share repurchases through single-market analyses, without performing a 
cross-country analysis, which can provide a direct comparison of the findings in the 
literature, and evaluate them through different regulatory, cultural, and institutional 
settings. Therefore, I have investigated the effects to the market of the announcement 
of intention to repurchase shares in the open market, and the management’s 
incentives for doing so, in a cross-country framework. In addition, I have analysed if 
managers in the United Kingdom time their decision to repurchase shares, and if they 
complete the intended repurchase programmes, as well as if the announcement and 
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the reporting of actual repurchase trades convey any information to the market that 
will impact the firms’ risk. 
For conducting this research, a comprehensive sample has been employed of 
970 hand-collected news announcements of corporations’ intention to repurchase 
their shares in the open market, of which 513 announcements took place in the United 
Kingdom, 263 in France and 194 in Germany. From the investigation of the 
managerial incentives for announcing an open market share repurchase program, it 
becomes evident that the same motives do not apply in every country. I find that in all 
three countries, firms that are large, and have low levels of ownership concentration 
are more likely to announce their intention to repurchase their shares in the open 
market. Further, I find only in the U.K. that firms’ low growth with high excess cash 
levels can have a significant impact on the likelihood of announcing an open market 
share repurchase programme. In addition, I find some evidence in France and 
Germany, that a firm’s potential undervaluation has a significant impact on the 
decision to announce a share repurchase. Finally, I find for all three countries that the 
dividend pay out has a positive relationship with the propensity to announce a share 
repurchase, hence supporting the hypothesis that share repurchases are viewed by 
managers as complements rather than substitutes to dividends. 
I find a positive abnormal market reaction to the announcement of open market 
share repurchases, which varies significantly among the three countries and is 
significantly lower than the average market reaction reported in U.S. research studies. 
Furthermore, I find a significantly higher market reaction on the initial repurchase 
announcement, compared to subsequent repurchase announcements made by the same 
firm, suggesting that subsequent announcements convey less information to the 
market. In addition, I find in all three countries that size and past share price 
performance have a significant impact on the market reaction. Moreover, it is only in 
the United Kingdom that firm leverage and regulatory as well as tax changes have a 
significant impact on the market reaction to share repurchase announcements.  
Finally, focusing on the actual open market share repurchase trades in the U.K., 
I find that approximately only 70% of the firms that have announced their intention to 
repurchase their shares have eventually initiated the repurchase programme. In 
addition, the evidence shows that on average firms repurchase approximately 74% of 
the shares targeted at the time of the announcement and for those firms that they do 
initiate the repurchase programme, it takes on average 69 days for them to do so. 
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Furthermore, I find that firms that increase their leverage, pay out dividends and 
decrease their ownership concentration after the share repurchase announcement, and 
especially those firms that initiate the announced repurchase programme the sooner 
after the announcement, are the ones who are more committed, and have higher 
completion rates. In addition, I find that the managerial incentive for carrying out the 
actual repurchase trades is to provide price support. Lastly, the evidence shows that it 
is the actual share repurchase trades, and their respective reporting, and not the 
repurchase announcements, that convey risk related information to the market. 
The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is as follows: I explore 
the existing gaps in the main contending hypotheses and investigate the impact of tax 
and regulatory changes on the market reaction to open market share repurchase 
announcements, as well as reflecting the level of homogeneity across the three main 
European markets. In addition, I provide an analysis of the signalling of 
undervaluation hypothesis. Moreover, this thesis contributes by examining and 
identifying what are the managerial incentives for publicly announcing an open 
market share repurchase. Furthermore, it contributes on the conflicting issue of share 
repurchases and the substitutability of dividends. This thesis also provides a thorough 
analysis of the actual repurchases trades and the completion rates of the announced 
repurchase programmes. What is more, this thesis delves into the question whether 
managers show timing ability for the actual share repurchase trades or do they 
repurchase for price support. In addition, it thoroughly examines the impact that the 
announcement, and even more so, the reporting of the actual share repurchase trades 
have on firms’ risk. Finally, this thesis documents that in varying markets the 
managerial motives for an open market share repurchase and the market’s reaction as 
well, diverge significantly. 
It should be noted though, that this thesis has not focused on a number of other 
important issues that have not yet been thoroughly investigated in the existing 
literature. One of these issues is the long-term share price performance, operating 
performance and profitability of those firms that have announced their intention to 
repurchase their shares in the open market. This can be taken one step further, and 
investigate if their respective performance varies significantly between firms that 
have completed or were near to completion of their respective repurchase 
programmes, and those that have not repurchased at all, or only a small number of 
shares compared to the shares targeted at the time of the announcement.  
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Another important issue, is the mapping of the specific ownership structure of 
repurchasing firms, such as the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors 
and other block-holders, and the effect that this may have on the likelihood to 
announce an open market share repurchase programme, and their respective 
completion. This would be a very interesting issue to investigate, due to the 
potentially conflicting interests, tax strategies, and benefits that each shareholding 
group may have. In addition, the potential of any changes occurring on the ownership 
type and structure prior to the firms’ announcement of intention to repurchase their 
shares could potentially have a significant impact on the market reaction due to the 
potential shift of the firms’ existing agency costs. 
Moreover, it is has not been clearly established if analysts revise their estimates 
after the announcement of a share repurchase, or if it is that firms make an open 
market share repurchase announcement, and actually repurchase their shares in order 
to meet the analysts’ recommendations. Furthermore, the investigation of the 
potential effects that the actual share repurchase trades may have on firms’ liquidity, 
which is a very interesting and relatively unexplored issue, falls outside the scope of 
this thesis. In addition, this thesis does not investigate the hostile take-over deterrence 
hypothesis nor the options funding hypothesis. However, firms that repurchase their 
shares in order to fend off a hostile takeover they are more likely to do this via fixed-
price tender offer or Dutch auctions share repurchases, which allows them to 
repurchase a large number of their shares in a short period of time at a pre-specified 
price range, thus making it a more efficient takeover deterrent mechanism contrary to 
open market share repurchases as previously argued in this thesis. Regarding the 
options funding hypothesis, the reason that it is not investigated in this thesis is that it 
has a greater impact on the actual share repurchase trades rather than on the 
announcement of intention to repurchase shares in the open market. Nevertheless, it 
could weigh on the decision to make an open market share repurchase announcement 
and therefore one should keep this in mind when interpreting the findings of this 
research.  
An additional limitation of this research is the fact that it does not consider any 
macroeconomic factors such as business cycles and market trends, which could add 
more explanatory power on the investigation of the motives for announcing the 
intention to repurchase shares in the open market but also for the execution of the 
actual share repurchase trades. However, the time period employed in this research is 
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not sufficient enough to allow the investigation of the impact of any cyclical 
macroeconomic effects since open market share repurchases in two of the three 
countries analysed in this research (i.e., France and Germany) were not allowed prior 
to 1997, thus restricting the time span of this research. 
When analysing the market reaction to the announcement of intention to 
repurchase shares in the open market, this research does not focus on the 
announcement specific information that each announcement carries, i.e. the amount 
or proportion of common shares to be repurchased at the time of the announcement. 
The reason for this is twofold. First, in Germany and France the overwhelming 
majority of the sample firms routinely announce the maximum proportion of shares 
allowed to be repurchased, therefore by including the announcement specific 
information it would not provide any meaningful results. Second, in the United 
Kingdom, a considerable portion of the sample firms announce only their intention to 
repurchase their shares in the open market without providing any details regarding the 
targeted amount of shares to be repurchased, which would considerably reduce the 
overall sample firms to be tested. Moreover, even though the majority of the 
announcements sampling is based on individual stand-alone announcements, it also 
includes announcements of intention to repurchase shares in the open market 
following firms’ annual or extraordinary general shareholder meetings (AGM/EGM) 
which could carry other types of information that could potential affect the market 
reaction on the day of the announcement. However, it should be clarified that the 
sample of announcements does not include any financial announcements, financial 
results, financial estimates etc., which would contaminate the findings on the market 
reaction to open market share repurchases and their respective interpretation. 
However, I acknowledge the fact that by not investigating the impact of the 
announcement specific information on the market reaction to open market share 
repurchase announcements, the findings and interpretation of this research should be 
treated with caution.  
Furthermore, this research focuses only on open market share repurchases 
without accounting for fixed-price tender offers or Dutch auction repurchases. This is 
due to the fact that the open market share repurchases have gained an increasing 
popularity in the U.S. and the U.K. as a payout method since the late 1980s, whereas 
it was in the late 1990s that share repurchase became popular in Continental Europe 
due to regulatory restrictions. Furthermore, open market share repurchases have 
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become popular due to the different characteristics between open market share and 
fixed price repurchases, as well as due to the greater flexibility, lack of commitment 
and virtually no cost bearing that the open market share repurchase mechanism offers. 
Thus, open market share repurchases have become a significant corporate event and 
payout method that deserves to be studied individually in its own right. Consequently, 
one of the drivers of this research is to have a comprehensive analysis of the market 
reaction as well as managerial incentives for open market share repurchases, since 
this method has different effects on the market as well as on managers’ motives 
compared to tender offers and Dutch auctions. 
When investigating the actual open market share repurchase trades and 
specifically the market timing versus the price support hypothesis in the United 
Kingdom, it must be noted that there exist a regulatory constrain that restricts firms 
from repurchasing their shares at a price that is higher than the five percent of the 
firm’s market price for the five business days prior to the repurchase trade. Therefore, 
this could potentially have impact the managers’ flexibility on timing their trades in 
order to provide price support or to exploit a potential market mispricing with a 
subsequent price increase. However, this should not have any significant impact in 
the case where managers would strive to time their trades and repurchase the shares at 
lower prices and therefore providing evidence in favour of the market timing 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, even though there is a regulatory constrain on the price paid 
for the repurchased shares, the evidence shows that managers do pay a relatively 
higher price in order to provide price support. When analysing the impact of the 
regulatory change that allowed firms to keep the repurchased shares as Treasury stock 
on the market reaction to open share repurchase announcements, it must be noted that 
even after the regulatory change, firms routinely kept cancelling at least a proportion 
of the repurchased shares. Therefore, even though Treasury stock is a flexible capital 
management tool that firms can make use of, the findings on the market reaction 
should be treated with caution.  
Finally, the fact that firms that have announced their intention to repurchase 
their shares in the open market and have actually implemented the announced 
repurchase programmes have low systematic risk (low  betas), is an issue that can be 
further investigated in order to identify what are the characteristics of the those firms 
that drive the low betas. This can be investigated even further by assessing whether 
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the low systematic risk is the cause or the driver for the actual repurchase trades or it 
is the outcome of their share repurchase intention and/or actual repurchase trades. 
In sum, it is acknowledged that this thesis has certain limitations and caveats 
which must be taken into consideration when interpreting the findings and results 
presented in this research. Furthermore, these limitations can constitute a fertile 
ground for further research that could strengthen the findings and outcomes of this 
thesis, as well as add to our knowledge regarding open market share repurchases and 
in general the payout policies that firms choose to employ. 
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7. Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Correlation analysis for the industry-matched samples 
This table reports the correlation matrices for each variable employed in the logit models for the industry matching method for the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France respectively. The p-values indicating statistically significant correlation for each pair of variables are reported in 
parentheses.  
Industry-Matched (United Kingdom) 
REP 
DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) RET 1YR MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.143 1 
(0.002) ----- 
DFCF 0.172 0.008 1 
(0.000) (0.866) ----- 
LVG 0.068 -0.019 -0.028 1 
(0.139) (0.671) (0.544) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.300 -0.117 -0.087 0.004 1 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.057) (0.922) ----- 
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.459 0.238 0.126 0.261 -0.545 1 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.013 0.011 0.021 -0.011 -0.066 0.041 1 
(0.775) (0.811) (0.649) (0.813) (0.148) (0.368) ----- 
MKBK -0.044 0.025 -0.005 -0.028 0.028 -0.045 -0.031 1 
(0.335) (0.585) (0.909) (0.533) (0.535) (0.322) (0.497) ----- 
D TAX -0.034 -0.039 -0.026 -0.007 0.057 -0.129 0.019 -0.092 1 
(0.461) (0.393) (0.570) (0.885) (0.211) (0.005) (0.671) (0.044) ----- 
DIV_ Y 0.112 0.231 0.005 0.021 -0.182 0.162 -0.009 -0.096 0.028 1 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.919) (0.649) (0.000) (0.000) (0.843) (0.035) (0.533) ----- 
DIV/NI -0.034 -0.024 0.016 -0.009 0.025 0.001 0.039 -0.045 0.033 0.001 1 
(0.455) (0.605) (0.725) (0.836) (0.578) (0.974) (0.390) (0.327) (0.468) (0.987) ----- 
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Appendix A. Continued 
Industry-Matched (Germany) 
REP 
DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) RET 1YR MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.050 1 
(0.486) ----- 
DFCF -0.002 -0.028 1 
(0.981) (0.696) ----- 
LVG -0.115 -0.050 0.277 1 
(0.112) (0.487) (0.000) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.317 -0.056 -0.065 -0.051 1 
(0.000) (0.443) (0.372) (0.478) ----- 
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.255 0.056 0.351 0.276 -0.226 1 
(0.000) (0.439) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.046 0.031 0.084 -0.019 0.094 0.139 1 
(0.529) (0.664) (0.246) (0.794) (0.195) (0.053) ----- 
MKBK 0.005 -0.073 -0.319 -0.071 -0.009 -0.078 -0.146 1 
(0.950) (0.315) (0.000) (0.325) (0.897) (0.278) (0.043) ----- 
D TAX 0.039 -0.009 0.143 0.027 0.085 0.273 0.069 -0.069 1 
(0.586) (0.904) (0.047) (0.706) (0.242) (0.000) (0.342) (0.339) ----- 
DIV_ Y -0.018 0.012 0.051 -0.045 0.209 0.126 0.024 0.039 0.158 1 
(0.804) (0.866) (0.479) (0.532) (0.004) (0.082) (0.736) (0.588) (0.028) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.106 0.009 0.056 0.028 -0.121 0.242 0.009 0.020 0.117 0.056 1 
(0.141) (0.899) (0.435) (0.697) (0.094) (0.001) (0.903) (0.782) (0.106) (0.441) ----- 
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Appendix A. Continued 
Industry-Matched (France) 
REP 
DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) RET 1YR MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.147 1 
(0.030) ----- 
DFCF 0.197 -0.034 1 
(0.004) (0.614) ----- 
LVG 0.006 -0.145 -0.018 1 
(0.926) (0.032) (0.794) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.377 0.140 -0.040 -0.115 1 
(0.000) (0.039) (0.562) (0.090) ----- 
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.477 0.018 0.246 0.226 -0.437 1 
(0.000) (0.790) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) ----- 
RET 1YR 0.058 -0.007 -0.034 0.102 -0.125 0.077 1 
(0.393) (0.914) (0.614) (0.133) (0.066) (0.260) ----- 
MKBK 0.118 0.276 -0.257 -0.061 0.002 -0.063 -0.045 1 
(0.083) (0.000) (0.000) (0.368) (0.980) (0.357) (0.513) ----- 
D TAX 0.052 -0.089 -0.023 0.099 -0.061 0.117 -0.035 0.003 1 
(0.442) (0.191) (0.738) (0.147) (0.371) (0.086) (0.609) (0.960) ----- 
DIV_ Y -0.016 0.011 0.032 -0.075 -0.037 0.065 0.098 -0.082 0.029 1 
(0.816) (0.874) (0.638) (0.268) (0.590) (0.342) (0.149) (0.229) (0.672) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.152 -0.012 -0.008 0.008 -0.153 0.251 0.001 0.037 -0.017 0.041 1 
(0.025) (0.858) (0.904) (0.901) (0.024) (0.000) (0.983) (0.591) (0.808) (0.545) ----- 
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Appendix B. Correlation analysis for the market-to-book-matched samples 
This table reports the correlation matrices for each variable employed in the logit models for the market-to-book matching method for the United 
Kingdom, Germany and France respectively. The p-values indicating statistically significant correlation for each pair of variables are reported in 
parentheses.  
Market-to-book-Matched (United Kingdom) 
REP DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) RET 1YR D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.175 1 
(0.000) ----- 
DFCF 0.042 -0.006 1 
(0.350) (0.891) ----- 
LVG 0.082 -0.002 0.031 1 
(0.065) (0.964) (0.486) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.325 -0.137 -0.050 -0.189 1 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.262) (0.000) ----- 
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.478 0.232 0.186 0.320 -0.529 1 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.004 -0.010 -0.029 0.019 -0.029 -0.020 1 
(0.933) (0.822) (0.520) (0.674) (0.510) (0.658) ----- 
D TAX -0.060 -0.103 0.041 -0.030 0.023 -0.070 0.009 1 
(0.175) (0.020) (0.359) (0.494) (0.608) (0.115) (0.835) ----- 
DIV_ Y -0.038 0.148 0.113 -0.040 -0.073 0.015 -0.044 0.159 1 
(0.397) (0.001) (0.011) (0.371) (0.101) (0.729) (0.317) (0.000) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.035 0.009 0.056 0.039 -0.033 0.064 0.006 -0.058 0.027 1 
(0.434) (0.844) (0.210) (0.382) (0.451) (0.148) (0.885) (0.194) (0.548) ----- 
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Appendix B. Continued 
Market-to-book-Matched (Germany) 
REP DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) RET 1YR D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.085 1 
(0.232) ----- 
DFCF -0.073 -0.039 1 
(0.305) (0.586) ----- 
LVG -0.171 -0.138 0.123 1 
(0.015) (0.051) (0.083) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.442 -0.084 0.003 -0.075 1 
(0.000) (0.235) (0.964) (0.293) ----- 
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.267 0.030 0.248 0.132 -0.333 1 
(0.000) (0.672) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.196 -0.120 -0.018 0.152 0.097 -0.063 1 
(0.005) (0.091) (0.799) (0.031) (0.171) (0.374) ----- 
D TAX -0.047 0.070 0.072 -0.051 0.069 0.142 0.079 1 
(0.510) (0.323) (0.307) (0.471) (0.334) (0.045) (0.265) ----- 
DIV_ Y -0.238 0.002 0.147 0.121 0.153 0.078 0.069 -0.006 1 
(0.001) (0.974) (0.038) (0.088) (0.030) (0.271) (0.330) (0.929) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.055 0.114 0.027 -0.134 0.020 -0.039 -0.103 0.009 0.152 1 
(0.439) (0.108) (0.707) (0.057) (0.777) (0.585) (0.145) (0.899) (0.032) ----- 
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Appendix B. Continued 
Market-to-book-Matched (France) 
REP DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) RET 1YR D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.060 1 
(0.324) ----- 
DFCF 0.057 -0.092 1 
(0.352) (0.131) ----- 
LVG 0.142 -0.152 0.094 1 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.122) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.342 0.068 -0.028 -0.174 1 
(0.000) (0.262) (0.644) (0.004) ----- 
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.391 -0.011 0.313 0.315 -0.432 1 
(0.000) (0.858) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ----- 
RET 1YR 0.021 -0.159 0.143 0.097 0.101 0.003 1 
(0.733) (0.009) (0.019) (0.111) (0.097) (0.956) ----- 
D TAX 0.018 0.087 -0.034 0.039 -0.115 0.112 -0.019 1 
(0.764) (0.155) (0.575) (0.526) (0.059) (0.065) (0.754) ----- 
DIV_ Y 0.006 0.004 0.144 0.008 0.084 0.064 0.045 -0.161 1 
(0.917) (0.946) (0.018) (0.893) (0.170) (0.293) (0.458) (0.008) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.164 0.045 0.056 0.034 -0.095 0.138 0.037 0.055 -0.035 1 
(0.007) (0.464) (0.362) (0.581) (0.119) (0.023) (0.543) (0.368) (0.565) ----- 
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Appendix C. Correlation analysis for the size-matched samples 
This table reports the correlation matrices for each variable employed in the logit models for the size matching method for the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France respectively. The p-values indicating statistically significant correlation for each pair of variables are reported in 
parentheses.  
Size-Matched (United Kingdom)  
REP DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON RET 1YR MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF 0.052 1 
(0.243) ----- 
DFCF 0.032 -0.046 1 
(0.474) (0.297) ----- 
LVG -0.024 0.020 0.074 1 
(0.584) (0.653) (0.097) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.106 -0.058 -0.099 -0.116 1 
(0.016) (0.187) (0.025) (0.009) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.040 -0.106 0.069 0.034 -0.037 1 
(0.365) (0.016) (0.118) (0.441) (0.406) ----- 
MKBK 0.013 -0.067 -0.015 0.068 -0.020 -0.065 1 
(0.776) (0.132) (0.732) (0.127) (0.654) (0.144) ----- 
D TAX -0.027 -0.084 0.020 0.012 -0.083 0.092 0.022 1 
(0.541) (0.057) (0.653) (0.792) (0.061) (0.037) (0.617) ----- 
DIV_ Y 0.048 0.181 0.250 0.024 -0.137 -0.043 -0.049 0.122 1 
(0.281) (0.000) (0.000) (0.591) (0.002) (0.336) (0.269) (0.006) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.034 0.043 -0.005 0.013 -0.081 -0.007 0.004 -0.058 0.020 1 
(0.445) (0.332) (0.902) (0.767) (0.068) (0.873) (0.934) (0.192) (0.644) ----- 
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Appendix C. Continued 
Size-Matched (Germany) 
REP DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON RET 1YR MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF -0.010 1 
(0.887) ----- 
DFCF 0.039 -0.017 1 
(0.571) (0.801) ----- 
LVG -0.095 -0.134 0.116 1 
(0.169) (0.052) (0.092) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.498 -0.051 -0.098 -0.092 1 
(0.000) (0.464) (0.158) (0.183) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.094 -0.161 0.066 0.006 0.097 1 
(0.173) (0.020) (0.338) (0.927) (0.162) ----- 
MKBK 0.135 0.152 -0.249 -0.111 -0.067 0.014 1 
(0.051) (0.027) (0.000) (0.109) (0.334) (0.836) ----- 
D TAX -0.026 0.022 0.183 -0.006 -0.012 0.086 0.016 1 
(0.710) (0.752) (0.008) (0.928) (0.859) (0.216) (0.816) ----- 
DIV_ Y -0.200 0.210 0.242 -0.016 0.152 0.063 -0.154 0.070 1 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.821) (0.027) (0.365) (0.026) (0.309) ----- 
DIV/NI -0.123 0.053 0.078 0.077 0.145 -0.041 -0.001 -0.050 0.230 1 
(0.074) (0.445) (0.261) (0.265) (0.036) (0.559) (0.990) (0.475) (0.001) ----- 
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Appendix C. Continued 
Size-Matched (France) 
REP DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON RET 1YR MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
----- 
CF -0.038 1 
(0.558) ----- 
DFCF -0.003 -0.116 1 
(0.957) (0.072) ----- 
LVG 0.004 -0.205 0.094 1 
(0.953) (0.001) (0.148) ----- 
OWN_CON -0.321 0.010 0.109 -0.132 1 
(0.000) (0.876) (0.092) (0.042) ----- 
RET 1YR -0.019 -0.122 0.155 0.079 0.115 1 
(0.768) (0.059) (0.016) (0.224) (0.075) ----- 
MKBK 0.040 0.036 -0.271 -0.047 -0.082 -0.188 1 
(0.538) (0.575) (0.000) (0.470) (0.206) (0.003) ----- 
D TAX -0.013 0.041 -0.057 0.041 -0.036 -0.061 -0.058 1 
(0.842) (0.532) (0.377) (0.526) (0.579) (0.344) (0.375) ----- 
DIV_ Y -0.058 0.224 0.063 -0.080 0.013 0.073 -0.225 0.042 1 
(0.368) (0.001) (0.331) (0.219) (0.841) (0.258) (0.000) (0.515) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.021 0.011 0.045 0.069 0.032 0.076 -0.071 -0.033 0.093 1 
(0.746) (0.870) (0.490) (0.289) (0.622) (0.238) (0.272) (0.616) (0.150) ----- 
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Appendix D. Correlation analysis for the non-matched samples 
This table reports the correlation matrices for each variable employed in the logit models for the non-matched samples for the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France respectively. The p-values indicating statistically significant correlation for each pair of variables are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
Non-Matched (United Kingdom) 
REP 
DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) MKBK D TAX 
DIV_ 
Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
-----  
CF 0.008 1 
(0.411) -----  
DFCF 0.059 0.023 1 
(0.000) (0.019) -----  
LVG -0.002 -0.441 -0.014 1 
(0.799) (0.000) (0.146) -----  
OWN_CON -0.125 -0.007 -0.127 0.005 1 
(0.000) (0.461) (0.000) (0.633) -----  
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.270 0.109 0.338 -0.104 -0.382 1 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -----  
MKBK -0.003 0.007 -0.013 -0.010 0.017 -0.031 1 
(0.755) (0.444) (0.193) (0.318) (0.077) (0.002) -----  
D TAX 0.015 -0.023 0.023 0.006 0.033 -0.029 -0.010 1 
(0.123) (0.018) (0.017) (0.504) (0.001) (0.003) (0.297) -----  
DIV_ Y 0.033 0.031 0.145 -0.023 -0.102 0.267 -0.015 -0.007 1 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.471) -----  
DIV/NI 0.016 0.002 0.016 -0.002 -0.018 0.012 -0.002 -0.004 0.039 1 
(0.108) (0.834) (0.089) (0.807) (0.060) (0.202) (0.876) (0.685) (0.000) -----  
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Appendix D. Continued 
Non-Matched (Germany) 
REP 
DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
-----  
CF -0.033 1 
(0.159) -----  
DFCF 0.053 0.005 1 
(0.023) (0.818) -----  
LVG -0.026 0.618 -0.021 1 
(0.270) (0.000) (0.355) -----  
OWN_CON -0.172 0.046 -0.166 -0.019 1 
(0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.416) -----  
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.273 -0.296 0.292 -0.216 -0.189 1 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -----  
MKBK -0.006 -0.003 -0.028 0.012 0.038 -0.058 1 
(0.786) (0.888) (0.227) (0.591) (0.101) (0.012) -----  
D TAX 0.066 0.000 -0.036 0.010 -0.084 0.037 -0.039 1 
(0.004) (0.997) (0.116) (0.655) (0.000) (0.109) (0.096) -----  
DIV_ Y -0.023 -0.020 0.003 -0.014 0.017 0.031 -0.023 0.038 1 
(0.325) (0.381) (0.904) (0.541) (0.453) (0.176) (0.314) (0.102) -----  
DIV/NI -0.006 0.008 -0.036 -0.003 0.034 -0.047 -0.004 0.024 -0.125 1 
(0.783) (0.725) (0.119) (0.890) (0.139) (0.041) (0.870) (0.290) (0.000) -----  
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Appendix D. Continued 
Non-Matched (France) 
REP 
DUMMY CF DFCF LVG OWN_CON SIZE (ASSETS) MKBK D TAX DIV_ Y DIV/NI 
REP DUMMY 1 
-----  
CF -0.018 1 
(0.446) -----  
DFCF 0.079 0.002 1 
(0.001) (0.921) -----  
LVG -0.017 0.827 0.026 1 
(0.447) (0.000) (0.265) -----  
OWN_CON -0.227 0.020 0.008 0.017 1 
(0.000) (0.379) (0.722) (0.461) -----  
SIZE (ASSETS) 0.290 -0.227 0.242 -0.226 -0.207 1 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) -----  
MKBK 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.027 0.002 1 
(0.745) (0.940) (0.897) (0.986) (0.234) (0.941) -----  
D TAX 0.071 -0.009 0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.061 -0.002 1 
(0.002) (0.704) (0.898) (0.844) (0.969) (0.008) (0.924) -----  
DIV_ Y -0.018 0.033 0.055 0.045 0.040 -0.043 0.001 -0.044 1 
(0.436) (0.151) (0.017) (0.049) (0.085) (0.060) (0.950) (0.056) -----  
DIV/NI 0.015 0.024 0.020 0.041 0.015 -0.023 0.009 -0.029 0.035 1 
(0.515) (0.291) (0.387) (0.078) (0.503) (0.307) (0.686) (0.205) (0.129) -----  
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Appendix E. Correlation analysis for the determinants of open market share repurchase completion rates 
This table reports the correlation matrices for each variable employed in the cross-section analysis for determining the impact of firm specific 
characteristics on the completion rates of the announced open market share repurchase programmes in the United Kingdom. The p-values 
indicating statistically significant correlation for each pair of variables are reported in parentheses.  
CR SIZE MKBK REP LVG ΔLVG DIV_Y ΔDIV DIV/NI 
CF 
EXP CF UN ER ΔER 
OWN 
CON 
(%) 
ΔOWN 
CON 
DAY
_DIF 
CR 1 
----- 
SIZE 0.275 1 
(0.006) ----- 
MKBK 0.148 0.106 1 
(0.148) (0.302) ----- 
REP 0.144 0.379 0.224 1 
(0.160) (0.000) (0.027) ----- 
LVG  0.292 0.155 0.101 -0.051 1 
(0.004) (0.129) (0.325) (0.617) ----- 
ΔLVG  0.017 0.007 0.046 -0.030 -0.269 1 
(0.870) (0.946) (0.653) (0.772) (0.008) ----- 
DIV_Y 0.304 -0.023 -0.206 -0.022 0.051 -0.148 1 
(0.003) (0.822) (0.043) (0.830) (0.620) (0.148) ----- 
ΔDIV -0.069 0.007 0.164 0.184 0.025 -0.059 -0.216 1 
(0.504) (0.943) (0.108) (0.071) (0.811) (0.565) (0.034) ----- 
DIV/NI 0.083 0.069 -0.037 0.128 0.037 -0.032 0.026 -0.030 1 
(0.417) (0.503) (0.722) (0.212) (0.719) (0.757) (0.799) (0.774) ----- 
CF EXP -0.030 -0.066 0.358 0.145 -0.132 0.118 -0.152 -0.035 -0.030 1 
(0.773) (0.521) (0.000) (0.156) (0.196) (0.252) (0.136) (0.732) (0.767) ----- 
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CF UN -0.076 0.079 -0.147 -0.137 -0.050 -0.035 -0.266 0.107 -0.021 -0.036 1 
(0.458) (0.443) (0.151) (0.180) (0.629) (0.736) (0.008) (0.297) (0.835) (0.725) ----- 
ER -0.123 -0.197 -0.145 -0.023 -0.104 -0.081 0.132 -0.055 -0.055 0.087 0.234 1 
(0.232) (0.053) (0.157) (0.822) (0.312) (0.432) (0.197) (0.593) (0.595) (0.395) (0.021) ----- 
ΔER  -0.008 0.023 -0.004 0.030 -0.017 -0.070 -0.006 -0.006 -0.031 -0.166 0.170 0.012 1 
(0.940) (0.819) (0.970) (0.767) (0.868) (0.498) (0.957) (0.954) (0.767) (0.104) (0.095) (0.910) ----- 
OWN CON 
(%) -0.052 -0.354 -0.102 -0.171 0.015 -0.060 -0.085 0.015 0.006 -0.037 0.071 0.104 -0.105 1 
(0.613) (0.000) (0.319) (0.095) (0.888) (0.558) (0.407) (0.883) (0.955) (0.716) (0.491) (0.310) (0.305) ----- 
ΔOWN CON -0.107 -0.010 0.006 0.034 -0.010 -0.121 0.115 -0.061 -0.009 -0.255 -0.003 0.026 0.342 -0.179 1 
(0.297) (0.925) (0.957) (0.740) (0.926) (0.238) (0.262) (0.553) (0.933) (0.012) (0.973) (0.799) (0.001) (0.080) ----- 
DAY_DIF -0.216 0.025 -0.125 -0.131 0.112 -0.062 -0.009 0.003 0.002 -0.139 0.045 0.036 0.082 -0.036 0.033 1 
(0.034) (0.805) (0.221) (0.200) (0.273) (0.546) (0.928) (0.978) (0.981) (0.174) (0.662) (0.729) (0.423) (0.726) (0.749) ----- 
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